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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review
pursuant to, Utah Code Ann- §§ 78-2-2-(3)(e)(ii) and 63-46b-16
and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE I
A.

Issues; Whether Kennecott proved that the Tax

Commission's method of assessing Kennecott's property was the
same as Salt Lake County's method of assessing similar property.
B.

Standard of Review:

The Tax Commission finding1

that the assessment methods were the same will only be reversed
if Kennecott shows that the finding is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

First Nat'l Bank

v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (1990).
ISSUE II
A.

Issue; Whether the Tax Commission properly

refused to apply the 20% reduction found in § 59-2-304(1) under
the facts found by the Tax Commission.
B.

Standard of Review:

The Tax Commission ruling

will only be set aside if erroneous.

Savage Industries, Inc. v.

Utah State Tax Comm'nf 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).

A copy of the Tax Commission finding is attached as
Addendum A.

ISSUE III
A.

Issue: Whether Kennecott proved that Utah's

compliance with the 4R Act violates Kennecott's equal protection
rights because the classification created by the Act is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
B.

Standard of Review;

The Tax Commission's finding

that railroads and Kennecott are not similarly situated will only
be reversed if Kennecott shows that the finding is not supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

First Nat'l

Bank, supra.
ISSUE IV
A.

Issue; Whether the Tax Commission properly held

that Utah's compliance with the 4R Act did not violate
Kennecott's equal protection rights, under the facts found by the
Tax Commissions.
B.

Standard of Review:

The Tax Commission ruling

will only be set aside if erroneous.

-2-

Savage Industries, supra.

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
The pertinent constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
provisions are:
1.

United States Constitution 14th Amendment.

2.

United States Constitution Art. IV

3*

Utah Constitution Art. I § 24.

4.

Utah Constitution Art. XIII § 2.

5.

Utah Constitution Art. XIII § 3.

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1987).

8.

Utah Admin. Rule R884-24-7P.

Copies of these provisions are attached as Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
I*

KENNECOTT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT § 304 WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED.

In order to obtain relief under Amax Magnesium Corp.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990), Kennecott had
the burden of proving that the County and Tax Commission's
methods of assessing Kennecott's property were the same.

The Tax

Commission found that Kennecott had not satisfied this burden.
Conclusions of Law 5 15 (Rec. 36). This factual finding will not
be set aside unless Kennecott shows, after marshalling all the
evidence, that this finding is erroneous.
supra, 799 P.2d at 1165.
-3-

First Nat'l Bank,

Kennecott has not met its burden in this case. First,
it cannot show that the assessment methods are the same because
it

has not established what method County would have used.

Second, the evidence shows that the assessment methods used by
the County generally are not the same as the method used by the
Tax Commission to assess Kennecott's property.

For these

reasons, the Court should affirm the Tax Commission's refusal to
give Kennecott Amax relief.
II.

UTAH'S COMPLIANCE WITH OF THE 4R ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE KENNECOTT'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS

Kennecott has the burden of proving that Utah's
compliance with the 4R Act violated Kennecott's equal protection
rights.

Kennecott's burden is particularly difficult in this

case because of the strong presumption of constitutionality given
to tax laws.

The Tax Commission found that Kennecott was not

similar to railroad properties which receive 4R act protection
and that Kennecott had failed to show an equal protection
violation.

Conclusion of Law, f 18 (Rec. 18).

Kennecott has failed to establish that Utah's
compliance with the 4R Act violates the equal protection law.
The 4R Acts treatment of railroads is rationally related to the
legitimate governmental interest of protecting the financial
stability of railroads.

The Tax Commission's ruling should

therefore be affirmed.
-4-

ARGUMENT
I.

KENNECOTT HAS THE BURDEN OF AFFIRMATIVELY PROVING
THE TAX COMMISSION'S ACTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

It is axiomatic "that acts of the Legislature are
presumed constitutional, especially when dealing with economic
matters based on factual assumptions."

Rio Algom Corp. v. San

Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 190 (Utah 1984) (emphasis supplied).
The presumption of constitutionality applies with
particular force to tax statutes . . . .
No scheme of taxation . . . has yet been
devised which is free of all discriminatory
impact. In such a complex arena in which no
perfect alternatives exist, the Court does
well not to impose too rigorous a standard of
scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become
subjects of criticism . . . .
Id. at 191 guoting San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez. 411
U.S. 1 (1973).

Similarly, in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State,

779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) the Court held:
In the tax area, as in other areas of purely
economical regulation, we give broad
deference to the legislature when
scrutinizing the reasonableness of its
classifications and their relationship to
legitimate legislative purposes. . . .That
broad deference leads us to sustain a
classification if "facts can reasonably be
conceived which would justify the
distinctions or differences in state policy
[expressed by the challenged legislation] as
between different persons". . . .
The Court therefore sustains legislative tax enactments, unless
"[the] party attacking the constitutionality of a statute . . .
-5-

affirmatively

demonstrate[s] its unconstitutionality,"

Rio

Algom, supra, 681 P.2d at 191 (emphasis supplied).
On this appeal, Kennecott also faces the burden of
defeating adverse factual findings of the Tax Commission.

The

Court will only set aside such factual findings if they are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a
whole.

Kennecott, as the appellant, has the burden of

marshalling the evidence which supports these findings and then
persuading the Court that the findings are erroneous.

Kennecott

has not marshalled the evidence or shown how the evidence is
insufficient to support the Tax Commission's findings.

First

Nat'1 Bank, supra 799 P.2d at 1165.
II.

KENNECOTT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT § 304 WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED.
Kennecott has the burden of affirmatively proving § 304

unconstitutional. Rio Algom, supraf 681 P.2d at 191.

To satisfy

this burden, Kennecott must prove that the Tax Commission's
method of assessing Kennecott's property was the same as the
County's method of assessing similar property.

See generally

Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990).

-6-

Kennecott however has failed to satisfy its burden of proof and
the Tax Commission's ruling should be affirmed.2
Kennecott's evidence is insufficient for two reasons.
First, the record does not show how the County would have
assessed commercial property similar to Kennecott's.

Without

such evidence, Kennecott cannot prove that the County's method is
the same as the Tax Commission's method.

Second, although the

record does not show what method the County would have used, the
record does show that the various assessment methods generally
used by the County are different from those used by the Tax
Commission to assess Kennecott's property.

These differences, in

part, arise because of the legal restrictions on the Tax
Commission's assessment methods, restrictions which do not apply
to the County.

For these reasons, the Court should sustain the

Tax Commission's finding that Kennecott has failed to establish
that the Tax Commission's assessment methods and the County's
assessment methods are the same.
*2
Kennecott relies heavily on this Court's decision in
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Commission, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah
1990). There, the Court found that § 304 was unconstitutional,
as applied to Amax, because the parties had stipulated that the
Tax Commission's assessment methods and the County assessment
methods were the same. ^Ici- at 1260. Because of the parties'
stipulation, the Amax Court did not have to determine whether the
Tax Commission's finding of dissimilarity should be reversed or
whether the taxpayer had established that the assessment methods
were the same. These issues, which Amax did not address, are the
central issues in this appeal.
-7-

A.

Kennecott Has Not Established What Assessment Method
the County Would Use In This Case.
The record before the Tax Commission does not show

which appraisal method the County would have used to assess
commercial property similar to Kennecott's.

The Salt Lake County

Chief Appraiser, who testified at the hearing and by deposition,
did not identify what method or methods Salt Lake County would
have used to assess property such as Kennecott's.

Rather, he

merely identifies the various methodologies that the County
generally uses to assess commercial real estate and states that
the County has no primary method.
24; Tr. 110.

Butterfield Deposition, p. 20-

He was not asked nor did he testify whether or how

these methods would be applied to Kennecott's property.

Without

such proof of how the County would assess Kennecott, Kennecott
cannot prove that the County's method is the same as the Tax
Commission's and that § 304 has been unconstitutionally applied.
B.

The County's Methods of Assessing Commercial Property
Generally Are Significantly Different From the Tax
Commission's Method of Assessing Kennecott's Property.
Although the record does not reveal which method the

County would have used to assess property similar to Kennecott's,
it does refer to various methods used by the County to assess
commercial property generally.

A comparison of the County's

methods for assessing commercial property generally and the Tax
Commission's methods for assessing mines reveals substantial,
-8-

significant differences in nominally similar assessment methods.
These differences are, in part, due to statutes and regulations
which limit the Tax Commission's assessment methods but which do
not apply to the County.

Other differences are the result of

fundamentally different applications of nominally similar
assessment methods.

Whatever the source of the differences, the

record supports the Tax Commission's finding that Kennecott
failed to establish that the Tax Commission's and County's
methods were the same.
1.

Utah statutes and regulations restrict the Tax
Commission's assessment of mines.

The Utah Code sections and Tax Commission regulations
govern the methods used by the Tax Commission in assessing mines
such as Kennecott's.

Hearing Tr. p. 45. Under this law, the Tax

Commission assesses mines using what is called the "capitalized
net revenue method."
Rule R884-24-7P.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(2); Utah Admin.

As discussed more fully below, the Tax

Commission's regulations describe in detail the specific formula
for assessing property using this method.
The Utah Code provision governing the assessment of
mines further provides: "In no event may the fair market value of
the mining property be less than the fair market value of the
land, improvements, and tangible personal property upon or
appurtenant to the mining property."
-9-

This statute requires the

assessment of the individual items of property with the value
being the sum of the individual assessments,
called the "summation method.")

(This is sometimes

Thus, the Tax Commission values

mining property under the capitalized net revenue method and the
summation method but uses the higher of the two methods for
assessment purposes.

Hearing Tr. p. 35, 50-51.

These statutes and regulations only apply to the Tax
Commission, they do not apply to the County.

As a result, in

some cases, Utah law requires the Tax Commission to use an
assessment method different from the method that the County could
use in a similar situation.
2.

Hearing Tr. p. 45, 52, 55.

The Tax Commission's capitalized net revenue
method for assessing mines is different from the
County's income method.

The Tax Commission regulations contain a specific
formula for computing value under the capitalized net revenue
method. Utah Admin. Rule R884-24-7P; Hearing Tr. p. 59.

These

regulations do not apply to the County which is free to choose
other income methods for valuing property.

A comparison of the

Tax Commission's capitalized net revenue method and the County's
income method reveals substantial differences in methodology.
The Tax Commission valued Kennecott's property under
capitalized net revenue method following the formula found in the
Tax Commission's Rule.

Under this rule, the Tax Commission
-10-

values mines by determining the mine's net income for the prior
five years.

Net income equals gross income less expenses

including capital expenditures.

Unused capital expenditures can

be carried forward to reduce net income for future years. As a
result, large capital expenditures in a year can reduce or
eliminate net income for that year or subsequent years.

Hearing

Tr. p. 50-51.
Once the Commission computes net income for the prior
five years, it averages the five year net income and discounts
the average by an appropriate capitalization rate.

This method

assumes that the average net income for the prior five years will
not increase or decrease for the indefinite future.
p. 66.

Hearing Tr.

This method also assumes that the mine owner will not get

a return on his capital investment other than his cost of
capital.

Hearing Tr. p. 67.

In other words, he will recover

nothing for the risk of investment.

This discounted five year

income average was Kennecott's assessed value under the
capitalized net revenue approach.3

Hearing Tr. p. 32, 35, 77;

Eyre Deposition, p. 18-19.
The County would not apply the capitalized net revenue
method as defined by Tax Commission regulations.

Specifically,

This capitalized net revenue method is a "very
primitive discounted cash flow" method. Hearing Tr. p. 62.
-11-

the County would not use the rolling five year income average or
loss carry forward used by the state.

Hearing Tr. p. 99.

Thus,

to the extent that the County would use an income approach, it
would not use the method used by the Tax Commission.
3.

The Tax Commission's summation method is different
from the County's assessment methods•

Under the summation method, the Tax Commission
individually assesses Kennecott's real property, improvements and
tangible personal property.
these individual values.

The assessed value is the sum of

The Tax Commission's method of valuing

the real property component of the summation method is different
from the County's method.
On the surface, the Tax Commission's method of valuing
real property appears to be the same as the County's.
what may be called the sales or market method.

Both use

Using this

method, the Tax Commission and the County assessors determine
value by using the sales price of comparable properties.

Hearing

Tr. p. 30.
Although using nominally similar methods, the Tax
Commission and the County apply them in dramatically different
ways.

The Tax Commission uses as comparables commercial property

which does not have minerals.

As a result, the Tax Commission's

summation method does not give a value to minerals located under
-12-

Kennecott's property/

Hearing Tr. pp. 34-35, 40, 51, 67, 74.

The County, on the other hand, would value the minerals located
under Kennecott's property by using mining property as
comparables or by making adjustments to the non-mining
comparables to reflect the value of Kennecott's minerals.
Hearing Tr. p. 101-102.
Thus, the Tax Commission's and the County's summation
methods are different because the Tax Commission does not include
a value for minerals whereas the County does.5
III. UTAH'S COMPLIANCE WITH OF THE 4R ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE KENNECOTT'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
Kennecott claims that Utah's compliance with the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("4R
Act") violates it equal protection rights under the 14th
Amendment of United States Constitution6 and the uniform laws
A

The Tax Commission does not value minerals separately
under the summation method because the capitalized net revenue
approach indicated that those minerals had negligible economic
value.
5

In 1988, Kennecott had gross income of $600-800 million
from the sale of minerals mined from this property. Tr. p. 38,
40.
6

Arguably, the equal protection component of the 5th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution should govern the
constitutionality of a federal statute such as the 4R Act, since
the 14th Amendment only applies to the states. The Court,
however, need not address this issue since the equal protection
analysis under the 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment are the same.
Compare United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449
-13-

provision of the Utah Constitution.7

State in other words,

Kennecott claims an equal protection right to be treated the same
as railroads are treated under the 4R Act.

Kennecott however has

failed to prove that Utah's compliance with the 4R Act violates
Kennecott's equal protection rights or to prove what relief the
Court should grant ij, an equal protection violation has occurred.
A.

The 4R Act, the Union Pacific case, and Utah's
Treatment of Railroads.
The Congress enacted the Railroad Revitalization and

Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("4R Act") in an effort to restore
the financial stability of the railway systems of the United
States.

Union Pacific Railroad Company v. State Tax Commission

of Utah, 716 F.Supp. 543, 545 (D.Utah 1988).

In order to

accomplish this purpose, the 4R Act prohibits various types of
State taxes which discriminate against railroads.

Ogilvie v.

State Board of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1981).
(The Act's goal was "to eliminate the long - standing burden on
U.S. 166 (1980) (5th Amendment analysis) with Nordlinqer v. Hahn,
S.Ct. Bull. (CCH) B2831 (June 18, 1992) (Attached hereto as
Exhibit C) (14th Amendment analysis).
7

Under the Supremacy Clause, a federal enactment is
supreme over conflicting state statutes or constitutional
provisions. U.S. Const. Art. VI. Thus, Utah's compliance with
the 4 R Act cannot violate Utah Constitutional provisions, since
the federal enactment supersedes these state provisions.
However, since the Tax Commission's compliance with the 4R Act is
constitutional under both the federal and state constitutions,
the Court need not address this issue.
-14-

interstate commerce . . . from discriminating . . . taxation. . .
.")•

Specifically, the Act prohibits a State from
assess[ing] rail transportation property at a
value that has a higher ratio to the true
market value of the rail transportation
property than the ratio that the assessed
value of other commercial and industrial
property in the same assessment jurisdiction
has to the true market value of the other
commercial and industrial property.

49 U.S.C. § 11503(b)(1).8

Stated in hopefully simpler terms,

Congress made railroads a special classification of taxpayer and
required that the State assess railroads at the same ratio to
true market value as it assesses all other commercial or
industrial property in the State.

Under the Supremacy Clause of

the United States Constitution, this Act supersedes conflicting
State constitutional or statutory taxing provisions but leaves
unaffected State tax laws which do not impact railroads.

Federal

Express Corp. v. Tenn. State Board of Equalization, 717 S.W. 2d
873, 876 (Tenn. 1986). (Attached hereto as Exhibit D.)
The Act provides that railroads, injured by taxes
prohibited by the Act, may obtain relief in federal court.

In

such a case, the Court must determine whether the State assessed
the railroad property at a higher ratio to true market value than

8

The Act's other provisions create other types of
prohibited discrimination. These other provisions however are not
relevant to this appeal.
-15-

the State assessed all other commercial and industrial property
in the State,

If the State assesses the railroad at a higher

ratio, the court will order the railroad's assessment reduced to
make the railroad's ratio of assessed value to true market value
equal to the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all
other commercial and industrial property in the State.
This provision of the 4R Act was at issue in Union
Pacific v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, supra.

There, several Utah

railroads brought an action in federal court alleging that Utah's
treatment of railroads violated the 4R Act.

The railroads

claimed that the ratio of assessed value to fair market value for
commercial and industrial properties was less than the ratio
assessed value to fair market value for railroads.

In ruling for

the railroads, the Court compared the ratio for railroads and for
all other commercial property and found that the ratio for
railroads was higher.

It therefore ordered the assessed value of

the railroads' property reduced so that the railroads' ratio of
assessed value to true market value equaled the ratio for all
other commercial and industrial property.
The Union Pacific ruling only adjusted the railroads'
assessments for 1984 and 1985 tax years.

In subsequent tax

years, the Tax Commission has adjusted the railroads' assessment
pursuant to the formula followed by the court in the Union
-16-

Pacific case and mandated by the 4R Act.

Specifically, the Tax

Commission determines for each year the ratio of assessed value
to true market value for all commercial and industrial property
in Utah.

This computation includes both locally assessed and

centrally assessed property and includes Kennecott's property.
This ratio is then compared to the ratio for railroads' and the
railroads' assessments are adjusted to equalize railroads'
assessment ratio with the assessment ratio for all other
industrial and commercial property in Utah.

For the tax year in

question on this appeal, the 4R Act required an adjustment of 14%
to the railroads' assessed value.
B.

Eyre deposition p.29-34.

Kennecott Has Failed to Prove That Utah's Compliance
With the 4R Act Violates Kennecott's Equal Protection
Rights
Kennecott has not proven that Utah's compliance with

the 4R Act violates Kennecott's equal protection rights. To
prevail on its equal protection claim, Kennecott must establish
that the difference in treatment between the railroads and other
taxpayers including Kennecott is not reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.

Nordlinger v. Hahnf S.Ct. Bull.

(CCH) B2831, B2840-41 (June 18, 1992).

Blue Cross, supra, 779

P.2d at 637. Under this test, the Court must consider three
interrelated, but separate factors:

(1) the classifications

created; (2) the governmental purposes involved; (3) the
-17-

relationship between the classification and the governmental
interest.

Each of these is considered in turn below.
1.

The 4R Act makes railroads a special taxpayer
classification.

The 4R Act makes railroads a special classification of
taxpayer and restricts how states may tax them.

Since Kennecott

is not a railroad, it does not fall within the 4R Act's
protections.

To prevail on its equal protection claim, Kennecott

must prove that this classification and resulting difference in
treatment is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
interest.
2.

Congress' purpose in enacting the 4R Act is a
legitimate government purpose.

The 4R Act's purpose is to "restore the financial
stability of the railroad system of the United States."

Union

Pacific, supra, 716 F.Supp at 545. Kennecott does not contest
the legitimacy of this governmental purpose.9

Rather, it seeks

to incorporate the purpose of § 304 of the Utah Code into its
analysis of the constitutionality of the 4R Act of the United
States Code.

Kennecott Brief at p.37.

9

Section 304 of the Utah

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in analyzing the constitutionality of the Act under the
Commerce Clause has held: "[T]he legitimate end of Congress [in
enacting the Act] is to revitalize the nation's railroads to
improve the flow of interstate commerce." Arizona v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe, 656 F.2d 398, 407 (9th Cir. 1981).
-18-

Code however does not create the classification at issue here and
cannot provide the purpose for a classification it did not
create.

Since Congress by enacting the 4R Act created the

classification at issue here, the Congressional purpose is found
in that Act, not in some unrelated Utah statute.
It is important to recognize that neither the Utah
Legislature not the Tax Commission created the railroad
classification at issue here.

Rather, the 4R Act, as interpreted

by the United States District Court, required the Tax Commission
to treat railroads as a special classification.

As a result the

Tax Commission's treatment of railroads is to further a federal
governmental objective, not a Utah one.

The constitutionality

of the Tax Commission's actions must therefore be based upon
these federal objectives rather than Utah objectives.
3.

The 4R Act's classification of railroads is
reasonably related to the Congressional purpose of
furthering railroad financial stability.

The relationship between the 4R Act's treatment of
railroads and a legitimate governmental purpose cannot be
seriously challenged.
Without doubt the well-being of the nation's
railroads is essential to its economic
health. In passing section 11503 Congress
acted "to eliminate the long-standing burden
on interstate commerce resulting from
discriminatory State and local taxation of
common and contract carrier transportation
property."
-19-

Southern Railway v. State Board of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522,
528 (11th Cir. 1983).

Protecting railroads from discriminatory

taxes improves their financial health and thereby furthers the
legitimate governmental purposes.

C£. Atchison, Topeka, supra,

656 F.2d at 407 (Analyzing the constitutionality of the Act under
the Commerce Clause, the Court held:

"The means that Congress

has adopted, prohibiting state from assessing railroad property
at higher ratios than other commercial property, is 'plainly
adapted to that end [revitalizing railroads],' by having the
effect of diminishing the proportionate tax burden in railroads .
. . •").

The Act's classification is their constitutional.
A case factually similar to the instant case is Federal

Express v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, supra.

There the

Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state
tax law partially preempted by the 4R Act.

The Tennessee tax law

in question provided that the property of public utilities,
including railroads, be taxed at 55% of its value, and that
commercial and industrial property be assessed at 30% of its
value.

The 4R Act however required that railroads be assessed at

the same percentage as commercial property, notwithstanding
Tennessee's law classifying railroad as utilities.

Federal

Express, a utilities under Tennessee's scheme, but not a
railroad, challenged Tennessee's treatment of railroads under the
-20-

4R Act and claimed that Tennessee had violated the taxpayer's
equal protection rights by assessing the railroads as commercial
property.
The Tennessee Supreme Court summarily rejected this
challenge and held:
The legislature classified railroads as
public utilities and assessed them for ad
valorem tax purposes at 55% of the value of
their properties. However, the Congress of
the United States, by . . . [the 4R Act] . .
. preempted the state classification of
railroads and provided that they should be
taxed as industrial and commercial property
are taxed. The Act, having as its purpose
the revitalization of railroads, affected
only that business. Thus leaving in effect
the state classification of other businesses
as public utilities. The assessment of each
of the businesses classed as public utilities
is at the same ratio to value as the
assessment of Federal Express property;
consequently, we find no violation of . . .
the Tennessee Constitution or the Equal
Protection Clause of the Federal
Constitution.
Id. at 876.
Kennecott is in the same position as the taxpayer in
Federal Express.

The 4R Act has preempted Utah's tax law and

requires that railroads be treated in a manner different from
Kennecott and other centrally assessed taxpayers.

Although the

4R Act alters the treatment of railroads, it leaves unchanged
Utah's taxing scheme as it applies to other businesses.
Kennecott cannot complain of the treatment of railroads because
-21-

the 4R Act furthers a legitimate governmental purpose and
Kennecott cannot challenge the Commission's treatment of its own,
property because Kennecott is treated the same as other centrally
assessed property.

This Court should therefore find, as the

Tennessee Supreme Court did, that Utah's compliance with the 4R
Act does not violate the equal protection rights of the other
taxpayers.
Kennecott cites Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commissioner of Weber County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) to supports its
claim that Utah's compliance with the 4R Act violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

In Allegheny

Pittsburgh, the county assessor for one county in West Virginia
started assessing property at its acquisition value.

As a

result, more recently transferred property had dramatically
higher assessed values than other similarly situated property.
In analyzing the constitutionality of the assessor's
acts, the Supreme Court held that a state may properly create tax
classifications rationally related to
purposes.

legitimate governmental

Id. at 344. West Virginia, however, had not created

such a classification, but had required taxation at a uniform
rate based on market value. Id. at 345.

Instead of a formally

recognized governmental objective, a county assessor, apparently
acting on her own initiative, had simply adopted an "aberrational
-22-

enforcement policy" based on acquisition value and resulting in
wide disparities.

Id., at 345. The Supreme Court therefore

declared the assessor's practice unconstitutional because the
practice did not further any legitimate governmental interest.10
Allegheny Pittsburgh provides little guidelines here.
The classification created by the unilateral actions of a county
assessor are distinguishable from a classification created by
Congress' enactment of the 4R Act.11

More relevant to the

instant case is Nordlinger wherein the Court determined the
constitutionality Proposition 13, a formal legislative enactment.
Nordlinger is the United States Supreme Court's long
waited decision on the constitutionality of California's
Proposition 13 tax initiative.

Proposition 13, among other

things, adopts an "acquisition value" taxation system in which
property is assessed at its value when acquired by the taxpayer
rather than is assessed at its value when assessed.

This system

"created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons owning

10

The county asserted that the assessor's practice was
rationally related to the purpose of obtaining true value. Id.
at 344. It did not assert that any legitimate policy was
furthered by treating those who had purchased their property some
time ago less favorably than those who purchased more recently.
11

"Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts
precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the unequal
assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition
-value tax scheme." Id. at B2841.
-23-

similar pieces of property . . . . Indeed, in dollar terms, the
difference in tax burdens are staggering."

.Id. at B2835.

Because of this disparate treatment, a California taxpayer, who
had recently acquired her home, challenged Proposition 13 on
equal protection grounds.
The Court analyzed the taxpayer's equal protection
claim under the minimum scrutiny analysis applied to economic
legislation.12

It framed the constitutional issue as "whether

the difference in treatment between newer and older owners
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Id*

at

B2840.

Stated in other words, the issue was whether the equal protection
clause prohibited California from denying a new owner "the
benefits of the same assessment value that her neighbors — old
owners —

enjoy." JTd. at B2841.

Notwithstanding the staggering

differences in assessed values, the Court had "no difficulty" in
identifying at least two reasonable grounds for denying newer
owners the benefits of the lower assessed values given to older
owners.13

Id. at B2841.

12

The Court found that the taxpayer lacked standing to
raise the constitutional right of travel as a basis for more
stringent review of Proposition 13. id. at B2840.
13

The Court described the scope of its review of the
relationship between the classification and the governmental
purposes as follows:
-24-

The equal protection analysis found in Nordlinger and
Blue Cross compels a finding that Utah's compliance with the 4R
Act is constitutional.1A

Congress in enacting the 4R Act could

have reasonably believed that preventing ceratin types of
taxation of railroads would promote its legitimate governmental

[T]he Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so
long as there is a plausible reason for the
classification . . . the legislative facts,
on which the classification is apparently
based, rationally may be considered to be
true by the governmental decision maker. .
.and the relationship of the classification
to its goal is not so attenuated as to render
the distinction arbitrary or irrational . . .
. This standard is especially deferential in
the context of classification made by complex
tax laws. "[I]n structuring internal
taxation schemes 'the States have large
leeway in making classifications and drawing
lines which in their judgment produce
reasonable systems of taxation . . . ."
Id. at B2841 (emphasis supplied). The Utah Supreme Court applies
a similar standard in assessing the constitutionality of tax laws
under the equal protection component of the Utah Constitution.
Blue Cross, supra, 779 P.2d at 637.
1A

Kennecott cites Northern Natural Gas v. Board of
Equalization, 443 N.W.2d 249 (Neb. 1989) which held that
Nebraska's compliance with the 4R Act violated the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment. The Court's opinion,
relies on outdated United States Supreme Court decisions and does
not cite Allegheny Pittsburgh. More importantly, it does not
attempt to analyze whether the classifications under the 4R Act
further a legitimate governmental interest as required in
Allegheny Pittsburgh and reaffirmed in Nordlinger. Thus, the
decision is of little value in assessing the constitutionality of
the 4R Act under the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment.
-25-

purposes of fostering the financial stability of railroads.
is all the equal protection clause requires.

This

The fact that

Kennecott and other taxpayers thereby bear a larger tax burden
does not make the Act unconstitutional so long as the difference
in treatment is related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Since the 4R Act treatment of railroads furthers a legitimate
governmental purpose, Utah's compliance with the act does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
C.

Kennecott Has Not Proven What Relief Is
Appropriate to Remedy Any Equal Protection
Violation

Kennecott has not established what relief it would be
entitled to if the Court finds that Utah's compliance with the
Act violates it's rights equal protection rights.

The 4R Act

does not require that railroads obtain any specific reduction in
assessed value.

Instead, the 4R Act requires that a state not

assess railroads at a higher ratio to their fair market value
than it assesses all other industrial and commercial property in
the state.

The Tax Commission and the railroads compute this

ratio on a yearly basis and have determined that the percent
reduction for 1988 should be 14%. In computing this ratio, the
assessed value of Kennecott's property was included with
commercial property to determine the assessment ratio.
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The record does not reflect that Kennecott is entitled
to a 14% reduction even if it is assumed that it is entitled to
same treatment as railroads.

If Kennecott is to receive the same

treatment as railroads under the 4R Act, Kennecott is only
entitled not to be assessed at a higher ratio to fair market
value than other commercial and industrial property in the state.
The record, however, contains no evidence of what these ratios
would be or the extent to which Kennecott would be entitled to a
reduction to equalize its assessment with other commercial and
industrial property in the state.

For this reason, Kennecott has

failed to establish its entitlement to relief.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should affirm the Tax
Commission's ruling.
DATED this

J£fS>y of

August, 1992.
PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION

Petitioner,
v.
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

Appeal No. 88-1347

Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for

a

formal

Commissioner,
Joe

B.

hearing
served

Pacheco,

on May

10,

1990.

G.

Blaine

as the Presiding Officer.
Commissioner,

and

Davis,

In addition,

Joseph

G.

Linford,

Administrative Law Judge, heard the matter for and on behalf of
the Commission.

Present and representing the Petitioner were

Maxwell A. Miller and Kent W. Winterholler, Attorneys at law,
of Parsons, Behle and Latimer.

Present and representing the

Respondent was Lee A. Dever, Assistant Utah Attorney General.
Present

and

representing

Peters, Special
Styler

and

Salt

Lake

County

were

Bill

Thomas

Deputy County Attorney, of Kinghorn, Peters,

Probst,

and

Karl

Hendrickson,

Deputy

Salt

Lake

County Attorney.
The
Commission
Petitioner,
1988.

Property

Tax

Division

of

the

Utah

State

Tax

originally mailed its Notice of Assessment to the
Kennecott

Corporation

(Kennecott)

on

April

28,

The total assessed value as initially determined by the
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Appeal No.
Property

88-11
Tax

Division

for

all

of

the

Centrally

assessed

property of Kennecott located in Utah on January 1, 1988, was
$635,570,036.
Request

Kennecott timely appealed that assessment by a

for Agency Action filed

May 31, 1988, and

a

later

Revised Request for Ager.cy Action filed September 9, 1988.
Kennecott and the Property Tax Division entered into a
Stipulation on December 9, 1988 in which they stipulated that
the assessed value should
preliminary

assessment,

be

reduced

to

$617,771,020

but

they

agreed

that

valuation could be higher or

lower

following

the

either

as

a

final
further

negotiations or litigation.
The
proposed
County

affected

reduction
(the

counties

to

were

Kennecott's

county)

objected

and

given

notice

valuation,
filed

and

a

of

the

Salt

Lake

Petition

for

Commencement of Adjudicative Proceedings on January 10, 1989.
Salt Lake County also filed a Motion to Consolidate on January
20,

1989.

Kennecott

objected to the Motion and Petition on

February 6, 1989.
On
issued

an

March
Order

3,
of

1989, the
Approval

Tax Commission executed
in

which

they

approved

and
the

preliminary determination of value at the stipulated amount of
$617,771,020, but the Order of Approval specifically provided
that Mthe acceptance of the assessed value in no way limits any
other issues relating to the appeal, and such issues shall be
left to further resolution."
On

August

7,

1989,

Petitioner

Amended Request for Agency Action.
Kennecott

raised

the

issues

-2-

of

filed

Petitioner's

In that Amended Request,
economic

and

functional

00000025

obsolescence,

imputed

interest

on

construction

work

in

progress, and equalization or equal protection of the laws.
On February
Stipulation

with

14, 1990, the Petitioner entered

Salt

Lake

County

wherein

the

into a
parties

stipulated to issues relating to this case and other pending
cases

between

the

parties.

In that

stipulation,

Kennecott

agreed to "withdraw, and dismiss, with prejudice, its Amended
Request for Agency Action, as that request for agency action
relates to the Property Tax Division's failure to allow for
functional

obsolescence

in

its

valuation

of

Kennecott's

property, and as a result of the inclusion by the Property Tax
Division of imputed interest in the valuation by the Property
Tax Division of Kennecott's construction work in progress in
1988."

Kennecott

did

not

withdraw

the

equal

protection

issues.

In that stipulation, Salt Lake County agreed that it

would "not contest the valuation of Kennecott's property by the
Utah State Tax Commission, or by the Property Tax Division of
the

Utah

State

Tax

Commission

except

to

the

extent

that

Kennecott seeks a reduction on that valuation as a result of
the 4-R case, or related legal theories."
The hearing was held May 10, 1990.

At the hearing,

Kennecott took the positions that:
a.

The assessed values of its real property should be

reduced by 20% to extend to it "the same 20% reduction
that

county

assessed

commercial

and

industrial

property owners received" because of the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304; or
b.

The assessed values of all of Kennecott's property
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should be reduced by 14% to grant to them "the same
percentage reduction of 14% that
railroads

received

for

their

the state
taxable

assessed
property"

pursuant to the decision of the United States District
Court

in Union Pacific v, Utah State Tax Commi

.on,

716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988).
No testimony or evidence was presented at the hearing
to

indicate that

the value of Kennecott*s property was

any

amount other than the amount of $617,771,020 to which Kennecott
and the Property Tax Division stipulated.

Therefore, the only

issues before the Commission at the time of the hearing were
the two issues raised by Kennecott.
At the time of the hearing there were at
pending

motions

Commission.

which

had

not

been "ruled

upon

least two
by

the

Kennecott had filed a Motion to Strike, and Salt

Lake County had filed a Motion for Consolidation.
Subsequent

to

the

date

of

the formal

hearing, but

prior to the issuance of a final decision on this case, the
Utah

Supreme Court

issued

its decision

in the case of Amax

Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission,

796 P2d

1256 (Utah 1990) which held that Amax Magnesium was entitled to
the 20% discount in the valuation of its taxable property which
is extended to some county assessed property pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §59-2-304.
Court

That case was decided by the Utah Supreme

on July 18, 1990, and on July 20, 1990, the Petitioner

filed with the Tax Commission in this proceeding a copy of the
Amax decision with a Submission of Decision in a Related Case
in which they requested that the principles of the Amax case be

-4-
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applied to this case and that Kennecott's property assessment
be immediately reduced.
On

October

4,

1990,

Kennecott

filed

Petitioner's

Second Amended Request for Agency Action in which they raised
substantially

the

same

issues

as

in

their

first

Amended

Petition, but they added further elaboration on the 20% issue
because of the Amax decision.
Therefore, to clarify the current positions of each of
the parties and to review the issues that must be decided, the
Commission entered an order on October 28, 1991, requiring the
parties to submit memoranda indicating what effect, if any, the
Amax decision had on the present case.

Each of the parties

timely filed the requested memoranda.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, as well as post hearing memoranda

submitted

by the

parties, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is property tax.

2.

The period in question is the lien date January

3.

For

1, 1988.
the

lien

date

January

1,

1988,

the

Respondent, pursuant to stipulation and the Order of Approval
entered

by

the

Commission,

has

assessed

the

Petitioner's

taxable centrally assessed property, exclusive of any property
which

may

have

been

assessed

by

Salt

Lake

County,

at

$617,771,020.00, including all real property, improvements and
personal

property.

That

value

has

been

approved

by

the

-5-
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Commission, subject to any changes that might be made through
this proceeding.
4.
commercial

During the period

in question, locally assessed

and industrial real property

located in Salt Lake

County was assessed by the county using a combination of
comparable
income

ne

sales method, the cost appraisal method, and the

approach.

property was

The

then

value

so

determined

for

such

real

reduced 20% pursuant to the provisions of

Utah Code Ann. S59-2-304.

The 20% reduction does not apply to

personal property and was not applied to personal property by
the county.
5.
all

real

As of January 1, 1988, the fair market value of

and

personal

property

of

Union

Pacific

Railroad,

Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, and Southern Pacific Railroad
in Utah was valued

by a combination

of

the

cost: appraisal

method, the income approach, and the stock and debt approach.
The values determined by each of those

approaches were

then

correlated based upon the judgment of the appraiser, and the
final correlated value so determined by the appraiser was then
reduced by 14%, pursuant to a decision of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Utah entered December 29, 1988.

This

reduction was applied to the railroads' state assessed unitary
property which includes both real and personal property.
6.

The

correlation

process

is

not

a

precise

mathematical process, but depends strongly upon the judgment of
the appraiser.

Different appraisers can begin with the same

estimates of value based upon the three different approaches or
methods of valuation, and if they have different opinions of

-6-
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the relative importance of the different approaches to value,
then the final determination of value of each appraiser could
be

significantly

determinations

different.

Nevertheless,

of value may still

each

be a fair

of

and

those

reasonable

determination of the fair market value of the property.
7.

Although

the

methods

and/or

approaches

for

determining value for railroads assessed by the Property Tax
Division of the State Tax Commission
those

used

by

the

counties

in

are similar

determining

in name to

the

values

of

commercial and industrial properties, the actual methodology is
very

dissimilar.

railroads
whereas

For

example,

uses historical
the

cost

cost

method

the

from

for

cost
the

method

for

accounting

commercial

and

the

records,
industrial

properties uses estimated replacement cost as estimated by an
appraisal service such as Marshall and Swift.
cost method

Thus, while the

is not normally given substantial weight

in the

final valuation of a railroad, if replacement cost is used in a
railroad valuation, the total value under the cost method will
be much greater than it is if the historical cost is used from
the

accounting

utilization

of

records.
the

Similar

income

distinctions

approach,

the

exist

in

comparable

the
sales

approach, and the stock and debt approach which is utilized for
railroad
because

valuation
there

are

instead
very

of

few,

the
if

comparable
any,

sales

sales
of

method
railroad

properties to use as comparables.
8.

The value of Petitioner's state assessed property

was not reduced below its estimated fair market value for 1988.
-7-
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9.

Mining

Petitioner, are not
railroad

such

in

category

properties

properties.
law

properties,

they

the

or

same

most

as

those
of

commercial

owned

by

properties

and

as

industrial

They have different characteristics and under Utah
are

properties

assessed

in Utah

by

are

different

valued

methodologies.

using

only

one

Mining

method,

the

"capitalized net revenue method" as set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§59-2-201, which method is more fully set forth by the Rules of
the Tax Commission in Rule R884-24-7P.

Under Utah law, that

methodology is exclusive to the assessment of mines.
10.

Kennecott

was

valued

pursuant

to

the

same

methodology and on a uniform and equal basis with all other
mines in the State of Utah.
11.

Kennecott is not valued by the unit approach, and

does not operate as a unit across state lines.
12.

The assessment of Kennecott was not made by the

county assessor, but was made by the Property Tax Division of
the State Tax Commission.
13.
either
method,

the

The assessment of Kennecott was not made by using
comparable

but

was

14.

The

made

sales
by

method

using

or

the

cost

the capitalized

appraisal

net

revenue

method.
capitalized

net

revenue

method

fair market value without any consideration

to

calculates

transactional

costs, i.e., it assumes that the fair market value is available
to the owner without incurring transactional costs.
15.

The ratio of real property to personal property

for Petitioner

is

substantially

-8-

different

than

the ratio of

0000U031

real property to personal property for either the railroads or
for commercial and industrial properties assessed by the county.
16.

Petitioner

has

not

submitted

any

evidence

to

establish that its property is not assessed at its fair and
just value.

In fact, they have stipulated that it is assessed

at its fair market value.
17.

Petitioner

has

not

submitted

any

evidence

to

establish that the tax burden it will pay is disproportionate
to the amount of property it owns.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Utah State Constitution Article XIII, Section

2(1) provides as follows:
Section 2
(1)
All tangible property in the
state, not exempt under the l^ws of the
United States, or under this Constitution,
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate
in
proportion
to
its
value,
to
be
ascertained as provided by law.
2.

The

Utah

State

Constitution,

Article

XIII,

Section 3(1) provides as follows:
Section 3
(1) The Legislature shall provide by
law a uniform and equal rate of assessment
on all tangible property in the state,
according to its value in money, except as
otherwise provided in Section 2 of this
Article. The Legislature shall prescribe by
law such provisions as shall secure a just
valuation for taxation of such property, so
that every person and corporation shall pay
a tax in proportion to the value of his,
her, or its tangible
property, provided
that the Legislature may determine the
manner and extent of taxing livestock.
3.

Utah Code Ann S 59-2-201(1) provides in pertinent

part as follows:

U000U032
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By May 1 the following property shall be
assessed by the commission at 100% of fair
market value, as valued on January l, in
accordance with this chapter:
(a) All property which operates as a unit
across county lines, if the values must be
apportioned among mere than one county or
state; . . . .
(e) All mines and mining claims except In
cases as determined by the commission, where
the mining claims are used for other than
mining purposes, in which case the value of
mining claims used for other than mining
purposes shall be assessed by the assessor
of the county in which the mining claims are
located: and. . .
(f)
All machinery used in mining, all
property or surface improvements upon or
appurtenant to mines or mining claims. For
the purposes of assessment and taxation, all
processing plants, mills, reduction works,
and smelters which are primarily used by the
owner
of
a mine or mining claim for
processing, reducing, or smelting minerals
taken from a mine or mining claim shall be
considered appurtenant to that mine or
mining claim, regardless of actual location.
4*

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201(2) provides as follows:

The method for determining the fair market
value of productive mining property is the
capitalized net revenue method or any other
valuation method the commission believes, or
the
taxpayer
demonstrates
to
the
commission's satisfaction, to be reasonably
determinative of the fair market value of
the
mining
property.
The
rate
of
capitalization applicable to mines shall be
determined by the commission, consistent
with a fair rate of return expected by an
investor in light of that industry's current
market, financial, and economic conditions.
In no event may the fair market value of the
mining property be less than the fair market
value
of
the
land,
improvements,
and
tangible
personal
property
upon
or
appurtenant
to
the
mining
property.
(Emphasis added)
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Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304(1) provides as follows:

If the county assessor uses the comparable
sales or the cost appraisal method in
determining the fair market value of taxable
property
for
assessment
purposes,
the
assessor
is required to recognize that
various fees, services, closing costs, and
other expenses related to the transaction
lessen the actual
amount
that may be
received in the transaction.
The county
assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of the
value based on comparable sales or cost
appraisal of the property as its fair market
value.
6.

Utah

Code Ann. §59-2-304(2),

as of January

1,

1988, provided that the Commission would develop and implement
methods of appraisal which would not
fair

market

Subsection

value

the

(1) and

longer apply.

"intangible

that

include as part of the
values"

thereafter

as

Subsection

outlined

in

(1) would no

Instead, the methods developed by the Commission

were to then be fully implemented.
7.

Under

the above provisions

the Legislature has

been given the authority to provide a "uniform and equal rate
of assessment on all tangible property

in the state" and to

"secure a just valuation

of such property"

for taxation

in

order for every entity to pay taxes in proportion to the value
of that entity's property.

Pursuant to that authority granted

under the constitution, the Legislature has enacted §§59-2-201
and 59-2-304.
8.
when

fair

The
market

Legislature
value

has

made

is calculated

a determination
by

using

either

that
the

comparable sales method or the cost appraisal method there are
transaction

costs

determined

value.

which
The

have

been

included

Legislature

"ll"

has

as part
also

of the

made

the
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determination that when fair market value is calculated by any
other method, such as the capitalized net revenue method, there
are no transaction costs which have been included as part of
the

determined

between that

value.

There

legislatively

is

a

reasonable

determined

relationship

classification

and

the

purpose of §59-2-304(1), the purpose of which is to equalize
the tax burdens imposed upon the various properties.
9.

The

Legislature

found

no basis

for

intangible

values or transaction costs for centrally assessed properties
as

is

indicated

by

the

exclusion

of

centrally

assessed

properties from the provisions of §59-2-304, and also by the
express

provisions

of

§59-2-201.

The

Legislature

has

determined that centrally assessed properties, including mine
properties

such

as Petitioner's, are tor' be assessed

by the

Commission using methods other than the comparable sales method
or

the

property

cost

appraisal

valuation

method.

methods,

Those

including

centrally

the

assessed

capitalized

net

revenue method, have been determined to not include transaction
costs in the calculation of fair market value.

The Legislature

has, therefore, specifically excluded properties such as that
which

is

owned

by

the

Petitioner

from

the

operation

of

§59-2-304 because of the difference in methodology.
10.

The

20%

reduction

provided

by Utah

Code

Ann.

§59-2-304 applies only to real property valued by either the
comparable sales method or the cost appraisal method.

It does

not apply to personal property.
11.

The federal

"4-R" Act does not apply to mining

properties such as the property of Petitioner.
-12-
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12.

If the property of Petitioner had been valued by

the county pursuant to the capitalized net revenue method, the
values so determined would not have been reduced 20% because of
the provisions of Utah Code Ann, §59-2-304.
13.

Utah

Code

Ann.

§§59-2-1007

and

59-1-210(7)

provide that the Tax Commission may equalize an assessment with
other similarly assessed property, and ensure that assessments
are just, equal and their burden is distributed without favor
or discrimination.
14.
should

It is Petitioner's position that the Commission

equalize

property

the assessment of Petitioner's property with

which

is

similarly

assessed.

However,

the

Petitioner's property has not been deemed by the Legislature to
be similarly assessed with properties whi<5h do receive the 20%
or 14% reductions.

The subject property as a mine property is

centrally assessed under the above provisions and also under
section 4 of Article XIII of the Utah State Constitution and
the

relevant

therefore

statutes

in the

and

same

rules

category

of

the

as

other

Commission.

It

is

property which is

centrally assessed and all centrally assessed property is taxed
at 100% of fair market value.
15.

The Petitioner has not shown that the appraisal

methods used by the Petitioner
County were the same.

and those used by Salt Lake

Therefore, the decision

of the Utah

Supreme Court in Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax
Commission,

796 P.2d

1256

govern these proceedings.

(Utah

1990) does

not

control

or

In the present case, although the

methods used by the Respondent and the county may be referred

-is-
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to by the same names (i.e. income appr
market

approach) the techniques

jh, cost approach, and

and methodologies used within

each of those separate methods are quite different with respect
to the subject property.
16.

In the altt

ative,

Petitioner

asserts

that

should be accorded the 14% reduction allowed to railroads.

it
The

controlling case to this issue is Union Pacific vs. Utah State
Tax Commission, 716 F.Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988).

As a result of

that case, railroads under the federal

"4-R" Act have a 14%

reduction

their

in

the

assessed

values

subject property, however, is not

of

similar

reduction.

to
The

railroad
subject

properties
property

The

a railroad property and is

also not governed by the federal "4-RM Act.
not

property.

is

that

It is therefore,
receive

required

by

the

14%

law to be

assessed at 100% of its full market value.
17.
Alqom

The

Commission

finds

Corp. vs. San Juan County,

further that the case Rio
681 P.2d

184

(Utah

1984)

states the rationale and principles which are controlling in
this case.

The Rio Alqom Court found that a "certain degree of

de facto classification is unavoidable" and the Legislature has
a proper amount of discretion
uniformity

mandated

under

in meeting the requirements of

the Utah

Constitution.

The court

stated:
Under Article XIII, S3, the property taxes
paid on each property are required to be
uniform and in proportion to the value of
the property.
Although the objective is
easily
stated,
its
attainment
is more
difficult.
Because of the many different
kinds of property and the various factors
that affect their value, the determination
of what constitutes equal "in proportion to
the value of his, her, or its tangible
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property/' under Article XIII, §3/ cannot be
made by application of any single property
formula.
Of primary importance is the determination
of what valuation method should be utilized,
and that depends on the nature of the
properties
to
be
taxed.
Residential,
commercial,
transportation,
mining
and
public utilities, etc., must be treated
differently
because
of
the
economic
conditions
that
give
value
to
such
properties. Rio Algom at 188.
18.
Clause

Petitioner

of

the

United

Petitioner

to

which

accorded

are

claims

be

that

States

treated
the

the

Equal

Constitution

differently
20%

and

than

14%

Protection

does, not
those

allow

properties

reductions.

However,

Petitioner does not fall within the classifications of these
other

properties,

unlawfully

so

treated

within

its

clause

does

Petitioner

differently

classification.
not

mandate

has
than

not
otjaer

Therefore,
a

shown

the

reduction

that

it

is

mines

or

equal

protection

of

the

others

value

of

Petitioner's property.
19.
owned

The distinctions

by Petitioner

and other

between property
properties

such as that

in the state is a

reasonable one which has been made by the Legislature
exercise of its proper discretion
capricious.
by

the

The distinctions

Legislature

do

not

in the

and is neither arbitrary nor

and classifications
result

in

an

established

intentional

or

systematic overvaluation of the Petitioner's property from the
valuation of the property of other taxpayers within the same
class.

See

Allegheny

Pittsburgh

Coal

Company

vs.

Webster

County West Virginia, 109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989).
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20.

Valuations

of

different

types

of

properties

cannot be determined by the application of a single or uniform
formula.

The

value

of

a

mine

is

not

determined

by

the

application of the same formula or rneth- :>logy as is used to
determ ae the value of a home.

Likewi

neither a mine nor a

home can be determined by the application of the same formula
or methodology as is used to determine the value of a railroad.
21.

The

valuation

mathematical precision.

of

property

is

not

subject

to

Different appraisers can use the same

general methodology such as the income approach, but by making
slightly different

assumptions, such as capitalization

rate,

they may arrive at substantially diverse conclusions of fair
market value.

However, each of those determinations of value

may still be a fair and reasonable determination of the fair
market value of the property.
22.

"Market Value" is a term that cannot be applied

in an overly rigid fashion, and is not subject to mathematical
precision.

It cannot be determined to the nearest dollar.

It

is a term which is at best a reasonable approximation based
upon

the

best

evidence

available

experience of the person making

and

the

judgment

and

the determination of value.

While the term has a precise meaning, an appraisal

is not a

wholly fixed, precise, or exact number.
23.

The factual premise of the Legislature was that

properties valued by either the comparable sales method or the
cost

appraisal

method

had

elements

of

transaction

costs

included in those values, and that since those costs were not
included in values determined pursuant to other methods, those

~16~
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transaction costs should not be required to bear a portion of
the tax burdens.

It was the Legislature's way of equalizing

taxes as required by the constitution.
presented

at

the

hearing

that

There was no evidence

the premise

assumed

by

the

methods

of

the

Legislature was not correct.
24.

In

Amax,

supra, the

valuation

Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission were
identical
county.

in all

respects

to

the valuation methods of the

In this proceeding, the

property

of

Petitioner

is

valued using a different method than was used for residences or
railroads.
25.

The Utah Supreme Court in Amax, supra, did not

hold Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304(1), unconstitutional, but it held
that the 20% reduction required by the statue must be applied
to the property of AMAX because it had been valued by exactly
the

same methodology

used

by

the

county

in valuing county

assessed property.
26.

Based

on

the

above, the Commission

determines

that the relief sought by Petitioner cannot be granted.

The

assessment of Petitioner's property at 100% of its fair market
value pursuant to the capitalized net revenue method is proper,
fair, reasonable, and required by the constitution and laws of
the state of Utah, and does not contravene any provision of
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federal law or violate any provisions or requirements of the
United States Constitution.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order
of the Utah State Tax Commission that:
1.
and

the

denied.

The Motion to Consolidate filed by the County,

Motion

to

Strike

filed

by

Petitioner

are

hereby

Any other pending motions are also denied.
2.

Petitioner's

The

request

property

is

for

a

hereby

reduction
denied,

in the
and

the

value

of

value

of

Petitioner's property for the lien date of January 1, 1988, is
affirmed at $617,771,020.

DATED this

X

It is so ordered.

day of y?&A*

JLs * ^ 2 .

/

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

(UmiUMMi*
S. Blaine Willes*
Commissioner

B. Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(l),
63-46b-14(2)(a).
*Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner G. Blaine Davis
has
been
replaced
by
Commissioner
S.
Blaine
Willes.
Commissioner Willes has been duly advised of the £^^^fT?§£
circumstances regarding this case and is qualified
decision.
GBD/sj/9416w
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Kennecott Corporation - Utah Copper
c/o Kent Winterholler
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT
84147
Robert L. Yates
Salt Lake County Assessor
2001 South State #N2323
Salt Lake City, UT
84190
Mike
Salt
2001
Salt

Reed
Lake County Auditor
South State Street, #N2200
Lake City, UT -S4190

Karl
Salt
2001
Salt

Hendrickson
Lake County Attorney
South State Street, S3600
Lake City, UT
84108

Anne R. Dunyon
Tooele County Assessor
County Courthouse
Tooele,, UT
84074
Glenn W. Caldwell
Tooele County Auditor
County Courthouse
Tooele,, UT
84074
J. Mike Monson
Director, Property Tax
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Brent Eyre
Assistant Director
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
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L. Brent Gardner
Utah Association of Counties
55 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Bill Thomas Peters
Deputy County Attorney
9 Exchanc? Place ttlOOO
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Lee Dever
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84114
DATED this

3

day of

^ ^

n

^

m

1992,

Secretary^/
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ADDENDUM B

Art. I, $ 23

CONSTITUTION O F UTAH
COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S

00
I

U t a h I J I W H e v i e w . - T h e Condemnor's Liopening, widening, or otherwise altering high
ability for D a m a g e s Arising Through Institutway. 13 A L R 3 d 1149
ing, Litigating, or Abandoning E m i n e n t DoProperty for e x c h a n g e for other property remain Proceedings, 1967 U t a h L Rev 5 4 8
quired for public use, condemning. 2(1 A L R 3d
C o m m e n t , H i g h w a y Nome D a m a g e and
862
Utah E m i n e n t D o m a i n Law. 1972 Utah L. Rev
Restrictive covenant, e x i s t e n c e of, a s e l e 116
•Mttl in fixing price of property condemned, 2 2
City of O a k l a n d v Oakland Raiders DefinA L R 3 d 961
ing t h e P a r a m e t e r s of Limit lean Power. 1983
Eminent domain right to enter land for preU t a h L Rev 3 9 7 .
liminary survey or e x a m i n a t i o n , 2 9 A L R 3d
E m i n e n t Domain Compensation in Western
1104
S t a l e s A Critique of the Fair Market V a l u e
Entry upon or exploration of land before conModel. 1984 U t a h L Rev 4 2 9
demnation, 29 A L R 3d 1104
T h e Failure of Subdivision Control in t h e
Schools liability of public schools a n d instiWestern United S t a l e s A Blueprint for Local
tutions of higher learning for t a k i n g or d a m a g Covernmeiit Action. 1988 U t a h I. Rev 5 6 9
ing private property lor public use. 3 3 A L R 3d
J o u r n a l off E n e r g y U w a n d P o l i c y .
703
Commt'tit, T h e Only Way to Manage a Desert.
Seisure of property a s evidence in criminal
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control. 8
prosecution or investigation a s compensable
J Energy L & P o l y 9 5 <I987)
taking, 44 A L R 4th .166
H a r v a r d L a w R e v i e w . — Constitutionality
of Zoning. 37 Harv L Rev 8 3 4
Validity, construction, and application of
A m . *lur. 2 d . - 2 6 A m J u r 2d E m i n e n t
state relocation assistance laws. 4 9 A L R 4 t h
Domain W 7. 13 e l aeq
491
C.J.8.
29A C J S Eminent Domain $ 3
Inverse condemnation state court class acA I R . - Iluilding restrictions, UH property
tions. 4 9 A L R 4 t h 6 1 8
rights for taking of which compensation must
Court appointment of attorney to represent,
he made. 4 A L R 3d 1137
without compensation, indigent in civil action,
Restrictive covenant, right to enforcement
52 A I R 4lh 1063
t h e i e o f a s com|M*iisahle pro|»erty right, 4
Eminent domuiu industrial park or s i m i l a r
A L R 3 d 1137
development at* public u s e justifying condern
Deduction of benefits in d e t e r m i n i n g comnation of privste property. 6 2 A L It 4 l h 1183
pensation or d a m a g e s in proceeding involving
Key Numbers.
Eminent Domain «•* 3

Sec. 23. (Irrevocable franchises

forbidden.]

No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege or
immunity.
H i s t o r y : C o n s t . 1896.
N O T E S TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Alcoholic b e v e r a g e s
1'ioneer Memorial Building
Public purpose
Alcoholic* beverages.
Former Liquor Control Act held not unconstitutional a s violative of this section Utah
MfrH' A a s n v S t e w a r t . 8 2 Utah 198, 23 P 2d
229 (1933)
S t a t e legislature w a s acting within its power
in e n a c t i n g Conner Liquor Control Act. which
in effect revoked previously granted license authorizing the sale of light beer Riggins v DIH
t n i t Court. H9 Utah I8J. 51 P 2d 6 4 5 (19351

122

Pioneer Memorial Building.
Act pertaining to leasing of portion of state
capitol grounds to D a u g h t e r s of U t a h Pioneers
for erection and m a i n t e n a n c e of Pioneer Me
mortal Huilding, and a m e n d m e n t s thereto
m a k i n g appropriations theiefor, an well an a p
propria!ion of $150,(MM) for that building, did
not violate this aection T h o m a s v D a u g h t e r s
of Utah Pioneers. 114 U t a h 108, 197 P 2d 477
(1948). appeal dismissed for want of a properly
presented substantial federal question, 3 3 6
U S 9 3 0 . 6 9 S Cl 7J9. 9 3 L Ed 1090 (1949)
Public purpose.
Construction and operation of parking facil
ity by city agency an part of a s l u m clearance

DECLARATION O F RKJHTS
project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals, any benefit** were
strictly incidental to the public purpoae of ter-

Art I, § 24

initiation of urban blight Tribe v Salt l-ake
City C o r p . 5 4 0 P 2d 4 9 9 ( U t a h 1975)

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
A m . J u r . 2 d . — 3 6 A m J u r 2d Franchises
W 9 to 2 3

C.J.S.
37 C J S Franchises ft 2 6
Key N u m b e r s .
Franchises ** 11

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.)
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation
H i s t o r y : C o n s t 1896.
Cross- References. — Prohibition

vate or special l a w s . U t a h Const., Art. VI, Sec
26

pri-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general
Age of majority
Agent for service of process
Automobile licenae law
Construction with Art VI, 8 2 6
Contract carrier permit
Cosmetologists' licenae law
Criminal actions
— Investigations
Prosecution
Sentence
Criminal s e n t e n c e
Disparate lax a s a e s s m e n l s
Excess revenue refunds
(tuesl statutes
Inheritance Tax l^aw
Insurance p r e m i u m l a x exemption
Intoxicating liquor
Licenses
Massage parlor ordinance
Municipal e m p l o y m e n t prerequisites
Notice r e q u i r e m e n t s
Properly
- Responsibility for water service
Public employees' retirement s y s t e m
Public officers' bonds
Public officers' aalaries
Road poll tax
School activities
Search warrants
Sunday closing I s w s
Tax sales
Unfair Practices Act
In g e n e r a l .
All l a w s shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted
Stale v
Holtgreve. 5 8 U t a h 5 6 3 . 2 0 0 P 8 9 4 . 26 A L R
6 9 6 (1921)
Objects s n d purpoaes of law present touch
stone for d e t e r m i n i n g proper s n d improper

classification!* S t a t e v Mason. 9 4 U t a h 5 0 1 , 7 8
P 2d 9 2 0 . 117 A L R 3 3 0 (1938). S t a l e v J I ) &
R E Walker, Inc , 100 U l a h 5 2 3 . 116 P 2d 7 6 6
(1941)
One w h o a s s a i l s l e g i s l a t i v e classification a s
arbitrary h a s burden of proving it to he such
S t a l e v , I H & R E Walker, luc . KM) Utah
52 \. 116 P 2 d 7 6 6 ( 1 9 4 U
Classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in UH inclusion or exclusion features so
long a s I here is s o m e basis tor differentiation
lielwecn classes or subject mutters included, a s
computed to those excluded, provided difieren
hat ion hears l e a s o n a b l e relation to purposes of
act S t a t e v J It Ik R E Walker. Inc . 100 U t a h
5 2 3 . 116 P 2 d 7 6 6 «194l>
Hefore legislative e n a c t m e n t can be inter
fered with, court must tie able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally l i s extension to those which it
l e a v e s untouched S t a l e v J H & R E Walker.
I n c . 100 U l a h 5 2 3 . 116 P 2d 7 6 6 (1941)
Only where s o m e persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are. a s to the subject matter of the law, in no diflerentiahle c lass
from those included in its operation, is I he law
discriminatory in the s e n s e of !>eing arbitrary
and unconstitutional, a n d if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional S t a l e v J II & R E Walker.
I n c . 100 U l a h 5 2 3 . 116 P 2d 7 6 6 (1941)
Inability of legislature to m a k e perfect clas
sification does not render statute u n i o n s t i t u
tional S t a l e v .III & K E Walker. Inc . KM)
Utah 5 2 3 . 116 P 2d 7 6 6 ( I 9 4 U
In determining whether classification made
by legislature is unconstitutional, diacrimina
tlou is very eNsetice of t lassifiialion and is not
objectionable unless founded upon unreason
able distinctions (ironiund v Salt (.ake City,
113 Utah 2 8 4 . 194 P 2d 464 (1948)
An act is never unconstitutional liecause of

123

Art VIII. * 2

CI HMMII t m o r v </r
COLLATERAL

U t a h L a w R e v i e w . - An I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellale Court - Does U t a h Need O n e ' , 1979
U t a h l> Rev 107
A m . J u r . 2 d . — I6A A m .lur 2d Const itutional U w t>* 31)6 to 3 1 0
MI A m .lur 2d
Court* $ I el sen

»ir»n

RKrKRENCBS
C . J . 8 . — 16 ( M S
Constitutional I>«w
** 169 t« 214
A . L J t . - Judicial power to order discontinu• " < * of life s u s t a i n i n g treatment, 4 B A L H 4th

cancy in his office incurs, and the remaining
justices h a v e authority to call in or permit a
district judge to sit with t h e m in a particular
case which is argued before the vacancy is
filled by appointment of the governor and the
appointee qualifies S u c h d i s t r u t judge is at

least a judge de facto, and h e m a y participate
in the case and in t h e court's decision and the
rehearing therein e v e n after vacancy has been
filled by a p p o i n t m e n t In re Thompson's Es
tate. 72 U t a h 17. 2 6 9 P 103 (1928)

6 7

COLLATERAL

K e y N u m h e r * . - Constitutional l.aw «=* 67
to 7», Courts «=» I 4 7 ' 0 , 20tiO2 , ' i i. S t a t e s «=> 5 2

Sec. 2. ISupreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law
unconstitutional — Justice unable to participate.!
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall consist of at least
five justices The number of justices may he changed by statute, but no change
shall have the effect of removing a justice from office. A chief justice shall be
selected from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute
The chief justice may resign as chief justice without resigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme Court by rule may sit and render final judgment
either en banc or in divisions The court shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the Constitution of the United States, except
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the Supreme Court. If a
justice of the Supreme Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to participate
in a cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is
disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an
active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the
cause.
H i s t o r y : C o n s t . IMM; I* 194.1. H . . I R . 2;
1084 <2nd 8.S.I. H . . I H . I.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . - Election following ap
point m e n ! to judicial office, 4 2 0 I 7 7
Statutory provisions, $ 78 2 1 ct w<|

Am. J u r . 2d.
el seq
C . I S.
4fiti

REFERENCES

2 0 Am .lur 2d Courts t> 87

21 C I S

on testimonv
heard
by
predecessor,
22
A I. It td 9 2 2
UiKqunlifK HIIOII of pidge on ground of lieing
a witncHH in the c a s e . 2 2 A L K 3d 1198
Disqualification of j u d g e for bias against
counsel for l i t i g a n t . 2 3 A I, It 3d 1416
Disqualification of j u d g e b e c a u s e of his or
another s holding or o w n i n g stock in corpora
tion involved in l i t i g a t i o n . 2 5 A L R 3d 1331
Key N u m b e r s .
C o u r t s •=» 2 4 8

Courts <>«j 2«M. 4 M to

A.L.R.
Disqualification of |iidge for hav
ing decided diflerei.1 case against litigant, 21
A L K 3d 1369
Power of successor or substituted judge, in
civil case, to render decision or enter judgment

Sec. 3. (Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.l
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the
United States The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all
writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
or the complete determination of any cause
H i s t o r y : C o n s t . 1896; HM3, S . I . R . 2: 1984
( 2 n d S.8.), S . I . R . I.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . - Provisions similar to
those in t h i s section were formerly found in
Art VIII. Sec 4

Cross References.
Original and appel
late jurisdiction. « 7 8 2-2

NOTKS TO DKCISIONS

00
I

N O T K S T O DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
A N A I YSI8

"Disqualification" construed
Effect of s y l l a b u s of c a w
Tower* of district judge flitting in plnre of d e
censed justice
"Disqualification" construed.
The term "disqualified" «H used in t i n s aril
cle is used in its natural aiu\ o n b n u r v seiine.
• n d t h u s includes i l l n e s s or a physical disability or other condition incapacitating a member
of the court, and m a y e v e n include the death of
such member In re Thompson s Estate, 72
Utah 17. 2b9 I' 103 tl92Hi
Thin section n e g a t e s t h e idea that if n justice
is temporarily disqualified, there should he an
appointment by t h e governor T h e term "disqualified" used therein h a s been interpreted to
m e a n not only personal interest in t h e particular case on the part of a justice, or t h a t he w a s
counsel during the trial or prior proceedings, or

that he w a s otherwise disqualified to hear the
case Since statehood it has lieen the practice to
call in a district judge when a m e m b e r of the
Supreme Court la ill "or otherwise unnble to lie
present ot hearing of a c a u s e " Accordingly,
where justice enlera armed forces of nation as a
reserve officer, n district judge may I** called
in Critchlow v Monson, 102 U t a h .178. I Ml
I* 2d 794 <I*M2> Ear sequel to this case, s e e
S t a t e en rel .lugler v Crover. 102 U t a h 4f»9.
1.12 P 2 d 125 <I942>

Appellate jurisdiction
Certiorari
H a b e a s corpus
legislative enlargement
powers

abridgement

of

Appellate jurisdiction.
Appellate jur indiction connotes review of the
action of an inferior court Federal courts are
not inferior courts to the U t a h S u p r e m e Court
and supreme court's a n s w e r to certified questions in a <ase that originated in or is to lie
abjudicated in a federal court is not an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction within the m e a n i n g of
t h i s section Holden v N L Indus . Iiu . 6 2 9
P 2 d 4 2 8 <Utab 19811

Kfteet o f s y l l a b u s o f c a s e .
Where it is not clear from separate opinions
of the court exactly what the holding is, the
decision of the court should 1M* ascertainable by
reading the syllabus Shields v U t a h Light &
Traction Co . 9 9 U t a h 307, 10ft P 2d 347 (I94(M

Certiorari.

P o w e r s o f d i s t r i c t j u d g e s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of
deceased justice.
Under this section, when a justice dies, a va

Under this section
not a justice thereof,
writ of certiorari, and
power on a S u p r e m e
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or

the Supreme Court, and
is authorized to issue a
a s t a t u t e conferring such
Court justice must give

way to the C o n s t i t u t i o n Carter v West. 38
U t a h 3 8 1 . I l l p I 0 2 5 (19111
Where, due to u n t i m e l i n e s s . a criminal conviction w a s no longer subject to review by the
statutory remedy of appeal, and a habeas corp u s proceeding, whic b WHH properly liefore the
S u p r e m e Court on upiMitl. held that defendant
bud lieen deprived ot b i s const it utioii H l right to
an appeal, nod the a l l e g e d erior could not have
lieen torrefied on appeal and the defendant
had taken the i n i t i a t i v e to seek an apiical lie
foie the t i m e for apix-al bad passed. Supreme
Court exercised its discretion to issue the common law writ of certiorari to allow defendant a
direct review in t h e S u p r e m e Court of the al
h g e d errors in his lri.il l l o g g e s s v Morris. 635
P 2 d 3 9 ( U t a h 19811
Habeas corpus.
Matters which h a v e been or could have been
raised on appeal c a n n o t lie brought before the
court by h a b e a s corpus H a b e a s corpus is a
civil matter and the findings of the trial court
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REVENUE AND TAXAIION

Art

XIII, <> I

Art. XIII. § 2

r ( I N S T I T U T I O N OF UTAH
N I N E S TO l>E< ISIONS

does not prevent tin* shite Irom K O , " K m l o the
liquor hiiHinesH Ki^gniH v DiHlrut Court, H'l
Utah I H.I, 51 l>2d <»45 (19.15)

COLLATERAL RKr'HKKNCKS
U t u h l*aw R e v i e w .
Antitrust S y m p o
s i u m . I*M>9 Utah I. Itev 6 1 7
The U t a h AiititruHt Act of 1979 (Jetting into
the S t a t e Antitrust B u s i n e s s . 1980 U t a h L
Rev 7.1
J o u r n a l o f E n e r g y I . a w unci P o l i c y .
An
Ktououiic AnalyHiM ol Utility f o a l f o t n p a n y
Relationships, H J Energy I. & I'ol'y 11 (I9M7)
A L.K. - Divestiture aa a v a i l a b l e relief under I) 16 of Clayton Act <15 U S f S I 26) in ac
lion by private par Ilea. 77 A L R r e d 5 0 9

Standing of private party under <) M> of
Clayton Act I15 U S f S * 26) to Meek injunction
to prevent merger or acquisition allegedly pro
hihited under « 7 ol the Act (15 U S f S 0 IM».
7H A L R rod 159
A m . J u r . Sid.
54 Am .lur 2d Monopolies.
ReNtramtN of Trade, and Unfair Pilule I'rac
tices I 44J et aeq
C . J . S . — 5 8 C J S Monopolies « 27
Key Number*.
MonopolieH *-• 10

ARTICLE XIII
REVENUE AND TAXATION

W
I

Section
1 IFiacal year |
2 (Tangible property to be taxed
Value aa
tertained
Exemptions
Remittance or a b a t e m e n t of l a x e s
of poor — Intangible property
l e g i s l a t u r e to provide an
nual tax for Hlate I
3 (Assessment and t a x a t i o n of tangible prop
erty - Livestock — I .and used
for agricultural pur|M»aeH |
4 | M i n e s and c l a i m s to l»e asaesMed
IIHHIH
and multiple
What to be at*
seased aa tangible property |
5 | luteal authorities to levy local t a x e s S h a r i n g l a x and r e v e n u e s by
political subdivisions I
6 | A n n u a l s t a t e m e n t to lie published |
7 | Repealed I
8 |Officer not to m a k e profit out of public
moneyH |

Section
9 I State expenditure to lie kept within revenues |
10 |All property taxable where situated |
11 (Creation of S t a t e Tax C o m m i s s i o n —
Membership
Oovernor to a p
point
Terms
Duties
County Itoards
Duties |
12 (Stamp, income, occupation, license or
franchttto
lux prrmtHHible
~
hVfereme to United SlateH l a w s
in imposition of income t a x e s
Income or intangible property
taxes allocated to public school
system |
1.1 I Revenue from highway user and motor
fuel l a x e s to lie used for high
way purposes I
14 ITangible personal property tax e x e m p
lion |

Section 1. (Fiscal year.I
T h e fiscal year shall begin on t h e first day of J a n u a r y , unless changed by
the l e g i s l a t u r e
lliatory: Const. I8M.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . ~ l>aws 1980, S e n a t e
Joint Resolution No 6, proposed to amend Article XIII The promised a m e n d m e n t w a s sub
milted to the electors at the general election in

1980 and failed to pass because it did not re
ceive the necessary majority
Croas-References.
Fiscal year of Htale to
commence on first ol J u l y , <* tiJ I.I I

flond issue
City ordinance authorising tmnd itxtue for
improvement ol waterworks and specifying
that for purpose ol Hervutng IMIIUIH fiwul year
should continue s a m e a s t alendar year was not

invalid as attempting to lix list a I year other
than that provided by t h i s uectton Fjeldsted v
Ogden City H l U t a h 2 7 M 2H I* 2d 144(19.131,
Wadswotth v Santmjuin City, 8.1 U t a h .121, 28
I* 2d lt»l 119 t i l

COLLATERAL K E r E R E N C E S
CIS.
H4 ( M S Taxation t 357
Key N u m b e r s .
'taxation « - JIM

Sec. 2. ITangible property to be taxed — Value ascertained — Exemptions — Remittance or abatement of taxes of poor — Intangible property —
Legislature to provide annual tax for state.|
(I) All tangible property in the state, not exempt u n d e r t h e laws of t h e
United S t a t e s , or under this Constitution, shall he taxed a t a uniform and
equal r a t e in proportion to its value, to lie ascertained a s provided by law
C2) T h e following are property tax exemptions
(a) T h e property of the state, school districts, and public libraries,
(bl T h e property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all
other political subdivisions ol the state, except t h a t to t h e e x t e n t and in
t h e m a n n e r provided by the l e g i s l a t u r e t h e property of a county, city,
town, special district or other political subdivision ol t h e s t a t e located
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to
the ad valorem property tax,
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes,
(d) Places ol burial not held or used lor private or corporate !>enefit, and
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by s t a t u t e This
exemption shall be implemented over a period ol time as provided by
statute
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on J a n u a r y I, m , which is
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside
t h i s s t a t e within twelve months may be deemed by law to h a v e acquired no
s i t u s in U t a h for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law Irom such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or without the s t a t e
(4) Tangible personal property present in U t a h on J a n u a r y 1, m , held for
sale in t h e ordinary course ol business and which constitutes t h e inventory of
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may
be deemed for purposes of *n\ valorem property taxation to In* exempted
<5> Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land within the s t a t e owned by such individuals or
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxa
tion to the extent t h a t they shall be owned and used for such purposes
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for
generating and d e h v e u n g electrical powei, a poition ol which is used for
22«J
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f u r n i s h i n g power for p u m p i n g w a t e r for i r r i g a t i o n purpofles on lands in the
atate of U t a h , m a y be e x e m p t e d f r o m t a x a t i o n to the extent t h a t such property
ia uaed for auch purposes T h e s e exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the
users of w a t e r so pumped under such re#ulati<m.q as the l e g i s l a t u r e m a y
prescribe.
(7) T h e taxes of the poor m a y be r e m i t t e d or abated at such t i m e s and in
such m a n n e r as nn< , 1
' d by law.
(8) T h e Legislature i»« . ,
le by l a w for the exemption from t a x a t i o n of
not to exceed 4 5 % of t h e f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e of residential property as defined
Hy l a w ; and a l l household f u r n i s h i n g s , f u r n i t u r e , and equipment uned exclusively by the owner thereof a t his place of abode in m a i n t a i n i n g a home for
h i m s e l f and f a m i l y .
(9) Property owned by disabled persona w h o served in any w a r in the m i l i t a r y service of the U n i t e d S t a t e s or of t h e state of U t a h and by the u n m a r r i e d
widows a n d minor orphans o f such disabled persons or of persons who w h i l e
serving i n the m i l i t a r y service of t h e U n i t e d States or the state of U t a h w e r e
k i l l e d in action or died as a result of such service m a y be exempted as the
l e g i s l a t u r e m a y provide.
( 1 0 ) I n t a n g i b l e property m a y be exempted from t a x a t i o n as property or it
m a y be taxed as property i n such m a n n e r and to such extent as the Legislat u r e m a y provide, but i f t a x e d as property t h e income therefrom shall not also
be taxed Provided t h a t i f i n t a n g i b l e property is taxed as property t h e r a t e
thereof shall not exceed five m i l l s on each dollar of v a l u a t i o n .
< 11) T h e l e g i s l a t u r e shall provide by law for an a n n u a l tax sufficient, w i t h
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the
state for each fiscal year. For t h e purpose of paying the state debt, i f any t h e r e
lie, the l e g i s l a t u r e shall provide for l e v y i n g a tax a n n u a l l y , sufficient to pay
the a n n u a l interest a n d to pay t h e principal of such debt, w i t h i n t w e n t y years
from the f i n a l passage of the law c r e a t i n g the debt.
Hiatory: Const. IMM; U 1930 (Spec. deam.K
S..I R. 2; 1945. H J R. 3; 1967. H J R 7; IMI,
S J R. 6: 1963, 8.J.R. 5; 1967, 8. J R . I; 1962,
8 J R . 3; 1986, H J R . 18.
Compiler's Notes. — l.aws 1959, Senate
Joint Resolution No 5 proponed a constitutional amendment to be voted ot> h\ the elec
torn at the general election in » i •• The proposed amendment failed to paaa because it did
iMit receive I he necessary majority
The 1979 proposed amendments to thin section hy House Joint Resolutions Nos 23 snd 25
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Joint
Resolution No 6. Laws l<>8»
lawn 1986, Senate Joiel H* H lution No 4,
proposed to smend Subsection 12 • ) of this section The proposed amendment was submitted
to the electors st the general election in 1986
snd fsiled to pass because it did not receive the
necessary majority
Cross-References. — Armories exempt
from taxstion. ft 39 2-1
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, ( 2 1 4 1

County service ana
property exempt.
I 1 7 A 2 429
Disabled veteran's exemption, ftft 59 2-1104,
59 2 1105
Exemptions generally, ft 59 2 1101 et seq ,
Chapter 23 of Title 78
Indigent persons, abatement or deferral of
taxes. I * 59 2-1107 to 59 2 1109
Industrial facilities development property
exempt. I 11-17 10
Mine and mining claim improvements, machinery or structures not exempt. 9 59 5 64
Privilege tax on possession and use of taxexempt properties. ft 51 4-101
Property of higher education institutions exempt, f 53 fl 20 106
Property tax relief, ft 59-2 1201 et seq
Rate of assessment of property, ft 59-2 103
School property exempt from taxation,
i 53A 3 408
Tangible persons! property held for saie on
January I exempt, ft 59 2 1114

its area IH wholly matter of legislative discretion, and exercise of mil h discretion is not sub
ject of judicial investigation or revision
Kimball v <irantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P
I. 45 | , R A 628 »I899>
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In general
Banks
Boundaries of taxing districts
Charitable organization s property
Charitable purport?
Charitable use exemption
Government subsidies
Hospital under construction
- M a t e r i a l reciprocity test
- Operating expenses
Church property
City property
Cooperative corporation property
Corporations for irrigating land
County improvement district contingent lax
Disparity in state and county assessment
Excess revenue refunds
l*abor union property
Mining claims
Property of United States or its instrumental
ity
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per
sons
Roll hack of assessed volue
Scientific research institute
Sewer chmges again*! city school hoard prop
erly
S|>ecial assessments
State colleges
State property
Transfer of property to tax exempt corporation
True market value
Intentional discrimination
Utah State Retirement Fund property
Value determination by classification
Cited
In general.
State's power of taxation is not within appli
cation of. and is not limited by. Art I Sec 22.
providing that private property shall not lie
taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation Kiinhitli v (irantsville t it v. 19
Utah 3«>8, 57 P I . 45 L It A 628 H8«i«i|
Unless tax laws tonflitt will. Home constito
tional provision, either expiesnly or by implica
tion. courts have no authority to prevent their
execution Kimball v tJranlsville City. 19
Utah 368, 57 P I, 45 L i t A t>28 <I8«W>
Banks.
All noneaempt h»cal property of national
bunk located in aisle is wilhin stale s power
of taxation Commercial N a t l Hank v Cham
Iters. 21 Utah 324 61 P 560. 56 I. R A '116
< 19001, alTd 182 U S 556, 21 S CI Ho I 15 I.
Kd 1227 (19011
Boundaries of taxing districts
Fixing of Itoumlartes of taxing district and
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Charitable organization** property.
Housing lac ihty operated by nonprofit corporation WIIH not exempt from taxation as a charity where senior citizen resident** were paying
lor all the services thev received and rental of
apartments was deteimined not by need but by
what was recpured to pay mortgage and opera
tional expenses Friendship Manor Corp v
Tax Column. 26 Utah 2d 227. 487 P 2d 1272
H97li
If charitable organization does not use its
real property and building thereon exclusively
for charitable purposes such property is not exempt but that oigamzation is exempt from
federal taxation is not determinative, nonprofit
character of organization is essential hut not
determinative Friendship Manor Corp v Tax
C.m.mn, 26 Utah 2d 227. 487 P 2d 1272
H«»7I>
Where plaint iff" applied for exemption from
ad vuluMin taxation as a nonpiofit organ m i
lion with charitable purpose, and where plain
till earned on various chanlable activities
lM>lh in building and awav from premised for
which exemption was sought
exclusive use"
of lot with building thereon did not require all
chailiable activity take place in that building,
and lax Commission'* refusal of exemption
was reversed Benevolent & Protective Order
of ttlka No 85 v Tax Comm n. 536 P 2d 1214
(Utah I975I
Fraternal organization's lot. and the lodge
building thereon were not entitled to a tax exemption on the basis of charitable use where
the activities conducted in the lodge consisted
chieflv of drinking c .ticl playing, dancing and
other social rather tb.in fraternal, functions,
.incl the ordain/.it ion's expenditures on charila
hie ohieds amounted to only slightly more
than l"< ol totnl expenditures Maker v One
Piece of Improved Re.il Pioperty. 570 P 2d
102 1 ( U t a h 19/7)
It is the use to which the real property is put,
not the natuie of the owning organization,
which is determinative of whether or not the
proticrty is exempt as being used exclusively
for cb.inl.ible purposes Yorgason v County
ltd oi ripuili/.itmii. / I t P 2 d l»r»t (Utah 1986)
An .ip.iitment building h»r needy elderly and
handle .ip|s»<i families and individuals IH ex
empt from real propeitv lax where it is used
exclusively for charitable purposes Yorgason
v County Bd of Fcpialization. 714 P 2d 653
(Utah IM86I
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Scientific research institute.
Exemption IB the exception to t h e rule, and
properly owner h a s burden of demonstrating
rleiirlv and unequivi>cally that h e falls within
the exempt ion, scientific research institute
failed lo m« el I his hurdeu where evidence wan
that almost half of IIH efforts were expended for
the IIS Defen.se I h p a r t m e i i t , its effoits were
t m uniw n h e d hy individual e m p l o y m e n t tontratls, and it occasionally restricted disclosure
of its findni|{s at request of a non g o v e r n m e n tal i h e n t , all of which combined to indicate
that the institute w a s benefiting the publiconly incidentally and w a s therefore not s c h s r
liable institution Eyring Research Inst , Inc
v Tax C o l u m n , 6 9 8 F i d 1348 t U l a h 19791

pay taxes due University of U t a h v Salt Lake
County, 547 P 2d 207 ( U t a h I97bi
State property.
Where the stale holds title to land in its gov
ernmental capacity, the properly is exempt
from taxation under the constitutional man
d a l e Duchesne County v S t a t e Tax C o l u m n ,
MM Utah 3b5. NO p 2d 3.15 <l<M.ii
Under this section lands, title to which is
acquired by the s l a t e hy foreclosure of mort
g a g e or atnveyance
for the e x t i n g u i s h m e n t of a
debt for money loaned from the s t a t e school
fund, are exempt from t a x a t i o n T h i s is partly
due to the reason that the property is owned hy
the state in its governmental capacity, but according to some of the judges is due solely to
the fact that such lands come within the mean
ing of the term "property" in constitutional
provision Ihichesue County v S t a l e 'lax
Comm'n. 104 Utah 3I>5, 140 P 2d 3 3 5 (1943)

Sewer charges against city school h o a r d
property.
( ' l u n g e s by city levied a g a i n s t board of education for connections to city sewer s y s t e m and
services thereof were mere p a y m e n t s for services enjoyed hy t h e board and were not
"taxes" or "assessments" from which board of
education w a s e x e m p t and a resulting h e n
from delinquent p a y m e n t of such c h a r g e s w a s
not an exercise of the city t a x i n g power Murray City v Itoard of Educ . 16 U t a h 2d 115, 3 9 6
P 2 d H28 «I«H>4>

jj
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Special assessments.
Provision of this section that all property not
exempt under l a w s of U n i t e d S t a t e s or under
state Constitution shall he taxed refers lo general t a x e s and not to special a s s e s s m e n t s , and
hence does not invalidate a statutory provi
Sion, which provides that property held by
Itoard of e d u i a t i o n shall l»e exempt from IIMUI
aHHessments Wey v Salt Lake City. .15 I Huh
504. IOI I' 3HI (19091
T h i s section does not apply to special a s s e s s
m e n t s S t a l e ex rel Lundberg v Green River
Irrigation D i s t , 4 0 U t a h 8 3 , 119 P 1U39
11911)
State colleges.
A bond issue by Itoard of t r u s t e e s of state
agricultural college in accordance w i t h legists
l i v e e n a c t m e n t for purpose of financing con
struction of student union building would not
violate t h i s section by creating debt against
s l a t e , w h e r e bonds showed on their face that
they were special obligations p a y a b l e solely
from revenue to be derived from operation of
union, including proceeds of s t u d e n t fee, and
not obligations of the state S p e n c e v Utah
S l a t e A g i l College, 119 U t a h 104, 2 2 5 V 2d 18
(19501
"Property of" a s t a t e university m e a n s property owned hy it, w h e r e university possessed
equipment leased from corporation which re
tamed title to it, the e q u i p m e n t w a s not ex
empt from county property taxation, and under
the t e i m s of the lease, university w a s l»ouitd to

Transfer of property to tax e x e m p t corporation.
Where a private corporation conveyed prop
erty to a tax exempt municipal corporation
prior to assessment and levy of t a x e s , the ad
valorem lax on the property w a s erroneously
and illegally levied and collected by t h e county
e v e n though the corporation owned the prop
erty on J a n u a r y I w h e n t h e h e n for tax attached, and the corporation's application for a
refund w a s proper U t a h Parks Co v Iron
County. 14 U t a h 2d 178. 3 8 0 P 2d 9 2 4 (1963)
True market value
—Intentional discrimination.
A federal district court is precluded from
probing into the a s s e s s m e n t process lo deter
mine whether the s t a l e h a s accurately deter
mined the "true market value" of a railroad's
property absent a strong s h o w i n g by the rail
road that the state h a s purposefully overval
ued its property with discriminatory intent
Union Pac R K v S t a t e Tax Comm'n. 6 3 5 V
Supp 1060 (I) Utah 1986)
To the extent that railroads a l l e g e that the
state h a s intentionally discriminated a g a i n s t
them, they may introduce evidence of their
true market value, a s well a s other probative
evidence, to establish their prima facie case of
intentional discrimination Union Pac R R v
State Tax Comm'n, 6 3 5 F S u p p lObOil) U t a h
1986)
Utah State Retirement Fund property.
Real property of t h e U t a h S l a t e Retirement
Kund w a s "properly of t h e s l a t e " w i t h i n the
meaning of this section, s n d w a s therefore tax
exempt Utah Stale Retirement Office v Salt
Lake County, 780 P 2d 8 1 3 ( U t a h I989i
Value determination by ilaesific ation.
County hoard of equalization w a s not autho
rued to determine value by classification of
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REVENUE AND TAXATION
n
property, and a s s e s s m e n t based thereon w s s in
violation of this section l l a r m e r v S l a t e Taxx
Comm'n, 22 U l a h 2d 3 2 4 . 4 5 2 P 2d 87b 11969)>
n
C i t e d in Salt l>ake County v Tax Comm'n
ex rel U l a h Transit Auth . 7 8 0 P 2d 1231

Art

XIII. fc 3

( U t a h 1989), Salt l^ike County ex rel County
Hd of Equalization v S l a t e Tax Comm'n ex
rel Kennecolt ( orp . 7 7 9 P 2d 1131 ( U l a h
1989)

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
A . L R.
Oil and g a s royalty a s real or per
sonal property, 5b A L R 4th 5 3 9
Properly lax effect of tax e x e m p t lessor's reversionary interest on valuation of nonexempl
lessee's interest, 57 A L R 4 l h 9 5 0
Exemption from reel property taxation of
residential facilities m a i n t a i n e d by hospital for
patients, stall, or others, 61 A L R 4th 1106
Propriety of federal court's ordering slate or
local lax increase to effectuate civil rights de
t r e e , 7b A L R Eed 504
Key N u m b e r s .
1 a x a t i o n • » 4 9 . 57 et seq ,
191 e l seq

U t a h U w R e v i e w . — Note, Financing
Modernized and Unmodermzed Local Govern
m e n l in the Age of Aquarius, 1971 U t a h L
Rev 3 0
Housing in Salt l*ake County — A Place l o
Live for the Poor?. 1972 U t a h L Rev 193
Brigbam Young IJIW Review.
A Municipality's Interest in an Electrical Power ( l e n e r
ating f a c i l i t y Some Tax Considerations. 1979
H Y U L Rev 125
A m . J u r . 2 d - 71 Am J u r 2d S t a t e and
Ixical Taxation 51 194 e l seq . 307 e l seq
C J . 8 . - 84 C J S Taxation I t 5 2 . 57 e l
seq , 2 1 5 e t seq

Sec. 3. (Assessment and taxation of tangible property —
Livestock — Land used for agricultural purposes.]
(1) The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money,
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article The legislature shall
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her. or its tangible property, provided that the
legislature may determine the manner and extent ol taxing livestock
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the legislature prescribes,
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the
value it may have for other purposes
I,
H i s t o r y : C o n s t . 1896; N o v . 6 . 1900; N o v 6,
1006; L. 1930 ( S . S ). 8 J . R . 2; 1046 (1st S S >,
>,
H J . R . 2; 1987, 8 . J . H . 2; 1962, S . J . R . 3 .
d
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — T h e 1979 proposed
a m e n d m e n t of this section by House Joint Res

olution No 23 w a s repealed and withdrawn by
S e n a t e Joint Resolution N o 6. I^iws 1980
Cross-References.
—
Uniform
School
Fund, t a x e s allocated to. § 53A 16 101

N O T E S TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In g e n e r s l
"According lo value in money" construed
Charitable association
Co operative corporation property
County c l e r k s probate fees
County improvement district contingent tax
Disparity in state and county a s s e s s m e n t
Double taxation
Drainage a s s e s s m e n t s

Occupation and license t a x e s
Remission of t a x e s of indigent or i n s a n e persons
Road poll t a x e s
Roll hack of assessed value
Special a s s e s s m e n t s
State properly
Telephone license tax
Uniformity and equality
Utility rates
( i ted
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Sec. 4. |Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and multiple — Wluit to hv assessed as tangible property.|
All metalliferous mines or mining c Inims, both placer and rock in place,
shall be assessed as the legislature shall provide, but the basis and multiple
now used in determining the value of metalliferous mines for taxation purposes and the addition.il • • ssed value of $5 00 per acre thereof shall not be
changed before Januiuy I, 1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by
law A l l other mines or mining claims and other vafuable mineral deposits,
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
mines or mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of mining
claims, or mining property for other than mining purposes, shall be assessed
as other tangible property
History C o n s t 1896; Nov 8. 1908; L. 1930
I S S ) , S J R 5. 1982. S J R 3.

Croaa-References. I 59 2 201

Statutory provision*.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANAI V8I8

D r a i n tunnels.
Under t h i * section, drain tunnel* used to
drain a mine, may not he separately taxed
where it appear* that they have no separate
and independent value, hut are inseparably
connected with the operation of the mine
Ontario Silver Mining Co v llixon 49 Utah
359 164 I' 498 (1917)

Construction and operation of w t t i o n
Drain tunnels

Nol i*e
Unpatented mining claim*

Waler right*
Construction a n d o p e r a t i o n o f aection.
Classification under thin section a* it for
merly read WHH not intended to limit phrase
or other valuable mineral deposit* hut em
tinned all mineral deposit* including gypsum
and net annual profit* from produH* inanufar
lured therefrom were taxable Nephi Plaster A
Mfg ( o v Juab < ounty t l Utah 114 9 1 P
5 1 , 14 I R A m m 11)41 »!**».'
Under this section a* it once M i l • blanket
assessment of all coal land* in county could not
he made at a Hat or uniform rate Ririe v Ran
dolph 51 Utah 274 169 P 941 <l<JI7l
Under this *ection as it formerly read, it was
held that for purpose of taxing net proceed* of
mines the tost of mining incurred in any one
year must lie considered independently from
the tost int tirred in any other year, and only
auih tost* as were incurred during year in
which net proceed* were obtained could lie con
aidered Mammoth Mining Co v Juab County.
51 Utah .lib I/O I' 78 (1918)

Notice
Assessment of mine* wan not defective
where notice described property with reason
able certainly a* to locality and identity Con
aolidatcd Uranium Mine* Inc v Moflilt. 257
r 2d .196 (10th O r 1958)
U n p a t e n t e d mining c l a i m * .
A lax imposed under stale law upon the pos
sensory right to explore and develop nuiu H lo
rated upon unpatented claims located upon
land belonging to the unappropriated public
domain of the United States is not open to chal
lenge upon the ground that it constitute* a tax
againnt property belonging to the United
States Consolidated Uranium Mine* Inc v
MofTlU. 257 r 2d .196 (10th O r 1*158 >
Water right*
Water right* are taxable whether considered
appurtenant to mine or independent properly
Utah Metal & Tunnel Co v (iroesheck, 62
Utah 251. 219 l> 248 < 192)1
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COI.LAIKKAI. RfcrhRhNChS
A m J u r 2d
71 Am .fur 2d State and
l/ocal Taxation * 218

V .1 S
84 C .1 S Taxation M 68. 73. 170
Key N u m b e r s
taxation *•=» 61 lr»H

Sec. 5. (Local authorities to levy local taxes — Sharing tax
and revenues by political subdivisions.!
The legislature Hhall not impose t«ixes lor the purpose of any county, city,
town or other municipal corporation, hut may. hy law, vest in the corporate
authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all
purposes of such corporation Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution, political suhdivisions may share their tax and
other revenues with other political suhdi visions as provided hy statute
l l i a t o r y Conat 1896; L 1982. S J R 3
Croaa Referencea
Appropriation* and
tax limitation, t 59 17a 101 et neq
City taxing power, Utah Conat Art X I , sec
5
NOIrS

County taxing power, <l 17 4 3
Kevt nue sharing l>etween political HUIKJIVI
HIOIIS

t) I I

1 I Mi 5

I t ) D M ISIONS
" C o r p o r a t e a u t h o r i t i e s " construed
( or|Mirat« authorities as used in this sec
lion iiM those rmuiM ipal off iters who either
are directly elected hy munn ipahly K inhabit
ants or are appoint* d in some mode lo whith
su« h inhahilanf s have given their assent Slate
e x n l Wright v Siandford 24 Utah 148 t.6 V
KH.I (I'MHi

A N A I Y.HIH

Agricultural extension work
Allocation of future tax
"Corporate aothoriltea conalrued
Court feea
Dependent mothers
DiHcriminatory tux
r.xcess revenue refund*
License feea
Purpose of taxation
Utah Neighl>orhond Developmi nt Art
Water district

Agricultural extension work
Statute it omp Laws I Ml 7 Q 52921 authoriz
ing contracts Itetween trustees of stat< n^rt< til
tural tollege and tounty <ouimisHion< rs with
respect to agin ultural cxt« onion woik and nu
thorizing commiHHioners lo provide funds net
essnry for the work in their resi»ettive cotin
ties, was not invalid as imposing a tax for
county purposes hy the legislature Hailey v
Vun Dyke M> Utah IH4 240 P 4r>4 il*)2 r n
Allocation of f u t u r e tax
I he law is w« II s< tiled that in ex« r< istng the
powers of the stale the legislature may r u p n i e
the revenue of a IIIUUM ipalily to Is applnd lo
uses other than that for whith the taxes wi re
levied thus th< re was no constitutional trans
gressmn in the a I lot at ion of certain expt<t«d
tax increments I generated hy new construction
in an area of urhan hlighll for itpavuuut of
Redcvelopnn ut Agency Imnds Itdtc V Sail
l,ake ( ity ( orp r>40 I* 2d 4*14 (Utah l«»7r»i

1 ourt feea
I he provisions of this section were contra
v< ned hy statute w h u h attt mpted lo fix soiled
ule of county clerks le< s for services in prohate
matters hascd on sliding scale where ft es in
creased as values of estates increased since
sti< h attempt was an im|>osition of taxes with
out uniformity for counties use and !>eiiefit
Smith v t artioii t ounty <M> Utah *>!»<» h i V 2d
2r»S I0H A I It r>l I <l<Hl»i
Dependent mothers
1 hi phras< foi all purposeN of su« h (orpora
tion is svnonvuious with the phrase puhhc
piir|M»s«s and t haptt r I I of t i t l e 17 I Puhhc
Aid for D« |H'ii«lf nt MolheiNl would he upheld
as puhhi pur|M»se
Denver & K t i K K v
Crand ( o u u i v r»l Utah 294 170 P 74 I
A I It 1221 i l ' * l / i
Di«< r i m i n a t o r y tax
A t ilv I m using ordiiiiintt whit h was a reve
nui raising ui« astin ind put some of I In liusi
n« ss« s afT«(l«d on i flat h< ha sis wilh only
ahoul om t w t l l l h is ninth lax as nlhtr husi
in HS« M whu h p.nd on .i suli s (ax hasis was un
(onsliititionallv dimnminalory O i i m t ity v
Pynt lt> Ut ih 2d IV> 401 l»2d IHI imti'ii
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59-2 104

R E V E N U E A N D TAXATION

H i s t o r y : C\ 1953, 5 9 2 104, e n a c t e d b y L.
I0H7, c h . 4, « 6 1 .
C o m p i l e r ' * N o t e s . - Former 4 5 9 4 I. as
last a m e n d e d by L a w s 1935. t h HI. *> I, ton
ttuned provisions Himilur to IIIIH He*lion
Effective Oate*.
I MWH I9M7 i h 4. * 308
m o k e s the m I c-flcctlvc on r e l o i i i u y fi, |9H7

Retrospective Operation.
Law8 19H7,
ch 4. $ .'107 provides "This HC! h a s relrosf>ective operation to J a n u a r y 1, 1987, except for
Sections 59 2 2 0 1 . 5 9 2 205. and 5 9 2 207,
w h u h take ellec I .lanuary 1 I9HH"
CroNN R e f e r e n c e s .
Pio|N-rly taxable
w h i l e Militated I Mull Const Ait XIII, <) 10

N O T E S TO DECISIONS

592-201

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
A m . J u r . 2 d - 7 1 Am J u r 2d State and
laical Taxation 1*t 6 4 8 to 651
C.J.S.
84 C J S Taxation 5* 113. 115
A.L.K.
Validity of municipal ordinance

imposing income tax or license upon n on rest
dents employed in t a x i n g jurisdiction tcoinmuter laxi. 48 A L R .Id 3 4 3
Kev N u m b e r s .
Tuxatioii • - 9 8

59-2-105. Situs of public utilities, bridges, ferries, and canals.
Public utilities, and bridges and ferries not public utilities, when operated
wholly in one county, and electric light lines and similar improvements, canals, ditches, and Humes when separately taxable, shall be listed and assessed
in t h e county in which the property is locuted

A N A I Y3IS

Boundaries of t a x i n g district
I .oca t ion of property
Property of foreign corporationa
Rolling alock of railroads
U n i t y of u s e doctrine
W a l e r rights
B o u n d a r i e s of taxing district.
F i x i n g of boundaries of t a x i n g district and
its area is wholly m a t t e r of legislative discre
lion, and exertiHe o f a u c h discretion IH not HUI»
ject of judicial inventigation or revision
Kimball v C r a n t s v i l l e City, 19 U t a h 3b8. 57 V
1, 4 5 L K A 6 2 8 118991

tJj
I
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PROPERTY TAX ACT

I vocation o f p r o p e r t y .
Term "owned," a s used in U t a h Const Art
XIII ft 10. which provides that all pernon* in
s t a t e HIIHII IH* Muloott to tshcttion on real and
perMontil properly "owned** or uaed by them
within territorial l i m i t s of authority levying
tax IIUH reference to p l a t e w h e i e properly is,
and not to where o w n e r may reside theiefote,
s h e e p were not a s s e s s a b l e in certain city where
none of t h e m had been within territorial limits
of citv at a n y t i m e during period for which
t a x e s were a s s e s s e d Murdock v Murdock, 38
Utah 373. i l l P :i:)o <i9io>
With r e a p e d to personal property of a langi
ble and corporeal n a t u r e and capable of having
a s i t u s of its o w n , residence of owner is generallv i m m a t e r i a l , a n d property is taxable where
it is found H a m i l t o n At Oleason Co v Finery
County, 7 5 U t a h 40«. 2 8 5 P 1006 (1930) S e e
U n i o n Refrigerator Transit Co v Lynch, IH
U t a h .178, 5 5 P « 3 9 , 4 8 L R A 790 118981,
aird. 177 U S 149. 2 0 S Ct 6.11. 44 I, Kd 708
llfHMM
Property of foreign corporations.
N e i t h e r tangible nor intangible prn|N*rty
owned nod used bv foreign corporation in
HtateN other t h a n U t a h w a s taxable in Utah
totintv in w h u h corporation s pnncipiil ollice
wiiH Nil lulled U t a h Idaho Suitor Co v Suit
l..ike < niinlv tU) t Hitli 4 9 1 . J i l l I' MM.. 27
A I. f( M/l HM22I
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Rolling stock o f r a i l r o a d s .
A s against contention of foreign corporation
that taxation of its refrigerator cars in U t a h
w a s forbidden by U S Constitution Itecause
such cars had no s i l u s in Ut<ih for pur|M>ae of
taxation and tax on t h e m would impoae burden
on interstate commerce, held that cars were
taxable in Utah on basis of a v e r a g e number
thereof used and employed by their o w n e r in
U l a n during year for which sssetisnienl was
made
Union Refrigeratoi Transit Co v
Lynch. 177 US 149. 2 0 S ( I b.ll. 44 L Fd
708 (I900I
Unity of use d o c t r i n e
The dot trine of unity of use for purpose of
determining a s s e s s m e n t for taxation cannot he
applied to manufacturing or other s i m i l a r
plants or industries w h u h may be under common ownership but used or o|ieraled in different atates Utah Idaho Sugar Co v S a l t l-ake
County. 6 0 Utah 4 9 1 . 2 1 0 P 106. 27 A L K 8 7 4
11922)
Water rights.
Where flow of percolating waters w a s devel
oped in process of m i n i n g operations, which
water was piped and wild to another company
w h u h took such w a l e r in another county and
through its own pipeH (onducted it HO ita o w n
mine, wuter righlH w e i e pro|ierly MHsessed
against mining t o m p a n y aclinic* s u t h w.iter in
county in w h u h its i»|x*rulions were conducted
and in county where water was transferred and
tax apportioned b e t w e e n HIKII c o u n t i e s U t a h
Melul & i i u i n e l Co v Cioenhetk. 6 2 Utah 2 5 1 ,
219 P JIM i l 9 2 t »

H i s t o r y : C . 1053, 5 9 2 I Oft, e n a c t e d b y L.
1867, c h . 4, I 5 2 .
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . - Former 8 59 4 2, a s
last amended by U w i 1931, ch 5 3 . S 1. con
t a m e d provisions similar to t h i s section
E f f e c t i v e D a t e s . - Laws 1987, ch 4, ft 3 0 8
m a k e s the act effective on February 6, 1987

R e t r o s p e c t i v e O p e r a t i o n . - Laws 1987.
ch 4, 4 307 provides "This act h a s retrospeclive operation to J a n u a r y I, 1987, except for
Sections 5 9 2 2 0 1 , 5 9 2 2 0 5 . ami 59 2 207.
which take eflect J a n u a r y I. 1 9 8 8 "
Cross References
Property taxable
where situated, U t a h Const Art XIII, 9 10

N O T E S TO DECISIONS
Railroad rolling stock.
A s a g a i n s t contention of foreign corporation
t h a t t a x a t i o n of its refrigerator cars in Utah
w a s forbidden by U S Constitution because
such cars had no Hit us in Utah for purpose of
taxation and tax on t h e m would impose burden
on interstate commerce, held that cars were

taxable in Utah on basis of a v e r a g e number
thereof used and employed by their owner in
IJtuh during year for which a s s e s s m e n t was
made
Union Refrigerator Transit Co
v
Lynch. 177 II S 149. 20 S Ct 6 3 1 . 44 L Kd
7 ^ ( 190O)

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
A m . J u r . 2 d . — 71 A m J u r 2d S t s t e and
Local Taxation 9 6 5 2

C.J.S.
84 C J S T a x a t i o n M 3 3 9 to 3 4 8
Key N u m b e r s .
Taxation «-* 9 8

PART 2
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY
59-2-201. Assessment by commission — Determination of
value of mining property — Notification of assessment — Property assessed by the unitary
method which is locally assessed.
(I) By May 1 the following property shall he assessed by t h e commission at
100% of fair m a r k e t value, as valued on J u n u a i y I, in accordance with this
chapter:
(aI all propelty which operates a.s a unit acio*s county lutes, if the
values must be apportioned among more than one county or state,
(b) all property of public utilities,
53
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(c) all mines and mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits,
(d) all machinery used in mining, all property or surface improvements
upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value of any
Rurface use made of mining claims or mining properly for other than
mining purpose s For the purposes of assessment and taxation, all pro
cessmg pi i
ills, redtn ti in works, and smelters which are primarily
used by 11
i r of a »
or mining claim for processing, reducing, or
smelting minerals taken i n a mine or mining claim, shall be considered
appurtenant to that mine or mining claim, regardless of actual location,
and
<e) in all cases where the surface of lands is owned by one person and
the mineral underlying thou© lands is owned by another, the property
rights shall be separately assessed to the respec tive owners If the surface
is used for other than mining purposes, the value of the surface shall be
assessed by the assessor of the county in which the property is located
(2) The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining
property is the capitalized net revenue method or any other valuation method
the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission s
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value of the
mining property The rate of capitalization applicable to mines shall be deter
mined by the commission, consistent with a fair rate of return expected by an
investor in light of that industry's current market, financial, and economic
conditions In no event may the fair market value of the mining property be
less than the fair market value of the land, improvements, and tangible per
sonal property upon or appurtenant to the mining property
(3) Immediately following the assessment, the owner or operator of the
assessed property shall be notified of the assessment The assessor of the
county in which the property is located shall also be immediately notified of
the assessment
(4) Property assessed by the unitary method, which is not necessary to the
conduct and does not contribute to the income of the business as determined
by the lommisHion, Hhall lie as»eH»ed Heparatelv by the local county assessor
tfiatory 1 I0&.1, 59 2 2 0 1 . enacted by L
IV87, r h 4 ft 53
< ompiler'a Not**
Former ft 59 2 52 na
amended hy U w a 1981 ch 75 ft 1 contained
provision* similar to thia aection
Fffecttve D a t e *
Lawa 1987 ch 4 ft 108
makes the act effective on February 6 1987

Retroapettive O p e r a t i o n
U w n I9S7
ch 4 ft 107 provides Thin net haa retroapec
live operation to lanuary 1 1987 except for
Sectiona V» 2 201 S9 2 205 and r>9 2 207
which take effect January 1 1988
1 roaa Reference*
luxation of minea
Utah Const Art X I I I * 4

NO I T S ro DF< ISIONS
A N A I V8IH

< hallc nging asaeaamc nt
Hv c<»untv
lnl< ntiomil dint riintnalieut
( out lands
Out* ol assessment
I ife tenant and r» mninderman
14K at ion of property
Mineral land
Mini s

Notice of assessment
Public utilities
Separate assessment
C hallenging aaaeaament
Since undcraaseRsment of mining projxrty
can cause a distinct and palpable uumv to u
county hy limiting I I H tax base a county has
standing to «u< tht tax commissiem on the
ground that sue h prei|N»rty WIIR und« DIHW ased
Ke nnecott ( orp v Suit I ake < ounty 702 P 2d
4SI t l l t a h 19Hr>>

Nettle e of asse Hamei nt
ANS« SHine nt of mine H WHH not defective
where notice dewnbed preiperlv with reason
able certainty OH to locality and identity ( on
aohdated Uranium Minea Inc v Moffitt 257
r 2d 196 (11Mb ( ir I9 r >8l

— I n t e n t i o n a l cliacriminatlnn
A federal diHtrirl court IR precluded from
probing into the assessment process to deter
mine whether the state haa accurately deter
mined the true market value of a railroad a
property absent a atrnng allowing by the rail
road that the state haa purposefully nverval
ued ita properly with diacriminatnry intent
Union Pat I I H v State Tax < omm n 6 lr> r
Supp 1060 (I) Utah 19H6»

Public utilftiea
IhiR section confera no authority upon tax
roinmiRsion In IIHHIHR car ceimpamea which are
ne»t public utilitieR < ryatal ( ar I me v State
lax ( o i n m n 110 Utah 426 174 P 2d 984
f19461

Coal land*
A blanket assessment of all toal land* in
county could not be made nt a flat or uniform
rate Rine v Randolph r»l Utah 274 169 P
941 11917)

Separate aaaeaament
A person in adverse poaaeaaton of the aurface
ground of a mining c bum who haa t»een aa
sesse d with aue h surface area ami haa paid
taxeN thereon may claim adve rae possession to
audi surface1 although owner of mining claim
haa paiel the taxes thereon Utah ( op|>er ( o v
rckman 47 Utah 16ri 152 P 178 114151
Where the re IH common nwnerahip of both
the surface and mineral rights in land uaed for
mining purpoaeH and no recpieat is made that
the surface IK* taxed on its valuation separately
fr tin the mine s an I mim nil rights if IH pro|H r
f i the e ouiil v « tin IIIIH l« •u^u^ule lb* valine
lions e f both Hiuface and mine nil righlM in up
plvmg the tax le vy and m all prenec dings nub
seepie nt thereto I e Ion is v Stale y 104 Utah
M 7 144 P 2 d 51 I ( I 9 4 t i
When the Rurface and mine nil estates of a
mining claim are owned hy the same peraon
only eme tax is asHeHsed on I be claim Phia is
because (be statute provides for separate aa
M «tsme nt of the surfaee «»nly whe n the aurface
and mini nil est«t«s are owned by different
owners I be statute make H HI olhci provision
f >r separate assessment of the two eatatea
I h e r c f m separate taxation of surface and
mine r il interest <l >< s not constitute double
taxation bee IUW the separate taxes would he
on difle ie nt pnpcitv inte re (« United Park
t it v Mutest o v r slat. ( ( l M K 7 t/ I 2d 17 I
<Ut ill I9H/)
I be a^si Nteme nt of the value of the suifiice
use it | i pe itv list d for milling is in addition to
ib« (Mr acre IISS« ssme nl of tin mining claim
and the additional asseHsme ut is required
whether the suiface is owned by the same

D a t e of aaaeaament
Property not within city on January I»l IR
not liable for payment of city taxes for thoae
yeara Plutua Mining ( o v Orme 76 Utah
286 289 P I 12 (19 (<H
I ife t e n a n t a n d r e m a i n d e r m a n
A life tenant should be assessed as owner
during the continuume of th*> lib (state
Sheppiek v Sheppiek 41 Utiid M l I IN I'
1169 U 9 I 4 I
l o c a t i o n of pro|>erty
Property of electric company operating in
only one county WUH assessable in county in
which property waa lorated although electric
company waa owned by company o|>er»ting in
aeveral countiea l"c lluride Power ( n v dates
61 Utah U 7 i l l I* I7S i l 9 2 l >
Mineral land
Until there IR proof that land has IOR( its
character aa mineral or mining property it IR
assessable by State lax ( mniniHMi n < r\stal
I ime Si I ernent t o v Hohhins I M> Utah 111
209 P 2 d 7J9 (|949i
Where title to land IR derived from federal
government tbi« ugh ISHUIIIHC of n pute nt is
mining |>TO|M 11 v (lore IH n pie Huuipti n tbnt it
IM pro|arty of tbnt chmmter cfntil it is piovtd
othowiHC < r>Mlnl I ime & < em« ut t » v It b
hma 116 Utah I I 4 209 P 2d 7 t9 i|949i
"Minea "
I he ternia

54

limited to mere Htible mine an « xe nvationa or
workings or to the me tals or metallife retua de
posits whether (untuned in veina that have
w« II ele fined walls or in beds or deports that
are irregular ami are found at or near the aur
hue en « tberwis* Nc phi Plaater At Mfg ( o v
lu ib tenuity U Utah 114 9 I P 5 t 14 1 K A
( I I s > Hit t t | 9 0 / i

—By county

mines

anil

mineral

nre not
r r

)»
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NOTES lO DE< ISIONS

v a l u e based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property for purposes
of assessment under Subsection 5 9 2 103(1)
(2) (a) Prior to J a n u a r y 1 , 1989, the commission shall develop a n d implem e n t comparable sales or cost appraisal methods in v a l u i n g t a x a b l e prop-

Constitutionality

e r t y for assessment purposes which provide t h a t the v a r i o u s fees, ser-

D l l l M ' S Ol IINHCMMOl .111*1 I It K|>ll V«*» »
E f l l ' t t o l (TIOIM'OOM JINN4'NHIItl I I I
N i t t t l M - Ol l i l k <|« l»t

a n d other i n t a n g i b l e values are not included as part ol t h e f a i r

vices, closing costs, and oilier expenses related to t h e sales transaction
market

value lor purposes of t a x a t i o n

Noiir«*Hi<l«'iil H prop* rly

(b) B e g i n n i n g J a n u a r y I , 1989, the provisions ol Subsection (1) do not

O W I H T ' N obligation In pay lux

apply

TrtiiiHft-r ol property to Ian exempt corporation

Beginning January

1, 1989, the commission s h a l l , by r u l e , order

county assessors to use the comparable sales or cost a p p r a i s a l
C 'onstltutionality.
Seclion IH nol HO vague and uniertum an to
l>e unconstitutional Norville v Stale Tax
< oniiu . 98 I Hah 170, 97 I' 2d 9.17. I2l> A I . K
i:tlH <I940)
D u t i e s o f assessor a n d t a x p a y e r s .
It IH duly of asseHsor to assess all properly at
lit* value, and it IH I ike wine duty ol every per
Hon and cnr|»orulioii having taxable pro|»erty to
I Ml name for taxation Utah Idabo Sugar Co v
Salt l ^ k e County. tM) Utah -I'M. 210 |» |1N» 27
A I . H 874 H 9 2 2 I
Eff«»«*t o f e r r o n e o u s assessment.
K u l u r e lo UHM-HH taxes lo owner did not in
validate assessment Jonea v llox Elder
< ounly. 52 r 2d MOHOthCir 19.11». tert den
285 U S 555. 52 S C| 45li. 78 I. Ed 944
< 19.121
Where property IH ni»t assessed to I be leal
owner, and it IH Hold under «ut b iiSMefesinenl a
tax deed issued in purnuaiue tbereol lias no
binding effect an against real owner Salt Lake
Inv Co v Oregon Short Line It It , 4b I Hah
2 0 I . 148 I* 4 . l 9 ( l 9 i 5 i . alTd 24h U S 44b .IH
S ( I 34H. f>2 L Ed 82.1 <I9IH»
N a t u r e of tax debt.
Thia section aeeiiiH to make the tax a d« bt
agaiiiHt the individual owning the propetty
and a lien on bin pioperly. father than a

Nonresident's p r o p e r t y .
l*r<»perty brought into I bin Htate by a nonres
idenl company and um.il in coiiHtruction woik
for an indefinite period IH nubject to taxation in
county where u w d , unth r Utah CODHI Art
X I I I , * HI Hamilton & UhiiMon Co v Emeiy
County. 75 Utah 40b, 28ft I' lOOh (19.10)
O w n e r ' s obligation to p a y tax
M« «onl owners ol it al prn|iertv on .laimarv I .
IIMil. were obll^att d to pay the l!M>4 pro|M-rty
lax. il January I record ownet transfers bin
interest in the piopcrty and does not want to be
held liable lor the tax it is IIIH obligation to
make arrangement lor payment by IIIH I runs
feree Uillman v rottlei. bfm I ' 2 d 974 (Utah
I9H2)
T r a n s f e r of p r o p e r t y to tax-exempt corporation.
Where a private coronation conveyed prop
erty lo a tax exempt muuuipal lorporation
prior to aHHeHHineiit and levy ol taxen under
thia Hection, the ad valorem tax on the properly
wan erroneouHly and illegally levied and col
let led by the county Utah P . I I H H C O V Iron
4'ounly. 14 Utab 2d 178. .IHO I* 2d 924 (I9t>.l)

in place of the r e q u i r e m e n t of Subsection (1)
History: C 1953, 50 2 304, enacted by L.
1987, c h . 4. « 72; 1087, c h . 160. I I .
A m e n d m e n t Notes — The 1987 amend
ment by Chapter 150. effective April 27, 1987,
substituted "1989" for "1988" in Subsections
<2><al and (2Mb)
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes.
Former I 59 5 4 5, as
amended by LMWH 1986, ch 115, ft I , ton turned
provisions Hinulitr to this section

U t a h I-aw K e v i e w .
IVrnonal ()bhgalu>n
to I'ay Heal Property Taxes in Utah Uilim.in
v rotter. I9H.1 Utah L Kev H45

REFERENCES
C.JS.
84 C J S Taxation * 378
Key Numbers.
'I.txatinu a-* 110 t t ne«|

Effective Dates.
1 aws 1987, ch 4, ft 308
makes the act ellective on February 6. 1987
Itetrespective O p e r a t i o n . - Laws 1987.
ch 4, ft 307 provides "This act has retrospective operation lo January I , 1987, except for
Sections 5 9 2 2 0 1 . 5 9 2 2 0 5 . and 5 9 2 2 0 7 .
which lake effect January I . 1 9 8 8 "

NOTES TO DECISIONS
not violate the equal protection proviHlons of
the Utah or United Stales Constitutions Kio
Algom Corp v San Juan County. hSI I* 2d 184
(Utah 19841

Constitutionality.
The proviHion tluil reduces by 20'X the value
of county assessed properly by comparable
sales or cosl materials is constitutional under
Article X I I I of the Utah Constitution snd does

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h IMW H e v l e w . - Recent Developments
in Utah Law. 1986 Utah L Kev M l . 207

59-2-305.
COLLATERAL

methods

which are r e q u i r e d to be developed and i m p l e m e n t e d i n Subsection (2)(a)

charge iigainHl the pto|»eily alone HayeH v
C l h l * . I l l l Utah 54, Ib9 l»2d 7 H | . H . H A M t
51.1 1194b)

Listing property in taxing districts.

T h e county assessor shall list a l l property in each t a x i n g district in the
county by identifier and value T h e commission m a y prescribe procedures and
formats, after consultation w i t h affected state agencies a n d county assessors,
which w i l l provide reasonable u n i f o r m i t y and reduced costs in listing property

59-2-304.

Recognition o f expenses in using c o m p a r a b l e
sales o r cost a p p r a i s a l method — I m p l e m e n t a t i o n
of n e w p r o g r a m .

(11 I f the county assessor uses (he comparable sales or tost appraisal
method in valuing; t a x a b l e property foi assessment purposes, the assessoi ts
ie«|tnr«*d to r e i o ^ n i / e that various lees, services, closing tosls, «ind other ex
penses rehited lo the tt.insat lion lessen the u i t u . i l a m o u n t th.it may he re
i eived in the 11 .IIIS<K I ion T h e count y assessor shall I her t hue, take HiVl of the

<>8

Retrospective O p e r a t i o n
LMWH 1987.
ch 4, ft 307 provides " I his act has retroapec
live operation to Junuary I , 1987. except for
Sections 59 2 201 59 2 205. snd 59 2 207.
which tMke effect January I . 1 9 8 8 "

History C 1953. 5 9 - 2 - 3 M . enacted by l~
1987. r h 4. ft 73
Compiler's Notes.
Former t 59 5 5. as
amended by LMWH 1982. ch 7 1 . § 2.1. contained
provisions similar to this section
Effective Hates
Laws 1987. ch 4 ft 308
makes the ait efttctive on February <> 19H7
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63-46h-16

STATE AFEAIKS IN (JKNKKAL

(b) T h e U t a h RuleH of Evidence apply i n j u d i c i a l proceedings under this
section.
History: C 1953, 6 3 - 4 6 b - l 5 , e n t i d e d l»y I,.
1987, ch. 101, ft 2 7 1 ; 1988, ch 72. « 25.
A m e n d m e n t Notes.
Tbe 1988 amendment, e l e c t i v e A p r i l 25, 1988. deleted "except
Hint rmal agency action Iron, i n f o r m a l adjudi
t a t i v e proceedings based on a leconl tdtall Iw
reviewed by tbe d i s l i i c l courts on tbe record

uccnrdiiiK to tbe standard* of Subsection
63 4hh I f e J l ' ul tbe end in Subsection ( I Mai
and made minor stylistic c h a n t s
Effective I)»tea.
Laws 1987. ch I b l .
| : < | 5 nm^VH
tbe a« I efle<five on .lutiuarv I.
\*JHH

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Section 61) 46b 16(11 provides t b a t all f i n a l
agency decisions Ibrougb f o r m a l adjudicative
proceedinga w i l l be reviewed by tbe U l a b Supieme Cotir< or Court of Append* Tberefore,

tbe district court w i l l no longer function as i n
termediale appellate court except to review in
formal adjuditalive proceedings de novo puraiianl to Subsection ( I Mai of this section In re
Topik, 761 I ' 2 d 32 l l l t a b Cl App ll»MH»

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
( I I As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review a l l final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek j u d i c i a l review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action w i t h the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court
(hi T h e appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate coin I.
(31 T h e contents, I .
< i l t a l , and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjutlu
w proceedings are governed by the U t a h Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, s u m m a r i z e , or organize the record; or
( i i l according to any other provision of law.
(4) T h e appellate court shall grant relief only ii, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines t h a t a |>erson seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following.
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on Ms face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat
ute;
(c> the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring lesoluhon,
id) tbe agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(el the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or dec-.sion-making pmcess, oi has failed to follow preset ibed proceduie,

7:ifi
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63 46b 17

( 0 the persons t a k i n g the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification,
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, t h a t is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h> the agency action is.
(il an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
( i l l contrary to a rule of I be agency;
(ni) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons t h a t demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise a r b i t r a r y or capricious
History: C. 11153, 63 46b 16, enacted by I..
1987, c h . 161. ft 272; 1988. c h . 72, ft 26.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. - Tbe I9HH amend
i m n l , e l h c l i v e A p n l 25, 1988, substituted As
provided by Mtatulr, tbe Supreme Coutt or tbe
Court of Appeals" for T b e Supieme Court or
other appellate court designated by s t a t u t e " i n
Subjection ( I ) , inserted " w i t b tbe appropnate

appellate court" i n Subsection (2»(al, and tiub
stituled " a p | x l l a t c rules of tbe appropriate ap
peltate c o u i t " (or " U l a b Rules of Appellate Pro
n d u r e " in Subsections (2»(al and I 2 M I I I
Effective Da tea
Lawn 1987. ch M i l ,
$ n s tUu^H
n, t . m l H l e i l i v e on January I.
|,mM

NOTKS TO DECISIONS
Function o f district court.
Subsection ( I l provides t h a i all f i n a l agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed
ings w i l l be reviewed by tbe U t a h Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals Theiefore. the dis

trict court wilt no longer function at) inlermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
II 63 46b 15(1 Mai In re T o p i k . 761 I* 2d 32
(Dt.tb Ct App I9S8I

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (aI In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(il order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside oi modify agency action,
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action, or
(vl remand the m a t t e r to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 63 46b 17. e n a c t e d by I..
1987, ch. 161, ft 273.
E f f e c t i v e Dates.
Laws 1987, ch 161.

^ 315 makes tbe a i l ellcctive on January
I9SM

7;*7
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JUDICIAL CODE

History: L. 1951, ch. 66, I I; C. 1643,
Supp , 104 2 1; L. IM9. ch. 247, | I; 1666, ch.
47. I 40; IMS. ch 148, • 4; I WO. ch. 00. I 4.
Amendment Nairn*.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 26. 1988. in Subsection
(2». rewrote the second sentence which read
'Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the
Supreme Court is ten years and until his successor is sppointed and spproved in accordance
with Section 20 1 7 1" and. in Subsection (A),
substituted "determines" for decides" at the
end of the fourth sentence
Hie 1990 Amendment, effective April 23.
1990. deleted "next" after "January" and made
punctuation changes in Subsection (2l, deleted
"not following "chief justice may' in the third
sentence of Subsection 1.11. deleted 'additional**
before "duties" tn Subsection (5). deleted

"where not inconsistent with the law" following "chief justice** and added "as consistent
with the law" at the end of Subsection (6)
Cross-References. — Chief justice. Utah
Const. Art VIII. Sec 2
Disqualification in particular case. Utah
Const. Art VIII. Sec 2
Judicial
nomination
and
selection.
I 20 I 7 1 et seq
Membership on stale law library hoard,
f 37-1 1
Proceedings
unaffected
by
vacancy.
I 78 7 21
Qualifications of justices. Utah Const . Art
VIII. Sac 7
Retirement. Utah Const. Art VIII. Sec 15,
I 49 6 101 et seq . If 78 7 29. 78 7 30
Salary. Utah Const. Art VIII. Sec 14

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Courts
Judges e* I, 7 to 12

Am Jur. 2d. - 20 Am Jur 2d Courts
ft 67. 68
C.J 8.
21 C I S Courts f 111 et seq ; 48A
CMS Judges ff .1. 7. 8. 21 to 25. 85

78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6.

101. 248.

Repealed.

It* peals - Section 78 2 I 5 (L 1969. ch
225 f 21. relating tn salaries of Supreme Court
juftlirt'R. was repealed by l*aws 1971, ch 182,
ft 4

Section 78 2 I 6 (L 1979, ch 134. f 1, 1981.
ch 156, f II, relating to salaries of justices,
was repealed by Laws 1981.ch 267. f 2. effective July 1, 1982

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
ils orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction
(31 The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(aI a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(hi cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c> discipline of lawyers;
(d> final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with
(i) the Public Service Commission;
tii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(ivl the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
<v) the state engineer;
l 0 final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e),
8

78 2 2

tgl a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of tecord involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony,
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and
(j> orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate junsdiction,
except
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge ol a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c> reapportionment of election districts,
(dl retention or removal of public officers,
(el general water adjudication,
(0 taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection t.'lHa) through ( 0
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection ClHbl
(6> The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings
History: ( 195.1, 78 2 2. enacted h v L
I WW, ch 47, ft 41; 1987. ch 161. I .10.1; 1988.
ch 248. • ft. 1989, rh 67. I I
Itepeala and Iteenactmenta
I .AWN 1986,
rh 47, ^ 41 repeals former *. 78 2 2 AH enacted
bv Lawn 1051 ch 58. ft I, relating to original
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and
euattR the above neclion
Amendment Note*. - The 1*188 amend
merit, ellective April 25. 1988, ftuhshttited "for
mal adjudicative proceeding*" for "raaen" in
Subsection i.lMel, added Subaeclioii llMfi. re
denignated former Suh*e« tionn (.'IMO to i.lMil ac
cnrdingly. aultfttilutcd "(it" for "(b»" al the end
of Subjection (4 rig I. and made minor slyliHlic
cbangca
The 1981 amendment, effective April 24
1989. added 'anil r or entry at the end of Sub
flection (.'iHeMuit. rewrote Subjection (4Hal
which read first degree and capital felony ton

vithonK". nobs! it ill cd '(ft" for ' (i)" at (be end of
Subsection (4t(gl. and mode minor slylislic
cbangen
Croat Reference*.
Appeals from juvc
rule courtft. <) 78 '.\a 51
Appeals in iriminal caseft. IJRCYI* 26
Chief just ice to preaide over impeucliment of
governor. ^ 77 5 2
Election
contest
appeals.
(*<i 20 [\ .15.
20 15 14
Kxtraordinary writs. Utah Conat Art VIII,
Sec .'I U U C P 65 H
Industrial tommissinn orders, review ol
« .15 I 16
Jurisdiction I Mull Collet Art VIII. Sec I
Stale bar promulgation of rubs, review of
disoptinar) orders. M 78 51 14 78 51 19
Unemployment compensation dcunions, te
view of. * 35 4 10

9

ot an order of occupancy or the execution of a right
of entry agreement, bears to the taxable year
m?
Article 2. Assessment by County Assessor
S9-S-4 General duties of cooniy assessor • Assessing
mientaie cnmers.
59-S-4 5 RrcofMUoa of expenses in using compatible
sales or con appraisal meinod
59-S-S U s u a t property ta cities, tow** school districts
sod special taxjag districts
59 $-4 Repon of viJuatioa of property to coaat*
sudttor • TraasiBittal by auditor to governiag bodies •
Certified tax rate
59-5-7 U s u a t property brought into couaty sfltr
Jaauary I Duties of assessor
59-5-7 ! Traasitory persoaal property brought froni
outside sistr 4sses&nent * Proratioa of tax •
Property tax ta saother state • Claims for rebates a i d
adjust meats
S t - M Statemeats by taxpayers.
59-5-9 Power of assessors respectiog statements •
Debet of taxpayer • Penalty
59-5- I t Assessor to estimate vtloe where taxpayer
refuses to give statement
59-5-11 Assessor to repon information gained to other
counties.
59-5-12 In aame of owner, mandatory, if known • If
unknown.
59-5-13 Assessmeat ta aame of representative Designation.
59-5-14 Assessment of property of decedents.
59-5- IS \ssessmeat of property in litigation.
59-5-16 Assessmeat of concealed property • Peaalty
59-5-17 Property escaping assessment - Five-year
limitation penod on assessment • Duties of assessor
59-5- IS Assessment in aame of claimaat as well as
owner.

59-5-4. General duties of county assessor •
Assessing interstate earners.
The countv assessor shall, before May 15 of each
year ascertain the names of ail taxable inhabitants
and all propeny in the county subject to taxation
except that assessed by the State Tax Commission
and shall assess the propeny to the person by whom
it was owned or claimed, or in whose possession or
control it was, at 12 o'clock m of January 1 next
preceding, and at its value on that date, unless a
subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real
propeny has been duly recorded in the office of the
county recorder more than 14 calendar days before
the date of mailing of the tax notice, in which case
the tax notice mav be mailed to the new owner No
mistake in the name of the owner or supposed
owner of property renders the assessment invalid
Assessors shall become fully acquainted with all
propeny in their respective counties, and. either in
person or by deputy, shall annually visit each separate district and establish the values of the propeny
they are required to assess When assessing contract,
private, and exempt earners covering interstate
routes, the county assessor shall apportion the assessment for the rolling stock used in interstate
commerce at the same percentage ratio that has been
filed with the Prorate Depanment of the Motor
Vehicle Division of the tax commission for determining the proration of registration fees
19*
59*5-4 J . Recognition of expenses in using
comparable sales or cost appraisal method.
(1) When the county assessor uses the comparable
sales or cost appraisal method in valuing taxable
propeny for assessment purposes, the assessor is
requtred to recognize that various fees, services,
closing costs, and other expenses related to the transaction lessen the actual amount that may be recCode • Co

eived m the transaction The county assessor shall,
therefore take 8 0 ^ of the value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the propeny as its
reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment
(2Ka) Prior to January 1 1988 the State Tax
Commission shall develop and implement comparable sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing
taxable propeny for assessment purposes which
provide that the various fees, services, closing costs,
and other expenses related to the sales transaction
and other intangible values arc not included as part
of the reasonable fair cash value for purposes of
assessment
(b) Beginning January 1 1988 the provisions
of Subsection 0 ) do not apply to county assessors
using the sales or cost appraisal method in valuing
taxable propeny for assessment purposes For assessments beginning January I, 1988, the State Tax
Commission shall by rule order county assessors to
use the comparable sales or cost appraisal methods
which are required to be developed and implemented
in Subsection <2Xa) tn place of the requirement of
Subsection (1)
ttt*
59-5-5. Listing propeny in cities, towns, scfeool
districts and special taxing districts
The list of the propeny in each city, town, school
district and special taxing district m his county, and
the valuation thereof, shall be so made b> the
county assessor that the propeny in each and the
valuation thereof can be separately shown
inn
59-54. Repon of valuation of propeny to county
auditor • Transmittal by auditor to governing
bodies • Certified tax rate.
(1) Before June 1 of each year, the county asse
ssor of each countv shall deliver to the county
auditor a statement showing the aggregate valuation
of all taxable propeny in each taxing distm, toge
ther with a statement showing the assessed valuation
of any additional personal propeny estimated by the
county assessor to be subject to taxation m the
current tax year The county auditor shall, on or
before June I transmit this statement together with
the certified tax rate and all forms necessary to
submit a tax levy request, to the governing body of
each taxing district
(2Xa) The 'certified tax rate* means a tax rate
that will provide the same ad valorem propeny tax
revenue for each taxing distnet as was charged for
the pnor year by that taxing entity, except in the
case of the minimum school levy established under
Section 53-7-18 and any debt service voted on by
the public under Section 53-7-8 1, in which case
the cemfied tax rate shall be the actual levy imposed
by those sections The certified tax rate shall be
established in accordance with Section 59-9-8
For new taxing districts, the certified tax rate shall
be zero
(b) For the purpose of calculating the certified!
tax rate the county auditor shall use the taxable roll
exclusive of new growth New growth is the increase
in value of the taxing district from the previous
calendar year to the current year less the amount of
increase to locally assessed real propeny values resulting from factoring, reappraisal, or any other
adjustments
(c) As used in this chapter, 'taxing district
means any county, city, town, school district,
special taxing district, or any other political subdivision of the state with the authonty to levy a tax
on propeny

Foe ANNOTATIONS, consult tne UTAH ADVANCE RETORTS
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chapter" arc o m i t t e d M unnecessary i n
v i e w of the restatement. T h « w o r d * " i n
the enforcement o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of
any
provision o f this chapter"
In
4 9 : 3 0 5 ( 0 «re ©rottled • • unnecessary i n
v i e w of the restatement.
The words
" a n d safety" i n 4 9 : 3 0 5 ( 0 a r e o m i t t e d as
b e i n g transferred t o list Secretary of
Transportaiion.
I n subsection ( b ) . the w o r d s - W h e n a n
Investigation u n d e r this subtitle" arc substituted for "Whenever I n a n y Invest Iga
l i o n u n d e r the p r o v i s i o n * o f this chapter.
o r i n mny Investigation Instituted u p o n
p e t i t i o n of* f o r clarity. T h e words "prov i d l n g transportation o r service subject
t o the Jurisdiction o f the C o m m i s s i o n
u n d e r subchapter I o r I V o f chapter 105
o f this title" are inserted f o r clarity. T h e
w o r d s "is about a" are substituted f o r

$ 1 1 5 0 3 .
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"shall be brought I n Issue" for clarity
T h e w o r d s " m a d e o r imposed by" are
o m i t t e d aa surplus. T h e words "disposi n g o f are substituted for "proceeding to
hear mnd dispose o T for clarity and ai
^ m - m o ^ inclusive
I n subsection ( c ) . the words "subchspicr
I I I o f chapter 105" arc used to
• * • * « , h * subsection apply to waief
c a r r i e r s since the words "under the provisions o f this section" require that re
• " ' • i n v i e w o f 49:1 J O )
T h e words "in
cases p e n d i n g before the Commission"
a r e o m i t t e d as unnecessary i n view of
the restatement
T h e w o r d s "may be
a i v e n " a r e substituted for "shall receive"
lor clarity
T h e w o r d s "may determine"
are substituted for "shall provide" for
clarity.

Tsui sliacHsnlnallon against r a i l transportation property

(a) In this section—
(1) "assessment** means valuation for a property tax levied by
a taxing district.
(2) "assessment Jurisdiction** means a geographical area in a
State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad
valorem taxation.
(3) "rail transportation property" means property, as defined
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, owned or used by a
rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this
title.
\
(4) "commercial and industrial property" means property,
other than transportation property and land used primarily for
agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy.
( b ) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any
of them:
(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a
higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation
property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial
and industrial property.
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be
made under clause ( I ) of this subsection.
730
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(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate
applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same
assessment jurisdiction.
(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission under subchapter 1 of chapter 105 of this title.
(c) Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to
the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district
court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other
jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent
a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted
under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true
market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5
percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other
commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. The burden of proof in determining assessed value and
true market value is governed by State law. If the ratio of the
assessed value of other commercial and industrial propeity in the
assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satisfaction of the district court through the random sampling method
k n o w n as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under
statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find,
as a violation of this section—
(1) an assessment of the rail transpoitation properly at a
value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail
transportation properly than the assessed value of all other
property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of all other commercial
and industrial property; and
(2) the collection of an ad valoiein pi ope My tax on the rail
transportation property at a lax rale that exceeds the tax ralio
rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district.
(Pub L. 95-473. Oct. 17. 1978. 92 Slat 1445 )
HlatortcaJ and Statutory Notes
Revised Section

Source (U.S.Code)

11503

49.26c

Source (Sialuies al Large)
Feb 4. 1887. ch 104. 24 Slat 379.
§ 28. added Feb 5. 1976.
Pub I 94-210. § 306. 90 Stal.
54; Oct
19. 1976. Pub L
94 S55. § 22(K». 90 Stal 2630

731

7 Motor vehicle salesman:
(a) application for license;
(b) salesman bond as prescribed in Utah Code
win. Section 41-3-17;
(c) picture of the applicant; and
(d) the fee required by law.
8 Distributor factory branch, distributor branch
representative:
(a) application for ucense; and
(b) the fee required by law.
9. New applicants may also be required to attend
in orientation class on motor vehicle laws and motor
,eh)de business laws before their license is issued.
|PJ7 41-1-4, 41-M. 41-J-U, 410-27. 41-1-21, 4I-Jtf. 41.J4. 41-M, 41-3-12

R884. Property Tax
RSS4-24. Property T o

R884-24. Property Tax
RSS4-24-SF. Abateaaeat or Deferral of Properly Taut
of ladlgeat Penou Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa.
SectSow 59.2-1107 taroagh 59-2-1109
RW4-24-TP. Asstsnaeat of Miaiat Properties P i n m i
to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-201
Rg*4-244P. Property Tax Wltaookiiag For Uraaiaai
aod Vaaadiuai MJoes Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa.
Sectioo 59-2-210 aod 59-2-211
RSS4-24-10P. Ttxatfoo of Uederfroead Rifits !• Laad
Tail Coataias Deposits of (XI or Gas Parsaaat to Utah

CooV Aaa. Sectfoas 5*2-2*1, 59-2-21«, tod 592-211
RSU-24-14P. Hlstork Pmerradoa Easeaaeats Parsaaat
to Utah Codt Aaa. SecOoas 4MIA-1 throaeh 4
Rtt4.24-14P. Asatsuaeat of laiertoeai Cooperadoa Act
Proiect Eatity Properties Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa.
Sectioa U-U-2S(4>
Rtt4.24-i7P. Reappraisal of Real Property by Coaafy
Assessors Parsaaat to Utah Coastftvttoa, Artiest XIII,
Sabsectioas 2 aod 11, aod Utaa Code Aaa. SocHooa 59Mt3, $9-2002, aad 59-2.79)4.
Rtt4-24-19P. Appraiser Ctnifleadaa Profraai Parsaaat
to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioas S9-2-701 aad 59-2-7t2
RU4-24-20P. Coastrorttoa Work ia Progress Panaaal
lo Utah Coast. Art. XIII. Sectioa 2; Utafe Code Aaa.
Seetioe 59-1-1; aad Utai Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-S1.
Rtt4-24-24P. Forai for Nofkt of Property VaJaatioo
aad Tax Caaaaes Pirsaaai to Utaa Codt Aaa. Sectioa
59*2-919
Rta4.24.25P. pTocedart for Aaeyaaet of 19* Properly
Tax Cxcaipdoa Heariaas For Nooproflt Hospitals aad
Nirriog Hotaca Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa
59-1-219
Rtt4-24-2dP. lUaaarttaeats of the Fanalaad Aaatataaeat
Act of 1949 Panaaat to Utah Codt Aaa. SeetSoaa 59*
2-541 taroagh 59-2-515
Rtt4.24.27P. Staadards far Asaesssaeat Lrrd
Perfonaaace Panaaat la Utai Code Aaa. Sectioa 59*
RtS4.24.2tP. Reporilat lUqairesaeats For Ltaaed or

Rtated Penoaal Property, Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa.
Sectioa 59-1.219
Rtt4-24-29P. TaxaMt Hoaseaotd Ftraisaiop Panaaal
to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-113
Rtt4-2402P. Leaseaold (Teaaati laiproveaaeats
Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-lfl
Rtt4-24-UP. Penoaal Property Vahiatioa Gaides aad
Schedules Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-1210
Rtt4-24-34P. Use of Appraisal laformaOoo Gathered ia
Coejsactioe Whh Asaessaeat/Saks Ratio Stadia*
Panaaat to Utah Codt Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-704

RSS4-24-5P. Abateaaeat or Deferral af Property
Taxes of ladlgeat Persoas Panaaat to Utah Code
Aaa. Sectioas 59-M107 (hroaga 59-2-1109
A. All sources of cash income shall be included in
amvint at annual gross income, inducting net rents,
interest, retirement income, welfare, social security,
etc.
B. Absence from the residence due to vacation,
confinement to hospital, or other similar temporary
situation shall not be deducted from the time requirement of ten-month's residency.
C. Written notification shall be given to any applicant whose application for abatement or deferral is
denied.
Rtt4.24.7P. Assessment of Miaiat Properties
Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-2SM
A. Definitions.
1. ' Mining property* means all taxable interests in
real property, improvements, and tangible penoaal
property owned or used in mixunt, processing, or
transportation of the product to the customary point
of sale or to the implied point of sale in the case of a
self-consumed mineral for both metalliferous and
nonmetalliferous mines.
2. 'Gross income* means actual receipts, plus the
fair value of selfconsumed minerals.
a. The fair value of self-consumed minerals is
determined annually by the Property Tax Division to
be either:
(1) allowable costs, plus an amount equal to allowable costs times the capitalization rate. Where the
taxpayer has outside sales and self-consumed,
minerals, the allowable costs shall be allocated
between the two on the oasts of the respective units
of measure in each category; or
Jfi value based upon representative sales pnee per
ton or other standard unit of measure of a like
mineral.
b. The method approved cannot be changed from
year to year unless approved by the Tax Commission.
3. "Allowable costs" means costs deductible in the
respective year, limited to the following:
a. management salaries;
b. labor;
c. payroll taxes and benefits;
d. workers' compensation insurance;
e. general insurance;
f. taxes;
g. supplies and tools;
h. power;
i. maintenance and repairs;
j. office and accounuat;
k. engineering;
1. sampling and assaying;
m. treatment;
n. letal fees;
o. royalties;
p. development expense;
q. transporuuoo;
r. miscellaneous; and
s. capital expenditures.
(1) No deduction ts allowed for interest or mine
exploration costs.
4. 'Net revenue' means gross income minus allowable costs.
5. 'Capital expenditure" means the total cost of
purchasing an asset used in the mining operation and
includes:
a. purchase price,
b. transportation costs,
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c transportation costs,
d. installation charges, and
e sales tax
6. "Nonproductng mine" means a mine that has
been closed for a continuous 12-month period, or
land held in reserve under a ounerai lease not reasonably necessary, indispensable, or needed in the
actual mining and extraction process in the current
tax year.
B. The capitalization rate shall be determined by
the Tax Commission using methods such as:
1. the summation method;
2 the weighted cost of capital
a. The cost of debt should consider current market
yields.
b. The cost of equity shall be determined by the
capital asset pricing model, nsk premium model,
discounted cash flow, or a combination thereof or
any other accepted methodology.
C. The income indicator of value shall be computed as follows:
1. annual net revenue, both net losses and net
gams, from the mining property for each of the
immediate past five years (or years in operation if
less than five years), shall be adjusted by an appropriate index of inflation;
2. average annual net revenue is the sum of the
values obtained above divided by the number of
years; i.e., five or less;
3. the average annual net revenue is divided by the
capitalization rate.
D. Reporting shall be on a calendar or fiscal year
basis consistently followed, with Tax Commission
approval.
RSS4-244P. Property Tax WithhoMisg For
I n a i u a aid Vaaadiuai Miaes Pursuant to Utah
Code A M . Section 5*-2-210 sad 5*-2-211
A. A list of mine owners and operators who have
made lump sum security deposits with the Tax
Commission will be furnished annually by the Commission to any person, mill, buying station, or other
legal entity receiving uranium or vanadium ore
mined, produced, or received from within Utah.
B. If not on the Tax Commission's original, or
subsequently updated list, the security deposit shall
be obtained through withholding as provided below:
1. Any person, mill, buying station, or other legal
entity receiving uranium or vanadium ore mined,
produced, or received from within Utah shall withheld 4 percent (or such higher amount as determined
by the Tax Commission) of the gross proceeds due to
the mine operators or owners.
2. All amounts withheld shall be remitted to the
Tax Commission by the last days of April, July,
October, and January for the immediately preceding
calendar quarter, on forms and in a manner as set
forth by the Tax Commission.
3. Not later than the last day of February, the
owners, or operators of each uranium and vanadium
mine shall be provided with a statement from the
Tax Commission showing all security deposit
amounts withheld from their gross proceeds during
the previous calendar year.
4. The Tax Commission shall provide the county
treasurers with a list of all uranium and vanadium
producers who have had security deposit amounts
withheld. The county treasurers shall then forward to
the Tax Commission an accounting of the amount of
taxes due from each taxpayer on the Tax Commissioa'slist.
5. Once all county treasurers have responded, the

Tax Commission shall forward to each county treasurer the taxes due, or the pro rata portion thereof,
to the extent said taxes have been withheld and
remitted to the Tax Commission
a. Any amount withheld in excess of the total taxes
due to ail counties shall be refunded to the appropriate producer by the Tax Commission.
b If the amount withheld is not sufficient to pav
the full amount of taxes due. the countv treasurers
shall collect the balance of said taxes directly from
the producers.
RSS4-24-10P. Taxation of Underground Rights Is
Land That Contains Deposits of Oil or Gas
Pursuant to t u b Code Aaa. Sections 59-2-201.
5*-2-210, aad 59-2-211
A. Definitions.
1. "Person" as defined in Utah Code Ann. Section
6S-3-12.
2. "Unit" as defined in Utah Code Ann. Section 592-210(3KF).
3. "Working interest owner" as defined in Utah
Code Ann. Section 59-2-210.
4. "Unit operator* means a person who operates
all of the producing wells in a unit.
5. "Independent operator" means a person operating an oil or gas producing property not in a unit.
6. One person can, at the same tune, be a unit
operator, a working interest owner, and an independent operator and must comply with ail requirements of this rule based upon his status in the various
situations.
B. Assessment Procedures.
1. Underground rights in lands containing deposits
of oil or gas and tangible property used in the operation of such rights, are subject to assessment by the
Tax Commission.
2. These rights and the tangible property used
therewith shall be assessed in the name of the unit
operator, the independent operator or other person
as the facts may warrant.
3. The taxable value of the underground oil rights
shall be 400 percent of the proceeds from the sale of
oil production from each such property during the
calendar year prior to the date of assessment, less
applicable exempt federal, state, Indian royalties, and
windfall profits tax.
4. The taxable value of the underground gas rights
shall be 400 percent of the proceeds from the sale of
gas production from each such property during the
calendar year prior to the date of assessment, less
applicable exempt federal, state, and Indian royalties.
5. The reasonable taxable value of productive
underground oil and gas rights shall be determined
by the method described in Subsections B.l. or B.2.
of this rule or such other valuation method that the
Tax Commission believes to be reasonably determinative of the property's fair market value.
6. All other tangible property shall be valued at
fair market value as determined by the Tax Commission.
C. Assessment Credits Greater Altamont/Bluebell
Field
1. Oil properties in the Greater Altamont/Bluebell
field shall receive a credit of 20 percent. All qualified
property shall therefore be valued at 80 percent of
the taxable value. This credit does not apply to gas
production.
2. The Greater Altamont/Bluebefl field is actually
comprised of three separate fields. These include
Altamont field. Bluebell field, and Cedar Rim field
as recorded by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and
CoocCo
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Art. VI

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

ARTICLE VI
[MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS]
[Assumption of public debt — Supreme Law — Oath of office — Religious tests prohibited-]
[1.] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under
this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
[3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both
of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.

ARTICLE VII
[ADOPTION]
[Ratification — Attestation.]
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.
Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of the states present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred
and eighty seven, and of the independence of the United States of America the
twelfth. In Witness Whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names,
Attest:
W7ILLIAM JACKSON,

Go. WASHINGTON — Presidt.
and deputy from Virginia

Secretary

New Hampshire

JOHN LANGDON,
NICHOLAS GILMAN.

Massachusetts

NATHANIEL GORHAM,
RUFUS KING.

Connecticut

WM. SAML. JOHNSON,
ROGER SHERMAN.

New York
New Jersey

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
WIL: LIVINGSTON,
DAVID BREARLEY,
WM. PATERSON,
JONA: DAYTON.
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AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec* 3- [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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Amend. XIV, § 4 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16,
1866, declared to have been ratified by threefourths of all the states on July 28, 1868

AMENDMENT XV
Section
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not 2 [Power to enforce amendment ]
to disqualify.]

Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to
disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.

Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
History: Proposed by Congress on February
27, 1869, declared to have been ratified by

more than three-fourths of all the states on
March 30, 1870

AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.
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NOTE Where it u feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

NORDLINGER v. HAHN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TAX
ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
No. 90-1912.

Argued February 25, 1992—Decided June 18, 1992

In response to rapidly rising real property taxes, California voters
approved a statewide ballot initiative, Proposition 13, which added
Article XIIIA to the State Constitution. Among other things, Article
XIIIA embodies an "acquisition value" system of taxation, whereby
property is reassessed up to current appraised value upon new
construction or a change in ownership. Exemptions from this reassessment provision exist for two types of transfers: exchanges of
principal residences by persons over the age of 55 and transfers
between parents and children. Over time, the acquisition-value
system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons
owning similar pieces of property. Longer-term owners pay lower
taxes reflecting historic property values, while newer owners pay
higher taxes reflecting more recent values. Faced with such a
disparity, petitioner, a former Los Angeles apartment renter who had
recently purchased a house in Los Angeles County, filed suit against
respondents, the county and its tax assessor, claiming that Article
XIIIA's reassessment scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The County Superior Court dismissed
the complaint without leave to amend, and the State Court of Appeal
affirmed.
Held: Article XIIIA's acquisition-value assessment scheme does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 7-15.
(a) Unless a state-imposed classification warrants some form of
heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental
right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification
rationally further a legitimate state interest. Pp. 7-8.
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NORDLINGER v. HAHN
Syllabus
(b) Petitioner may not assert the constitutional right to travel as
a basis for heightened review of Article XIIIA. Her complaint does
not allege that she herself has been impeded from traveling or from
settling in California because, before purchasing her home, she
already lived in Los Angeles. Prudential standing principles prohibiting a litigant's raising another person's legal rights may not be
overlooked in this case, since petitioner has not identified any
obstacle preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California
from asserting claims on their own, nor shown any special relationship with those whose rights she seeks to assert. P. 8.
(c) In permitting longer-term owners to pay less in taxes than
newer owners of comparable property, Article XIIIA's assessment
scheme rationally furthers at least two legitimate state interests.
First, because the State has a legitimate interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability, it legitimately can decide
to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership
of homes and businesses. Second, the State legitimately can conclude
that a new owner, at the point of purchasing his property, does not
have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher
taxes as does an existing owner, who is already saddled with his
purchase and does not have the option of deciding not to buy his
home if taxes become prohibitively high. Pp. 8-12.
(d) Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster, 488 U. S. 336, is not
controlling here, since the facts of that case precluded any plausible
inference that the purpose of the tax assessment practice there
invalidated was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax
scheme. Pp. 12-14.
(e) Article XIIIA's two reassessment exemptions rationally further
legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably could have
concluded that older persons in general should not be discouraged
from exchanging their residences for ones more suitable to their
changing family sizes or incomes, and that the interests of family and
neighborhood continuity and stability are furthered by and warrant
an exemption for transfers between parents and children. Pp. 14-15.
(f) Because Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, this Court must
decline petitioner's request to invalidate it, even if it may appear to
be improvident and unwise yet unlikely ever to be reconsidered or
repealed by ordinary democratic processes. P. 15.
225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER,
JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part II-A. THOMAS,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Cited 52 CCH S. Ct. Bull, p^
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 90-1912

STEPHANIE NORDLINGER, PETITIONER v.
KENNETH HAHN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TAX
ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 18, 1992]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1978, California voters staged what has been described
as a property tax revolt1 by approving a statewide ballot
initiative known as Proposition 13. The adoption of
Proposition 13 served to amend the California Constitution
to impose strict limits on the rate at which real property is
taxed and on the rate at which real property assessments
are increased from year to year. In this litigation, we
consider a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the manner in which real
property now is assessed under the California Constitution.
I
A
Proposition 13 followed many years of rapidly rising real
property taxes in California. From fiscal years 1967-1968
to 1971-1972, revenues from these taxes increased on an
average of 11.5 percent per year. See Report of the Senate
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the
California State Senate 23 (1991). In response, the Califor-

*See N.Y. Times, June 8,1978, p. 23, col. 1; Washington Post, June 11,
1978, p. Hi.
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nia Legislature enacted several property tax relief measures, including a cap on tax rates in 1972. Id.y at 23-24.
The boom in the State's real estate market persevered,
however, and the median price of an existing home doubled
from $31,530 in 1973 to $62,430 in 1977. As a result, tax
levies continued to rise because of sharply increasing
assessment values. Id., at 23. Some homeowners saw their
tax bills double or triple during this period, well outpacing
any growth in their income and ability to pay. Id., at 25.
See also Oakland, Proposition 13—Genesis and Consequences, 32 Nat. Tax J. 387, 392 (Supp. June 1979).
By 1978, property tax relief had emerged as a major
political issue in California. In only one month's time, tax
relief advocates collected over 1.2 million signatures to
qualify Proposition 13 for the June 1978 ballot. See Lefcoe
& Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador
Valley Case, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 173,174 (1978). On election
day, Proposition 13 received a favorable vote of 64.8 percent
and carried 55 of the State's 58 counties. California
Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement,
Primary Election, June 6,1978, p. 39. California thus had
a novel constitutional amendment that led to a property tax
cut of approximately $7 billion in the first year. Senate
Commission Report, at 28. A California homeowner with a
$50,000 home enjoyed an immediate reduction of about
$750 per year in property taxes. Id., at 26.
As enacted by Proposition 13, Article XIIIA of the
California Constitution caps real property taxes at 1% of a
property's afull cash value." § 1(a). <Tull cash value" is
defined as the assessed valuation as of the 1975-1976 tax
year or, "thereafter, the appraised value of real property
when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment." §2(a). The
assessment "may reflect from year to year the inflationary
rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year." §2(b).
Article XIIIA also contains several exemptions from this
reassessment provision. One exemption authorizes the
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legislature to allow homeowners over the age of 55 who sell
their principal residences to carry their previous base-year
assessments with them to replacement residences of equal
or lesser value. §2(a). A second exemption applies to
transfers of a principal residence (and up to $1 million of
other real property) between parents and children. § 2(h).
In short, Article XIIIA combines a 1% ceiling on the
property tax rate with a 2% cap on annual increases in
assessed valuations. The assessment limitation, however,
is subject to the exception that new construction or a
change of ownership triggers a reassessment up to current
appraised value. Thus, the assessment provisions of Article
XIIIA essentially embody an "acquisition value" system of
taxation rather than the more commonplace "current value"
taxation. Real property is assessed at values related to the
value of the property at the time it is acquired by the
taxpayer rather than to the value it has in the current real
estate market.
Over time, this acquisition-value system has created
dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons owning
similar pieces of property. Property values in California
have inflated far in excess of the allowed 2% cap on
increases in assessments for property that is not newly
constructed or that has not changed hands. See Senate
Commission Report, at 31-32. As a result, longer-term
property owners pay lower property taxes reflecting historic
property values, while newer owners pay higher property
taxes reflecting more recent values. For that reason,
Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a "welcome
stranger" system—the newcomer to an established community is "welcome" in anticipation that he will contribute a
larger percentage of support for local government than his
settled neighbor who owns a comparable home. Indeed, in
dollar terms, the differences in tax burdens are staggering.
By 1989, the 44% of California home owners who have
owned their homes since enactment of Proposition 13 in
1978 shouldered only 25% of the more than $4 billion in
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residential property taxes paid by homeowners statewide.
Id., at 33. If property values continue to rise more than the
annual 2% inflationary cap, this disparity will continue to
grow.

8
According to her amended complaint, petitioner Stephanie
Nordlinger in November 1988 purchased a house in the
Baldwin Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles County for
$170,000. App. 5. The prior owners bought the home just
two years before for $121,500. Id., at 6. Before her
purchase, petitioner had lived in a rented apartment in Los
Angeles and had not owned any real property in California.
Id., at 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12.
In early 1989, petitioner received a notice from the Los
Angeles County Tax Assessor, who is a respondent here,
informing her that her home had been reassessed upward
to $170,100 on account of its change in ownership. App. 7.
She learned that the reassessment resulted in a property
tax increase of $453.60, up 36% to $1,701, for the
1988-1989 fiscal year. Ibid.
Petitioner later discovered she was paying about five
times more in taxes than some of her neighbors who owned
comparable homes since 1975 within the same residential
development. For example, one block away, a house of
identical size on a lot slightly larger than petitioner's was
subject to a general tax levy of only $358.20 (based on an
assessed valuation of $35,820, which reflected the home's
value in 1975 plus the up-to-2% per year inflation factor).
Id., at 9-10.2 According to petitioner, her total property

Petitioner proffered to the trial court additional evidence suggesting
that the disparities in residential tax burdens were greater in other Los
Angeles County neighborhoods. For example, a small 2-bedroom house
in Santa Monica that was previously assessed at $27,000 and that was
sold for $465,000 in 1989 would be subject to a tax levy of $4,650, a bill
17 times more than the $270 paid the year before by the previous owner.
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taxes over the first 10 years in her home will approach
$19,000, while any neighbor who bought a comparable
home in 1975 stands to pay just $4,100. Brief for Petitioner
3. The general tax levied against her modest home is only
a few dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a
$2.1 million Malibu beachfront home. App. 24.
After exhausting administrative remedies, petitioner
brought suit against respondents in Los Angeles Coimty
Superior Court. She sought a tax refund and a declaration
that her tax was unconstitutional.3 In her amended
complaint, she alleged: "Article XIIIA has created an
arbitrary system which assigns disparate real property tax
burdens on owners of generally comparable and similarly
situated properties without regard to the use of the real
property taxed, the burden the property places on government, the actual value of the property or the financial
capability of the property owner." Id., at 12. Respondents
demurred. Jd.,atl4. By minute order, the Superior Court
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint
without leave to amend. App. to Pet. for Cert. D2.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Nordlinger v.
Lynch, 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990). It

App. 76-77. Petitioner also proffered evidence suggesting that similar
disparities obtained with respect to apartment buildings and commercial
and industrial income-producing properties. Id., at 68-69, 82-85.
^California by statute grants a cause of action to a taxpayer "where the
alleged illegal or unconstitutional assessment or collection occurs as the
direct result of a change in administrative regulations or statutory or
constitutional law that became effective not more than 12 months prior
to the date the action is initiated by the taxpayer." Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code Ann. § 4808 (West 1987). Although Proposition 13 was enacted 11
years before she filed her complaint, petitioner contended that the
relevant change in law was this Court's decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), decided 9 months
before petitioner filed her amended complaint. Because the California
courts did not discuss whether petitioner's action was timely under
§ 4808, we do not do so.
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noted that the Supreme Court of California already had
rejected a constitutional challenge to the disparities in
taxation resulting from Article XIIIA. See Amador Valley
Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal.3d 208,583 P.2d 1281 (1978). Characterizing Article
XIIIA as an "acquisition value" system, the Court of Appeal
found it survived equal protection review, because it was
supported by at least two rational bases:first,it prevented
property taxes from reflecting unduly inflated and unforeseen current values, and, second, it allowed property owners
to estimate future liability with substantial certainty. 225
Cal.App.3d, at 1273, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 691-692 (citing
Amador, 22 Cal.3d, at 235, 583 R2d, at 1293).
The Court of Appeal also concluded that this Court's more
recent decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster
County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), did not warrant a different
result. At issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh was the practice of
a West Virginia county tax assessor of assessing recently
purchased property on the basis of its purchase price, while
making only minor modifications in the assessments of
property that had not recently been sold. Properties that
had been sold recently were reassessed and taxed at values
between 8 and 35 times that of properties that had not been
sold. Id., at 341. This Court determined that the unequal
assessment practice violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court of Appeal distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh
on grounds that "California has opted for an assessment
method based on each individual owner's acquisition cost,"
while, a[i]n marked contrast, the West Virginia Constitution
requires property to be taxed at a uniform rate statewide
according to its estimated current market value* (emphasis
in original). 225 Cal.App.3d, at 1277-1278, 275 Cal. Rptr.,
at 695. Thus, the Court of Appeal found: "Allegheny does
not prohibit the states from adopting an acquisition value
assessment method. That decision merely prohibits the
arbitrary enforcement of a current value assessment
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method" (emphasis omitted). Id., at 1265, 275 Cal. Rptr.,
at 686.
The Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner's argument
that the effect of Article XIIIA on the constitutional right to
travel warranted heightened equal protection review. The
court determined that therightto travel was not infringed,
because Article XIIIA "bases each property owner's assessment on acquisition value, irrespective of the owner's status
as a California resident or the owner's length of residence
in the state." Id.9 at 1281, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697. Any
benefit to longtime California residents was deemed
"incidental" to an acquisition-value approach. Finally, the
Court of Appeal found its conclusion was unchanged by the
exemptions in Article XIIIA. Ibid., 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697.
The Supreme Court of California denied review. App. to
Pet. for Cert. Bl. We granted certiorari.
U. S.
(1991).
II
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, §1, commands that no State shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion
between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause
does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who
are in all relevant respects alike. F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).
As a general rule, "legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
Accordingly, this Court's cases are clear that, unless a
classification warrants some form of heightened review
because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the
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classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.
See, e. g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S.
432, 439-441 (1985); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297,
303 (1976).
A
At the outset, petitioner suggests that her challenge to
Article XIIIA qualifies for heightened scrutiny because it
infringes upon the constitutional right to travel. See, e.g.,
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982); Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 254-256
(1976). In particular, petitioner alleges that the exemptions
to reassessment for transfers by owners over 55 and for
transfers between parents and children run afoul of the
right to travel, because they classify directly on the basis of
California residency. But the complaint does not allege
that petitioner herself has been impeded from traveling or
from settling in California because, as has been noted, prior
to purchasing her home, petitioner lived in an apartment in
Los Angeles. This Court's prudential standing principles
impose a "general prohibition on a litigant's raising another
person's legal rights." Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751
(1984). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S.
163, 166 (1972). Petitioner has not identified any obstacle
preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California
from asserting claims on their own behalf, nor has she
shown any special relationship with those whose rights she
seeks to assert, such that we might overlook this prudential
limitation. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S.
617, 623, n. 3 (1989). Accordingly, petitioner may not
assert the constitutional right to travel as a basis for
heightened review.
B
The appropriate standard of review is whether the
difference in treatment between newer and older owners
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In general,
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the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is
a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,174,
179 (1980), the legislative facts on which the classification
is apparently based rationally may have been considered to
be true by the governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456,464 (1981), and
the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S.,
at 446. This standard is especially deferential in the
context of classifications made by complex tax laws. *[I]n
structuring internal taxation schemes 'the States have large
leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which
in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation."
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14, 22 (1985), quoting
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356,
359 (1973). See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Washington, 461 U. S. 540, 547 (1983) ("Legislatures
have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and
distinctions in tax statutes").
As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does
not discriminate with respect to either the tax rate or the
annual rate of adjustment in assessments. Newer and older
owners alike benefit in both the short and long run from
the protections of a 1% tax rate ceiling and no more than a
2% increase in assessment value per year. New owners and
old owners are treated differently with respect to one factor
only—the basis on which their property is initially assessed.
Petitioner's true complaint is that the State has denied
her—a new owner—the benefit of the same assessment
value that her neighbors—older owners—enjoy.
We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational
or reasonable considerations of difference or policy that
justify denying petitioner the benefits of her neighbors'
lower assessments. First, the State has a legitimate
interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and
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stability. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
The State therefore legitimately can decide to structure its
tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership of
homes and businesses, for example, in order to inhibit
displacement of lower income families by the forces of
gentrification or of established, "mom-and-pop" businesses
by newer chain operations. By permitting older owners to
pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of comparable property, the Article XIIIA assessment scheme
rationally furthers this interest.
Second, the State legitimately can conclude that a new
owner at the time of acquiring his property does not have
the same reliance interest warranting protection against
higher taxes as does an existing owner. The State may
deny a new owner at the point of purchase the right to "lock
in" to the same assessed value as is enjoyed by an existing
owner of comparable property, because an existing owner
rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in
his property or home that are more deserving of protection
than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the
point of purchase. A new owner has full information about
the scope of future tax Lability before acquiring the
property, and if he thinks the future tax burden is too
demanding, he can decide not to complete the purchase at
all. By contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with
his purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to
buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high. To meet
his tax obligations, he might be forced to sell his home or to
divert his income away from the purchase of food, clothing,
and other necessities. In short, the State may decide that
it is worse to have owned and lost, than never to have
owned at all.
This Court previously has acknowledged that classifications serving to protect legitimate expectation and reliance
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interests do not deny equal protection of the laws.4 "The
protection of reasonable reliance interests is not only a
legitimate governmental objective: it provides an exceedingly persuasive justification. . . " (internal quotations omitted). Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 746 (1984). For
example, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U. S.
450 (1988), the Court determined that a prohibition on user
fees for bus service in "reorganized" school districts but not
in "nonreorganized" school districts does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, because "the legislature could
conceivably have believed that such a policy would serve
the legitimate purpose of fulfilling the reasonable expectations of those residing in districts with free busing arrangements imposed by reorganization plans." Id., at 465.
Similarly, in United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
supra, the Court determined that a denial of dual "windfall"
retirement benefits to some railroad workers but not others
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because
"Congress could properly conclude that persons who had
actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits
while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater
equitable claim to those benefits than the members of
appellee's class who were no longer in railroad employment
when they became eligible for dual benefits." 449 U. S., at

4

Outside the context of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has not
hesitated to recognize the legitimacy of protecting reliance and expectational interests. See, e.g.y Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978)
("protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place"); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (whether regulation
of property constitutes a "taking* depends in part on "the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601 (1972) (state law
"property" interest for purpose of federal due process denotes "interests
that are secured by existing rules or understandings") (internal
quotations omitted).
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178. Finally, in New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, the Court
determined that an ordinance banning certain street-vendor
operations, but grandfathering existing vendors who had
been in operation for more than eight years, did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because the "city could reasonably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have
built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation." 427 U. S., at 305.6
Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA cannot be distinguished from the tax assessment practice found to violate
the Equal Protection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh. Like
Article XIIIA, the practice at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh
resulted in dramatic disparities in taxation of properties of
comparable value. But an obvious and critical factual
difference between this case and Allegheny Pittsburgh is the
absence of any indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the
policies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme
could conceivably have been the purpose for the Webster
County tax assessor's unequal assessment scheme. In the
first place, Webster County argued that "its assessment
scheme is rationally related to its purpose of assessing
properties at true current value" (emphasis added). Id., at
488 U. S., at 343.6 Moreover, the West Virginia "Constitu-

5

Because we conclude that Article XIIIA rationally furthers the State's
interests in neighborhood stability and the protection of property owners'
reliance interests, we need not consider whether it permissibly serves
other interests discussed by the parties, including whether it taxes real
property according to the taxpayers' ability to pay or whether it taxes
real property in such a way as to promote stability of local tax revenues.
*Webster County argued that the outdated assessments it used were
consistent with current-value taxation, because periodic upward
adjustments were made for inflation and it was not feasible to reassess
individually each piece of property every year. Although the county
obliquely referred in a footnote to the advantages of historical cost
accounting, Brief for Respondent in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Webster County, O.T. 1988, No. 87-1303, p. 30, n. 23, this was not an
assertion of the general policies supporting acquisition-value taxation.
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tion and laws provide that all property of the kind held by
petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the
State according to its estimated market valued and the
Court found "no suggestion" that "the State may have
adopted a different system in practice from that specified by
statute." 7d,at345.
To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand
for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or
governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the
purpose or rationale supporting its classification. United
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179.
See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969) (legitimate state purpose may
be ascertained even when the legislative or administrative
history is silent). Nevertheless, this Court's review does
require that a purpose may conceivably or "may reasonably
have been the purpose and policy" of the relevant governmental decisionmaker. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.
Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 528-529 (1959). See also Schweiker
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 235 (1981) (classificatory scheme
must "rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable
governmental objective" (emphasis added)). Allegheny
Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any
plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisitionvalue tax scheme.7 By contrast, Article XIIIA was enacted

Even if acquisition-value policies had been asserted, the assertion would
have been nonsensical given its inherent inconsistency with the county's
principal argument that it was in fact trying to promote current-value
taxation.
7
In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959), the
Court distinguished on similar grounds its decision in Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949), which invalidated a state
statutory scheme exempting from taxation certain notes and accounts
receivable owned by residents of the State but not notes and accounts
receivable owned by nonresidents. 358 U. S., at 529. After the Court in
Wheeling Steel determined that the statutory scheme's stated purpose
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precisely to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value
system. Allegheny Pittsburgh is not controlling here.8
Finally, petitioner contends that the unfairness of Article
XIIIA is made worse by its exemptions from reassessment
for two special classes of new owners: persons aged 55 and
older, who exchange principal residences, and children who
acquire property from their parents. This Court previously
has declined to hold that narrow exemptions from a general
scheme of taxation necessarily render the overall scheme
invidiously discriminatory. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. at 550-551
(denial of tax exemption to nonprofit lobbying organizations,
but with an exception for veterans' groups, does not violate
equal protection). For purposes of rational-basis review, the
"latitude of discretion is notably wide in . . . the granting of
partial or total exemptions upon grounds of policy." F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S., at 415.
The two exemptions at issue here rationally further
legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably
could have concluded that older persons in general should
not be discouraged from moving to a residence more
suitable to their changing family size or income. Similarly,

was not legitimate, the other purposes did not need to be considered
because *[h]aving themselves specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio
statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence."
Id, at 530.
*In finding Allegheny Pittsburgh distinguishable, we do not suggest
that the protections of the Equal Protection Clause are any less when the
classification is drawn by legislative mandate, as in this case, than by
administrative action as in Allegheny Pittsburgh. See Sunday Lake Iron
Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 (1918). Nor do we suggest that the
Equal Protection Clause constrains administrators, as in Allegheny
Pittsburgh, from violating state law requiring uniformity of taxation of
property. See Nashville, C. & St. L R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362,
368-370 (1940); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. King County, 264
U. S. 22, 27-28 (1924). See generally Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1,
8-11 (1944).
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the people of California reasonably could have concluded
that the interests of family and neighborhood continuity
and stability are furthered by and warrant an exemption for
transfers between parents and children. Petitioner has not
demonstrated that no rational bases lie for either of these
exemptions.
Ill
Petitioner and amici argue with some appeal that Article
XIIIAfrustratesthe "American dream" of home ownership
for many younger and poorer California families. They
argue that Article XIIIA places start-up businesses that
depend on ownership of property at a severe disadvantage
in competing with established businesses. They argue that
Article XIIIA dampens demand for and construction of new
housing and buildings. And they argue that Article XIIIA
constricts local tax revenues at the expense of public
education and vital services.
Time and again, however, this Court has made clear in
the rational-basis context that the "Constitution presumes
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political
branch has acted" (footnote omitted). Vance v. Bradley, 440
U. S. 93, 97 (1979). Certainly, California's grand experiment appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and
entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court of Appeal
surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to
prompt its reconsideration or repeal. See 225 Cal. App. 3d,
at 1282, n. 11, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 698, n. 11. Yet many wise
and well-intentioned laws suffer from the same malady.
Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline
petitioner's request to upset the will of the people of
California.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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STEPHANIE NORDLINGER, PETITIONER v.
KENNETH HAHN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TAX
ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 18,1992]
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission
of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), this Court struck
down an assessment method used in Webster County, West
Virginia, that operated precisely the same way as the
California scheme being challenged today. I agree with the
Court that Proposition 13 is constitutional. But I also agree
with JUSTICE STEVENS that Allegheny Pittsburgh cannot be
distinguished, see post, at 5. lb me Allegheny Pittsburgh
represents a "needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on
the State's legislative powers," New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U. S. 297, 306 (1976) (per curiam), and I write separately
because I see no benefit, and much risk, in refusing to
confront it directly.

I
Allegheny Pittsburgh involved a county assessment
scheme indistinguishable in relevant respectsfromProposition 13. As the Court explains, California taxes real
property at 1% of "full cash value,* which means the
"assessed value" as of 1975 (under the previous method)
and after 1975-1976 the "appraised value of real property
when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in value
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has occurred after the 1975 assessment." The assessed
value may be increased for inflation, but only at a maximum rate of 2% each year. See California Const., Art.
XIIIA, §§ 1(a), 2(a); ante, at 2. The property tax system
worked much the same way in Webster County, West
Virginia. The tax assessor assigned real property an
"appraised value," set the "assessed value" at half of the
appraised value, then collected taxes by multiplying the
assessed value by the relevant tax rate. For property that
had been sold recently, the assessor set the appraised value
at the most recent price of purchase. For property that had
not been sold recently, she increased the appraised price by
10%, first in 1976, then again in 1981 and 1983.
The assessor's methods resulted in "dramatic differences
in valuation between . . . recently transferred property and
otherwise comparable surrounding land." 488 U. S., at 341;
cf. Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 261, 269-270 (1990) (discussing the effects of
Proposition 13); Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A
Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County
Commission, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 87, 91, and n. 29 (1990);
Hellerstein & Peters, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Have Far-Reaching Implications, 70 J. Taxation 306,
308-310 (1989). Several coal companies that owned
property in Webster County sued the county assessor,
alleging violations of both the West Virginia and the United
States Constitutions. The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia upheld the assessment against the companies, but this Court reversed.
The Allegheny Pittsburgh Court asserted that with
respect to taxation, the Equal Protection Clause constrains
the States as follows. Although "[t]he use of a general
adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual
reappraisal violates no constitutional command," the Clause
requires that "general adjustments [be] accurate enough
over a short period of time to equalize the differences in
proportion between the assessments of a class of property
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holders." 488 U. S., at 343. "[T]he constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in
tax treatment of similarly situated property owners." Ibid.
(citing Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522,
526-527 (1959)). Moreover, the Court stated, the Constitution and laws of West Virginia "provide that all property of
the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform
throughout the State according to its estimated market
value," and "[t]here [was] no suggestion . . . that the State
may have adopted a different system in practice from that
specified by statute." 488 U. S., at 345. "Indeed, [the
assessor's] practice seems contrary to that of the guide
published by the West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid
to local assessors in the assessment of real property." Ibid.;
see also ibid. ("We are not advised of any West Virginia
statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of
the State to fashion their own substantive assessment
policies independently of state statute"). The Court refused
to decide "whether the Webster County assessment method
would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a
State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational
enforcement policy it appears to be." Id., at 344, n. 4.
Finally, the Court declared, "'[I]ntentional systematic
undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property
in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one
taxed upon the full value of his property/" Id., at 345
(quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350,
352-353 (1918), and citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923), and Cumberland Coal Co. v.
Board of Revision of Tax Assessments in Green County, Pa.,
284 U. S. 23 (1931)). The Court concluded that the assessments for the coal companies' properties had failed these
requisites of the Equal Protection Clause.
II
As the Court accurately states today, "this Court's cases"
—Allegheny Pittsburgh aside—"are clear that, unless a
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classification warrants some form of heightened review
because it jeopardizes [the] exercise of a fundamental right
or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest."
Ante, at 7; see also Burlington N. R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U. S.
,
(1992); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973). The California tax system, like
most, does not involve either suspect classes or fundamental
rights, and the Court properly reviews California's classification for a rational basis. Today's review, however, differs
from the review in Allegheny Pittsburgh.
The Court's analysis in Allegheny Pittsburgh is susceptible, I think, to at least three interpretations. The first is
the one offered by petitioner. Under her reading of the
case, properties are "similarly situated" or within the same
"class" for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause
when they are located in roughly the same types of neighborhoods, for example, are roughly the same size, and are
roughly the same in other, unspecified ways. According to
petitioner, the Webster County assessor's plan violated the
Equal Protection Clause because she had failed to achieve
a "seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment" of all the objectively comparable properties in
Webster County, presumably those with about the same
acreage and about the same amount of coal. Petitioner
contends that Proposition 13 suffers from similar flaws. In
1989, she points out, "the long-time owner of a stately
7,800-square-foot, seven-bedroom mansion on a huge lot in
Beverly Hills (among the most luxurious homes in one of
the most expensive neighborhoods in Los Angeles County)
. • . paid less property tax annually than the new homeowner of a tiny 980-square-foot home on a small lot in an
extremely modest Venice neighborhood." Brief for Petitioner 5; see also id., at 7 (Petitioner's "1988 property tax
assessment on her unpretentious Baldwin Hills tract home
is almost identical to that of a pre-1976 owner of a fabulous
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beach-front Malibu residential property worth $2.1 million,
even though her property is worth only l/12th as much as
his"). Because California not only has not tried to repair
this systematic, intentional, and gross disparity in taxation,
but has enacted it into positive law, petitioner argues,
Proposition 13 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
This argument rests, in my view, on a basic misunderstanding of Allegheny Pittsburgh. The Court there proceeded on the assumption of law (assumed because the parties
did not contest it) that the initial classification, by the
State, was constitutional, and the assumption of fact
(assumed because the parties had so stipulated) that the
properties were comparable under the State's classification.
But cf. Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 271-272 (noting
that some of the properties contained coal and others did
not). In referring to the tax treatment of a "class of
property holders," or "similarly situated property owners,"
488 U. S., at 343, the Court did not purport to review the
constitutionality of the initial classification, by market
value, drawn by the State, as opposed to the further
subclassification within the initial class, by acquisition
value, drawn by the assessor. Instead, Allegheny Pittsburgh assumed that whether properties or persons are
similarly situated depended on state law, and not, as
petitioner argues, on some neutral criteria such as size or
location that serve as proxies for market value. Under that
theory, market value would be the only rational basis for
classifying property But the Equal Protection Clause does
not prescribe a single method of taxation. We have consistently rejected petitioner's theory, see, e. g.y Ohio Oil Co. v.
Conway, 281 U. S. 146 (1930); BelVs Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890), and the Court properly rejects
it today.
Allegheny Pittsburgh, then, does not prevent the State of
California from classifying properties on the basis of their
value at acquisition, so long as the classification is supported by a rational basis. I agree with the Court that it is,
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both for the reasons given by this Court, see ante, at 9-12,
and for the reasons given by the Supreme Court of California in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P. 2d 1281
(1978). But the classification employed by the Webster
County assessor, indistinguishable from California's, was
rational for all those reasons as well. In answering
petitioner's argument that Allegheny Pittsburgh controls
here, respondents offer a second explanation for that case.
JUSTICE STEVENS gives much the same explanation, see
post, at 4-5, though he concludes in the end that Proposition 13, after Allegheny Pittsburgh, is unconstitutional.
According to respondents, the Equal Protection Clause
permits a State itself to determine which properties are
similarly situated, as the State of California did here
(classifying properties by acquisition value) and as the State
of West Virginia did in Allegheny Pittsburgh (classifying
properties by market value). But once a state does so,
respondents suggest, the Equal Protection Clause requires
after Allegheny Pittsburgh that properties in the same class
be accorded seasonably equal treatment and not be intentionally and systematically undervalued. Proposition 13
provides for the assessment of properties in the same statedetermined class regularly and at roughly full value; this
contrasts with the tax scheme in Webster County, where by
dividing property in the same class (by market value) into
a subclass (by acquisition value), the assessor regularly
undervalued the property similarly situated. This, according to respondents, made the Webster County scheme
unconstitutional, and distinguishes Proposition 13.
Respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh is, in my
view, as misplaced as petitioner's; their test, for starters,
comes with a dubious pedigree. In one of the cases cited in
Allegheny Pittsburgh, Allied Stores, we upheld against
an equal protection challenge a statute that exempted some
corporationsfromad valorem taxes imposed on others. Not
only does Allied Stores not even hint that the Constitution
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*require[s] . . . the seasonable attainment of a rough
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property
owners,* 488 U. S., at 343, we took pains there to stress a
very different proposition:
The States have very wide discretion in the laying of
their taxes. . . . Of course, the States, in the exercise of
their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality,
prohibiting theflexibilityand variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State
. . . is not required to resort to close distinctions or to
maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference
to composition, use or value." Allied Stores, 358 U. S.,
at 526-527.
Two of the other cases cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh,
Sunday Lake Iron and Sioux City Bridge, also rejected
equal protection challenges, see also Charleston Fed,
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182 (1945),
and the case in which the words intentional, systematic,
and undervaluation first appeared, Coulter v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599, 609 (1905), did not explain
where the test came from or why.
It is true that we applied the rule of Coulter to strike
down a tax system in Cumberland Coal, also cited in
Allegheny Pittsburgh. Cumberland Coal, however, reflects
the most serious of the problems with respondents' reading
of Allegheny Pittsburgh. As respondents understand these
two cases, their rule is categorical: A tax scheme violates
the Equal Protection Clause unless it provides for "the
seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment"
or if it results in " 'intentional systematic undervaluation' *
of properties similarly situated by state law, 488 U. S., at
343, 345. This would be so regardless of whether the
inequality or the undervaluation, which may result (as in
Webster County) from further classifications of properties
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within a class, is supported by a rational basis. But not
since the coming of modern equal protection jurisprudence
has this Court supplanted the rational judgments of state
representatives with its own notions of "rough equality,"
"undervaluation," or "fairness." Cumberland Coal, which
fails even to mention rational-basis review, conflicts with
our current caselaw. Allegheny Pittsburgh did not, in my
view, mean to return us to the era when this Court sometimes second-guessed state tax officials. In rejecting today
respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court, as
I understand it, agrees.
This brings me to the third explanation for Allegheny
Pittsburgh, the one offered today by the Court. The Court
proceeds in what purports to be our standard equal protection framework, though it reapplies an old, and to my mind
discredited, gloss to rational-basis review. The Court
concedes that the "Equal Protection Clause does not
demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a
legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate
at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification." Ante, at 13 (citing United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,179 (1980)). This principle
applies, the Court acknowledges, not only to an initial
classification but to all further classifications within a class.
"Nevertheless, this Court's review does require that a
purpose may conceivably or 'may reasonably have been the
purpose and policy* of the relevant governmental decisionmaker," the Court says, ante, at 13 (quoting Allied Stores,
supra, at 528-529), and "Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare
case where the facts precluded any plausible inference that
the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to
achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme,"
ante, at 13. Rather than obeying the "law of a State,
generally applied," the county assessor had administered an
"aberrational enforcement policy," 488 U. S., at 344, n. 4.
See ante, at 13. According to the Court, therefore, the
problem in Allegheny Pittsburgh was that the Webster
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County scheme, though otherwise rational, was irrational
because it was contrary to state law. Any rational bases
underlying the acquisition-value scheme were "implausible*
(or "unreasonable") because they were made so by the Constitution and laws of the State of West Virginia.
That explanation, like petitioner's and respondents', is in
tension with settled case law. Even if the assessor did
violate West Virginia law (and that she did is open to
question, see In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida
Coal Co.,
W. Va.
,
, 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564
(1987)), she would not have violated the Equal Protection
Clause. A violation of state law does not by itself constitute
a violation of the Federal Constitution. We made that clear
in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1944), for instance,
where a candidate for state office complained that members
of the local canvassing board had refused to certify his
name as a nominee to the Secretary of State, thus violating
an Illinois statute. Because the plaintiff had not alleged,
say, that the defendants had meant to discriminate against
him on racial grounds, but merely that they had failed to
comply with a statute, we rejected the argument that the
defendants had thereby violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
"[N]ot every denial of a right conferred by state law
involves a denial of the equal protection of the laws,
even though the denial of the right to one person may
operate to confer it on another. . . . [W]here the official
action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of
the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute,
is not without more a denial of the equal protection of
the laws." 7d,at8.
See also Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310
U. S. 362 (1940).
The Court today promises not to have overruled Snowden,
see ante, at 14, n. 8, but its disclaimer, I think, is in vain.
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For if, as the Court suggests, what made the assessor's
method unreasonable was her supposed violation of state
law, the Court's interpretation of Allegheny Pittsburgh
recasts in this case the proposition that we had earlier
rejected. See Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 268-269;
Cohen, 38 UCLA L. Rev., at 93-94; Ely, Another Spin on
Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 107, 108-109
(1990). In repudiating Snowden, moreover, the Court
threatens settled principles not only of the Fourteenth
Amendment but of the Eleventh. We have held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering
state actors to conform to the dictates of state law.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465
U. S. 89 (1984). After today, however, a plaintiff might be
able invoke federal jurisdiction to have state actors obey
state law, for a claim that the state actor has violated state
law appears to have become a claim that he has violated
the Constitution. See Cohen, supra, at 103; Ely, supra, at
109-110 ("[B]y the Court's logic, all violations of state
law—at least those violations that end (as most do) in the
treatment of some people better than others—are theoretically convertible into violations of the Equal Protection
Clause").
I understand that the Court prefers to distinguish
Allegheny Pittsburgh, but in doing so, I think, the Court has
left our equal protection jurisprudence in disarray. The
analysis appropriate to this case is straightforward. Unless
a classification involves suspect classes or fundamental
rights, judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
demands only a conceivable rational basis for the challenged state distinction. See Fritz, supra; Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U. S. 662,
702-706, and n. 13 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). This
basis need not be one identified by the State itself; in fact,
States need not articulate any reasons at all for their
actions. See ibid. Proposition 13, I believe, satisfies this
standard—but so, for the same reasons, did the scheme
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employed in Webster County. See Brief for Pacific Legal
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 7, 9-10, Brief for National Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae 9-13,
Brief for Respondent 31-32, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, O. T. 1988, Nos.
87-1303, 87-1310; ante, at 9-12. Allegheny Pittsburgh
appears to have survived today's decision. I wonder,
though, about its legacy.
*

*

*

I concur in the judgment of the Court and join Part II-A
of its opinion.
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JUSTICE STEVENS,

dissenting.

Dining the two past decades, California property owners
have enjoyed extraordinary prosperity. As the State's
population has mushroomed, so has the value of its real
estate. Between 1976 and 1986 alone, the total assessed
value of California property subject to property taxation
increased tenfold.1 Simply put, those who invested in
California real estate in the 1970s are among the most
fortunate capitalists in the world.
Proposition 13 has provided these successful investors
with a tremendous windfall and, in doing so, has created
severe inequities in California's property tax scheme.2
These property owners (hereinafter "the Squires'') are
guaranteed that, so long as they retain their property and

^lennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 261,
270, n. 49 (1990). Tor the same period, [property values in] Hawaii rose
approximately 450%; Washington, D.C. approximately 350%; and New
York approximately 125%.* Ibid, (citing 2 U. S. Dept. of Commerce,
Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values 86-111, Table 12 (1987); 2
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values
and Assessment/Sales Price Ratios 42, Table 2 (1977)).
2
Proposition 13 was codified as Article XIIIA of the California
Constitution; for convenience sake, however, I refer to it by its colloquial
name.
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do not improve it, their taxes will not increase more than
2% in any given year. As a direct result of this windfall for
the Squires, later purchasers must pay far more than their
fair share of property taxes.
The specific disparity that prompted petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Proposition 13 is the fact that
her annual property tax bill is almost 5 times as large as
that of her neighbors who own comparable homes: While
her neighbors' 1989 taxes averaged less than $400, petitioner was taxed $1,700. App. 18-20. This disparity is not
unusual under Proposition 13. Indeed, some homeowners
pay 17 times as much in taxes as their neighbors with
comparable property. See id., at 76-77. For vacant land,
the disparities may be as great as 500 to 1. App. to Pet. for
Cert. A7. Moreover, as Proposition 13 controls the taxation
of commercial property as well as residential property, the
regime greatly favors the commercial enterprises of the
Squires, placing new businesses at a substantial disadvantage.
As a result of Proposition 13, the Squires, who own 44%
of the owner-occupied residences, paid only 25% of the total
taxes collected from homeowners in 1989. Report of Senate
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the
California State Senate 33 (1991) (Commission Report).
These disparities are aggravated by § 2 of Proposition 13,
which exempts from reappraisal a property owner's home
and up to $1 million of other real property when that
property is transferred to a child of the owner. This
exemption can be invoked repeatedly and indefinitely,
allowing the Proposition 13 windfall to be passed from
generation to generation. As the California Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue observed:
"The inequity is clear. One young family buys a new
home and is assessed at full market value. Another
young family inherits its home, but pays taxes based on
their parents' date of acquisition even though both
homes are of identical value. Not only does this
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constitutional provision offend a policy of equal tax
treatment for taxpayers in similar situations, it appears to favor the housing needs of children with homeowner-parents over children with non-homeownerparents. With the repeal of the state's gift and inheritance tax in 1982, the rationale for this exemption is
negligible." Commission Report, at 9-10.
The Commission was too generous. To my mind, the
rationale for such disparity is not merely "negligible," it is
nonexistent. Such a law establishes a privilege of a
medieval character: Two families with equal needs and
equal resources are treated differently solely because of
their different heritage.
In my opinion, such disparate treatment of similarly
situated taxpayers is arbitrary and unreasonable. Although
the Court today recognizes these gross inequities, see ante,
at 4, n. 2, its analysis of the justification for those inequities
consists largely of a restatement of the benefits that accrue
to long-time property owners. That a law benefits those it
benefits cannot be an adequate justification for severe
inequalities such as those created by Proposition 13.
I
The standard by which we review equal protection
challenges to state tax regimes is well-established and
properly deferential. "Where taxation is concerned and no
specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is
imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce
reasonable systems of taxation." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973). Thus, as the
Court today notes, the issue in this case is "whether the
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difference in treatment between newer and older owners
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Ante, at 8.3
But deference is not abdication and "rational basis
scrutiny" is still scrutiny. Thus we have, on several recent
occasions, invalidated tax schemes under such a standard
of review. See e. g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989); Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612, 618 (1985);
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869 (1985); cf. Zobel v. Williams,
457 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1982).
Just three Terms ago, this Court unanimously invalidated
Webster Coimty, West Virginia's assessment scheme under
rational-basis scrutiny. Webster County employed a de
facto Proposition 13 assessment system: The Coimty
assessed recently purchased property on the basis of its
purchase price but made only occasional adjustments
(averaging 3-4% per year) to the assessments of other
properties. Just as in this case, *[t]his approach systematically produced dramatic differences in valuation between
. . . recently transferred property and otherwise comparable
surrounding land." Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at 341.
The u*[i]ntentional systematic undervaluation/" id., at
345, found constitutionally infirm in Allegheny Pittsburgh
has been codified in California by Proposition 13. That the
discrimination in Allegheny Pittsburgh was de facto and the
discrimination in this case de jure makes little difference.
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the

'As the Court notes, ante, at 8, petitioner contends that Proposition 13
infringes on the constitutional right to travel and that, accordingly, a
more searching standard of review is appropriate. There is no need to
address that issue because the gross disparities created by Proposition
13 do not pass even the most deferential standard of review. Cf. Hooper
v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612, 618 (1985); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1982).
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State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents" Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350,
352-353 (1918) (emphasis added). If anything, the inequality created by Proposition 13 is constitutionally more
problematic because it is the product of a state-wide policy
rather than the result of an individual assessor's maladministration.
Nor can Allegheny Pittsburgh be distinguished because
West Virginia law established a market-value assessment
regime. Webster County's scheme was constitutionally
invalid not because it was a departure from state law, but
because it involved the relative u 'systematic undervaluation
. . . [of] property in the same class'* (as that class was
defined by state law). Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at
345 (emphasis added). Our decisions have established that
the Equal Protection Clause is offended as much by the
arbitrary delineation of classes of property (as in this case)
as by the arbitrary treatment of properties within the same
class (as in Allegheny Pittsburgh). See Brown-Forman Co.
v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910); Cumberland Coal
Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23,2&-30 (1931). Thus,
if our unanimous holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh was
sound—and I remain convinced that it was—it follows
inexorably that Proposition 13, like Webster County's
assessment scheme, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, in my opinion, state-wide discrimination is far more
invidious than a local aberration that creates a tax disparity.
The States, of course, have broad power to classify
property in their taxing schemes and if the "classification is
neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no
denial of the equal protection of the law." Brown-Forman
Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U: S., at 573. As we stated in Allegheny Pittsburgh, a "State may divide different kinds of
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property into classes and assign to each class a different tax
burden so long as those divisions and burdens are reasonable." 488 U. S., at 344.
Consistent with this standard, the Court has long upheld
tax classes based on the taxpayer's ability to pay, see, e.g.,
Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 101
(1935); the nature (tangible or intangible) of the property,
see, e.g., Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19, 23-24 (1930); the use of the property,
see, e.g., Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114 (1900); and
the status (corporate or individual) of the property owner,
see, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U. S. 356 (1973). Proposition 13 employs none of these
familiar classifications. Instead it classifies property based
on its nominal purchase price: All property purchased for
the same price is taxed the same amount (leaving aside the
2% annual adjustment). That this scheme can be named
(an "acquisition value" system) does not render it any less
arbitrary or unreasonable. Under Proposition 13, a
majestic estate purchased for $150,000 in 1975 (and now
worth more than $2 million) is placed in the same tax class
as a humble cottage purchased today for $150,000. The
only feature those two properties have in common is that
somewhere, sometime a sale contract for each was executed
that contained the price "$150,000." Particularly in an
environment of phenomenal real property appreciation, to
classify property based on its purchase price is "palpably
arbitrary." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S.
522,530(1959).
II
Under contemporary equal protection doctrine, the test of
whether a classification is arbitrary is "whether the
difference in treatment between [earlier and later purchasers] rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Ante,
at 8. The adjectives and adverbs in this standard are more
important than the nouns and verbs.
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A legitimate state interest must encompass the interests
of members of the disadvantaged class and the community
at large as well as the direct interests of the members of
the favored class. It must have a purpose or goal independent of the direct effect of the legislation and one "'that we
may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial
legislature.'" Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U. S. 432,452, n. 4 (1985) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (quoting
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S.
166,180-181 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment)).
That a classification must find justification outside itself
saves judicial review of such classifications from becoming
an exercise in tautological reasoning.
"A State cannot deflect an equal protection challenge by
observing that in light of the statutory classification all
those within the burdened class are similarly situated.
The classification must reflect pre-existing differences;
it cannot create new ones that are supported by only
their own bootstraps. The Equal Protection Clause
requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory
application within the class it establishes/ Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 308 (1966).* Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14, 27 (1985).
If the goal of the discriminatory classification is not
independentfromthe policy itself, "each choice [of classification] will import its own goal, each goal will count as
acceptable, and the requirement of a 'rational' choice-goal
relation will be satisfied by the very making of the choice."
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205, 1247 (1970).
A classification rationally furthers a state interest when
there is some fit between the disparate treatment and the
legislative purpose. As noted above, in the review of tax
statutes we have allowed such fit to be generous and
approximate, recognizing that "rational distinctions may be
made with substantially less than mathematical exacti-
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tude." New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976).
Nonetheless, in some cases the underinclusiveness or the
overinclusiveness of a classification will be so severe that it
cannot be said that the legislative distinction "rationally
furthers" the posited state interest.4 See, e.g., Jimenez v.
Weinberger, All U. S. 628, 636-638 (1974).
The Court's cursory analysis of Proposition 13 pays little
attention to either of these aspects of the controlling
standard of review. The first state interest identified by the
Court is California's "interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability." Ante, at 9 (citing Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926)). It is beyond
question that "inhibiting the] displacement of lower income
families by the forces of gentrification," ante, at 9-10, is a
legitimate state interest; the central issue is whether the
disparate treatment of earlier and later purchasers rationally furthers this goal. Here the Court offers not an
analysis, but only a conclusion: "By permitting older owners
to pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of
comparable property, [Proposition 13] rationally furthers
this interest." Ante, at 10.
I disagree. In my opinion, Proposition 13 sweeps too
broadly and operates too indiscriminately to "rationally
further" the State's interest in neighborhood preservation.
No doubt there are some early purchasers Uving on fixed or
limited incomes who could not afford to pay higher taxes
and still maintain their homes. California has enacted
special legislation to respond to their plight.5 Those
4

"Herod, ordering the death of all male children born on a particular
day because one of them would some day bring about his downfall,
employed such a[n overinclusive] classification!, as did t]he wartime
treatment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry [which imposed]
burdens upon a large class of individuals because some of them were
believed to be disloyal." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 351 (1949).
8
As pointed out in the Commission Report, California has addressed
this specific problem with specific legislation. The State has established
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concerns cannot provide an adequate justification for
Proposition 13. A state-wide, across-the-board tax windfall
for all property owners and their descendants is no more a
"rational" means for protecting this small subgroup than a
blanket tax exemption for all taxpayers named Smith would
be a rational means to protect a particular taxpayer named
Smith who demonstrated difficulty paying her tax bill.
Even within densely populated Los Angeles County,
residential property comprises less than half of the market
value of the property tax roll. App. 45. It cannot be said
that the legitimate state interest in preserving neighborhood character is "rationally furthered" by tax benefits for
owners of commercial, industrial, vacant, and other nonresidential properties.6 It is just short of absurd to conclude
that the legitimate state interest in protecting a relatively
small number of economically vulnerable families is
"rationally furthered" by a tax windfall for all 9,787,887
property owners7 in California.

two programs:
"Senior Citizens Property Tax Assistance. Provides refunds of up to
ninety-six percent of property taxes to low income homeowners over age
62.
"Senior Citizens Property Tax Postponement. Allows senior citizens with
incomes under $20,000 to postpone all or part of the taxes on their homes
until an ownership change occurs.* Commission Report 23.
6
The Courts rationale for upholding Proposition 13 does not even
arguably apply to vacant property. That, as the Court recognizes,
Proposition 13 discourages changes of ownership means that the law
creates an impediment to the transfer and development of such property
no matter now socially desirable its improvement might be. It is equally
plain that the competitive advantage enjoyed by the Squires who own
commercial property is wholly unjustified. There is no rational state
interest in providing those entrepreneurs with a special privilege that
tends to discourage otherwise desirable transfers of income-producing
property. In a free economy, the entry of new competitors should be
encouraged, not arbitrarily hampered by unfavorable tax treatment.
7
Brief for California Assessors' Association as Amicus Curiae 2.
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The Court's conclusion is unsound not only because of the
lack of numerical fit between the posited state interest and
Proposition 13's inequities but also because of the lack of
logical fit between ends and means. Although the State
may have a valid interest in preserving some neighborhoods,8 Proposition 13 not only "inhibits the] displacement" of settled families, it also inhibits the transfer of
unimproved land, abandoned buildings, and substandard
uses. Thus, contrary to the Court's suggestion, Proposition
13 is not like a zoning system. A zoning system functions
by recognizing different uses of property and treating those
different uses differently. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U. S., at 388-390. Proposition 13 treats all property
alike, giving all owners tax breaks, and discouraging the
transfer or improvement of all property—the developed and
the dilapidated, the neighborly and the nuisance.
In short, although I agree with the Court that "neighborhood preservation" is a legitimate state interest, I cannot
agree that a tax windfall for all persons who purchased
property before 1978 rationally furthers that interest. To
my mind, Proposition 13 is too blunt a tool to accomplish
such a specialized goal. The severe inequalities created by
Proposition 13 cannot be justified by such an interest.9

8

The ambiguous character of this interest is illustrated by the options
faced by a married couple that owns a three- or four-bedroom home that
suited their family needs while their children lived at home. After the
children have moved out, increased taxes and maintenance expenses
would—absent Proposition 13—tend to motivate the sale of the home to
a younger family needing a home of that size, or perhaps the rental of a
room or two to generate the income necessary to pay taxes. Proposition
13, however, subsidizes the wasteful retention of unused housing
capacity, making the sale of the home unwise and the rental of the extra
space unnecessary.
•Respondent contends that the inequities created by Proposition 13 are
justified by the State's interest in protecting property owners from
taxation on unrealized appreciation. The California Supreme Court
relied on a similar state interest. See Amador Valley Joint Union High
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The second state interest identified by the Court is the
"reliance interests" of the earlier purchasers. Here I find
the Court's reasoning difficult to follow. Although the
protection of reasonable reliance interests is a legitimate
governmental purpose, see Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S.
728, 746 (1984), this case does not implicate such interests.
A reliance interest is created when an individual justifiably
acts under the assumption that an existing legal condition
will persist; thus reliance interests are most often implicated when the government provides some benefit and then
acts to eliminate the benefit. See, e.g., New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976). In this case, those who
purchased property before Proposition 13 was enacted
received no assurances that assessments would only
increase at a limited rate; indeed, to the contrary, many
purchased property in the hope that property values (and
assessments) would appreciate substantially and quickly.
It cannot be said, therefore, that the earlier purchasers of
property somehow have a reliance interest in limited tax
increases.
Perhaps what the Court means is that post-Proposition
13 purchasers have less reliance interests than pre-Proposition 13 purchasers. The Court reasons that the State may
tax earlier and later purchasers differently because
"an existing owner rationally may be thought to have
vested expectations in his property or home that are

School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 236-238, 583
P. 2d 1281, 1309-1311 (1978). This argument is closely related to the
Court's reasoning concerning "neighborhood preservation*; respondent
claims the State has an interest in preventing the situation in which
"skyrocketing real estate prices . . . drivfe] property taxes beyond some
taxpayers* ability to pay." Brief for Respondent 19. As demonstrated
above, whatever the connection between acquisition price and "ability to
pay,* a blanket tax windfall for all early purchasers of property (and
their descendants) is simply too overinclusive to "rationally further* the
State's posited interest in protecting vulnerable taxpayers.
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more deserving of protection than the anticipatory
expectations of a new owner at the point of purchase.
A new owner has full information about the scope of
future tax liability before acquiring the property, and
if he thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he
can decide not to complete the purchase at all. By
contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with his
purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to
buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high." Ante,
at 10.10
This simply restates the effects of Proposition 13. A preProposition 13 owner has "vested expectations" in reduced
taxes only because Proposition 13 gave her such expectations; a later purchaser has no such expectations because
Proposition 13 does not provide her such expectations. But
the same can be said of any arbitrary protection for an
existing class of taxpayers. Consider a law that establishes
that homes with even street numbers would be taxed at
twice the rate of homes with odd street numbers. It is
certainly true that the even-numbered homeowners could
not decide to "unpurchase" their homes and that those
considering buying an even-numbered home would know
that it came with an extra tax burden, but certainly that
would not justify the arbitrary imposition of disparate tax
burdens based on house numbers. So it is in this case.
Proposition 13 provides a benefit for earlier purchasers and
imposes a burden on later purchasers. To say that the later
purchasers know what they are getting into does not
answer the critical question: Is it reasonable and constitutional to tax early purchasers less than late purchasers

10

The Court's sympathetic reference to "existing ownertsl already
saddled" with their property should not obscure the fact that these early
purchasers have already seen their property increase in value more than
tenfold.
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when at the time of taxation their properties are comparable? This question the Court does not answer.
Distilled to its essence, the Court seems to be saying that
earlier purchasers can benefit under Proposition 13 because
earlier purchasers benefit under Proposition 13. If, however, a law creates a disparity, the State's interest preserving
that disparity cannot be a "legitimate state interest"
justifying that inequity. As noted above, a statute's
disparate treatment must be justified by a purpose distinct
from the very effects created by that statute. Thus, I
disagree with the Court that the severe inequities wrought
by Proposition 13 can be justified by what the Court calls
the "reliance interests" of those who benefit from that
scheme.11
In my opinion, it is irrational to treat similarly situated
persons differently on the basis of the date they joined the
class of property owners. Until today, I would have thought
this proposition far from controversial. In Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55 (1982), we ruled that Alaska's program
of distributing cash dividends on the basis of the recipient's
years of residency in the State violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court wrote:
"If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on length of residence, what would
preclude varying university tuition on a sliding scale
based on years of residence—or even limiting access of

11

Respondent, drawing on the analysis of the California Supreme
Court, contends that the inequities created by Proposition 13 are also
justified by the State's interest in "permitting the taxpayer to make more
careful and accurate predictions of future tax liability.* Amador Valley,
22 Cal.3d, at 239, 583 P. 2d, at 1312. This analysis suffers from the
same infirmity as the Court's "reliance* analysis. I agree that Proposition 13 permits greater predictability of tax liability; the relevant
question, however, is whether the inequities between earlier and later
purchasers created by Proposition 13 can be justified by something other
than the benefit to the early purchasers. I do not believe that they can.
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finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for
civil service jobs, or for government contracts by length
of domicile? Could states impose different taxes based
on length of residence? Alaska's reasoning could open
the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency. It
would permit the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes. Such a result
would be clearly impermissible." Id., at 64 (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, the Court invalidated on equal protection
grounds New Mexico's policy of providing a permanent tax
exemption for Vietnam veterans who had been state
residents before May 8, 1976, but not to more recent
arrivals. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S.
612 (1985). The Court expressly rejected the State's claim
that it had a legitimate interest in providing special
rewards to veterans who lived in the State before 1976 and
concluded that *[n]either the Equal Protection Clause, nor
this Court's precedents, permit the State to prefer established resident veterans over newcomers in the retroactive
apportionment of an economic benefit." Id, at 623.
As these decisions demonstrate, the selective provision of
benefits based on the timing of one's membership in a class
(whether that class be the class of residents or the class of
property owners) is rarely a "legitimate state interest."
Similarly situated neighbors have an equal right to share
in the benefits of local government. It would obviously be
unconstitutional to provide one with more or better fire or
police protection than the other; it is just as plainly
unconstitutional to require one to payfivetimes as much in
property taxes as the other for the same government
services. In my opinion, the severe inequalities created by
Proposition 13 are arbitrary and unreasonable and do not
rationally further a legitimate state interest.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., Appellee,
v.
TENNESSEE
STATE BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION and Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission, Appellants.
Supreme Court of Tennessee,
at Nashville.
Oct. 6, 1986.

Operator of interstate door-to-door
package delivery service challenged ad valorem taxation of its personal property.
The Equity Court, Davidson County, Irvin
H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor, dismissed,
and Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, Cooper, J., held that: (1) operator of interstate door-to-door package
delivery service, which used its own integrated air-ground transportation system of
aircraft and delivery vans, was an "express
company" subject to ad valorem taxation
under statute based on an assessment of
55% of value of its personal property, and
(2) assessing property of operator of package facility service at 55% of its value,
while assessing property of railroads at
industrial and commercial rate of 30% of
value, did not violate equal protection
clause or State Constitution, where original
state assessment of railroads at 55% of
value of their properties had been preempted by Federal Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act.
Court of Appeals reversed.

1. Taxation *»142
Operator of interstate door-to-door
package delivery service, which used its
own integrated air-ground transportation
system of aircraft and delivery vans, was
an "express company" within classification
of "public utility" subject to ad valorem
taxation under statute based on an assess-

ment of 55% of value of its personal property. T.C.A. § 67-5-50M8XF).
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Constitutional Law 4=229(3)
Taxation 4=42(2)
Assessing property of operator of interstate door-to-door package facility service at 55% of its value for ad valorem
taxation purposes, while assessing property of railroads at industrial and commercial
rate of 30% of value, did not violate equal
protection clause or State Constitution,
where original state assessment of railroads at 55% of value of their properties
had been preempted by Federal Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act.
T.C.A. § 67-5-501; Revised Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 11503;
Const. Art. 2, § 28; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
14.
Joe C. Peel, Ass't Atty. Gen., WJ. Michael Cody, Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellants.
Waring Cox, Saul C. Belz and Earl J.
Achwarz, Memphis, for appellee.
OPINION
COOPER, Justice.
The application for permission to appeal
was granted to review the holding of the
Court of Appeals that Federal Express Corporation was not a "public utility" within
the definition set forth in T.C.A. § 67-5501(8), and the concomittant holding that
personal property of Federal Express was
to be assessed at the 30% commercial and
industrial rate rather than the 55% public
utility rate.
In 1979, the tax period in question, Federal operated an interstate door-to-door
package delivery service, mainly using its
own integrated air-ground transportation
system of some 80 to 90 aircraft and approximately 1,500 delivery vans. Federal's
aircraft were operated over a hub-andspoke pattern with its facilities at the Memphis International Airport as the hub. Fed-
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era! would pick up documents and packages, weighing no more than 70 pounds,
from customers in various cities and transport them by air to Memphis. In Memphis,
the documents and packages were sorted
by destination, reloaded into the aircraft,
flown to their destination cities by early
morning, and were delivered by Federal's
couriers if the consignee was within the air
terminal zone. Under regulations in effect
at the time, Federal could not pickup or
deliver outside the air terminal zone. If
package pickups and deliveries were required beyond the zone, the packages were
either received from or tendered to an ICC
certificated motor carrier.
Beginning in 1974, the Shelby County
Tax Assessor assessed Federal Express's
personal property as public utility property.
In challenging the 1979 tax assessment,
Federal initially questioned only the rate of
depreciation applied to its fleet of 727 aircraft. The public utility classification issue
evolved as the case progressed through the
administrative review process and the lower courts. Most of the controversy centered on whether Federal Express, operating its aircraft under an All Cargo Certificate, could be considered to be a "commercial air carrier holding a certificate of convenience and necessity," which would bring
it within the definition of a public utility.
See § 67-&-50K8XM). The assessor also
argued that Federal is an "express company" and thus is within the classification of
a public utility set forth in T.C.A. § 67-550K8KF).
The Court of Appeals concluded that
Federal's operation did not come within
either classification, and that its property
was not subject to being assessed at the
public utility rate. We disagree. As we
view the record, Federal Express's operation was that of an "express company"
and, as such, was subject to an ad valorem
tax based on an assessment of 55% of the
value of its personal property.
Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee
Constitution, as amended in 1973, specifically authorized classification of property
for ad valorem tax purposes according to

use. General American Transportation
Corporation v. Tennessee State Board of
Equalization, 536 S.W.2d 212 (Tenn.1976).
It expressly authorized the classification of
tangible personal property into three classifications: (1) public utility property to be
assessed at 55% of its value; (2) industrial
and commercial property to be assessed at
30% of its value and (3) all other tangible
personal property to be assessed at 5% of
its value. Article II, Section 28 of the
Constitution of Tennessee. The definition
of property in each class was left to be
determined by the legislature.
For the tax year 1979, T.C.A. § 67-601,
now § 67-5-501, provided, in pertinent
part, that:
Definitions —For purposes of classification of property:
(8) "Public utility property" is hereby defined to include all property of every
kind, whether owned or leased, and use
or held for use, directly or indirectly in
the operation of a public utility, which
shall include but not necessarily be limited to the following business entities,
whether corporate or otherwise:
(F) Express companies:
"The primary purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect, if
possible, to the intention of purpose of the
legislature as expressed in the statute."
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. King, 678
S.W.2d 19 (Tenn.1984). Legislative intent
is derived from construing the statute in its
entirety, and it should be assumed the legislature used each word purposefully and
that those words convey some intent and
have a meaning and a purpose. Tennessee
Growers, Inc. v. King, 682 S.W.2d 203, 205
(Tenn.1984). "While it is well settled that
revenue statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer and strictly
construed against the taxing authority [citation omitted], it is equally clear that the
plain import of the language of the act is to
be given effect [citation omitted], and that
the legislative intent to tax must not be
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thwarted by the strict construction rule."
International
Harvester Company v.
Carr, 225 Tenn. 244, 259-260, 466 S.W.2d
207, 214 (1971) quoted with approval in
Oliver v. King, 612 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tenn.
1981).
The legislature's purpose in promulgating T.C.A. § 67-5-501(8) was to define
"public utility property" by its use. The
precise issue is whether Federal Express's
use of its property is that of an "express
company," a term which is not specifically
defined in the statute.
Federal Express asserted in the Court of
Appeals that it was not an "express company" because it collects and ships packages
from the public via modes of transportation
which it owns. According to Federal Express "[t]he term 'express company' is a
term of art which dates to the latter part of
the 19th Century. It was typically applied
to a shipper who collected packages from
the public and shipped those packages to
the destination city via modes of transportation which it did not own." The cases
relied upon in support of this contention do
not define the term "express company;"
they merely describe the operations of the
particular express company that was involved in that litigation.
In American Railway Express Co. v.
Wright, 128 Miss. 593, 91 So. 342 (1922) the
Mississippi Supreme Court determined that
the following was "a very good definition
of an express company:"
A firm or corporation (usually a corporation) engaged in the business of transporting parcels or other moveable property, in the capacity of common carriers,
and especially undertaking the safe carriage and speedy delivery of small but
valuable packages of goods and money.
91 So. at pp. 343-344 See Alsop v. Southern Express Co., 104 N.C. 278, 10 S.E.
297 (1899).
"An express company is a common carrier." Express Company v. Johnson, 92
Tenn. 326, 21 S.W. 666 (1893); Railway
Express Company v. Kessler, 189 Va. 301,
52 S.E.2d 102 (1949). "A common carrier is
one who, by virtue of his calling under-

takes for compensation to transport personal property from one place to another
for all such as may choose to employ him;
and everyone who undertakes to carry for
compensation the goods of all people indifferently, is as to liability, to be deemed a
common carrier." Jackson Architectural
Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y. 34, 52
N.E. 665 (1899) quoted with approval by
Greyhound Corporation v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 360 Mich. 578,
104 N.W.2d 395 (Mich.1960). "It is well
known and understood that its, [an express
company's], business is the transmission
and delivery of packages, for which it receives a compensation." American Railway Express Co. v. Wright, supra, 91 So.
at 343-344.
[1] In our opinion the activities of Federal Express comes within the ordinary and
plain meaning of the term "express company." While it is true that 19th century
express companies transported packages
via railroads and steamships owned by others, see Memphis & Little Rock Railway
Co. v. Southern Express Co., 117 U.S. 1, 6
S.Ct. 542, 628, 29 L.Ed. 791 (1886), we have
been unable to find any case which has
defined express companies in such terms.
There seems to be no policy reason to differentiate between companies which pick
up, transport, and deliver small packages
via modes of transportation owned by others and companies which perform this service primarily using modes of transportation which that company owns. Both types
of companies are common carriers owing
similar duties to the general public. "All
common carriers are public utilities, but all
public utilities are not common carriers."
Aberdeen Cable TV Service, Inc. v. City of
Aberdeen, 176 N.W. 738 (S.D.1970). Thus
a company transporting packages on an
expedited basis as a common carrier must
be deemed to be an express company which
falls within the definition of a "public utility" for purposes of T.C.A. § 67-5-501.
[2] Federal Express also argues that to
assess its property for ad valorem tax purposes at 55% of its value, while assessing
the property of railroads at the industrial
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and commercial rate of 30% of value, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and Article II,
Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution,
which requires "the ratio of assessment to
value of property in each class or subclass
shall be equal and uniform throughout the
state. The legislature classified railroads
as public utilities and assessed them for ad
valorem tax purposes at 55% of the value
of their properties. However, the Congress of the United States, by Section 306
of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. § 11503
("4-R Act"), preempted the state classification of railroads and provided that they
should be taxed as industrial and commercial property are taxed. The Act, having
as its purpose the revitalization of railroads, affected only that business. Thus
leaving in effect the state classification of
other businesses as public utilities. The
assessment of each of the businesses
classed as public utilities is at the same
ratio to value as the assessment of Federal
Express property; consequently, we find
no violation of either Article II, Section 28
of the Tennessee Constitution or the Equal
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed. The judgment of the Chancery
Court dismissing the cause is affirmed.
Costs are adjudged against Federal Express Corporation and its surety.
BROCK, CJ., and FONES, HARBISON,
and DROWOTA, JJ., concur.
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Teresa Ann LENTZ, Appellee,
v.
Gary Benton LENTZ, Appellant
Supreme Court of Tennessee,
at Knoxville.
Oct. 6, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 10,1986.
In divorce and custody action, the
Chancery Court, Anderson County, Allen
Kidwell, Chancellor, granted custody of
two oldest children to former husband and
of youngest child to former wife. Former
husband appealed. The Supreme Court,
Cooper, J., held that: (1) grant of custody
of youngest child to former wife was in
that child's best interest, and (2) order that
former wife pay $25 per week in support
was reasonable under circumstances.
Affirmed.
1. Parent and Child *=>2(3.1)
While parentage of child is major, and
often determinative, factor in deciding who
shall have custody of that child, overriding
issue is what is in child's best interest.
2. Divorce *»298(4)
Grant of custody in divorce action to
former wife, who was natural mother and
had had custody since birth, was in child's
best interests, where former husband had
demanded blood-grouping test to determine
if he were father of child, despite former
wife's admission that child was product of
adulterous affair with her pastor.
3. Divorce *=>308
Determination that former wife should
contribute $25 per week toward support of
two children in former husband's custody
was reasonable under circumstances, in
view of parties' relative earning capacity
and fact that former wife had responsibility of supporting third child.
A. Thomas Monceret, William C. Cremins, Knoxville, for appellant.

